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This thesis concerns the development of wide area special protection and emergency 
control scheme that can provide effective countermeasures against long term voltage 
instability induced cascading events and blackouts in power system. Most past cascaded 
blackouts are caused by unexpected backup relay operations due to low voltage or 
overload state in the post stage of N-1 (or N-k) contingency. If such state could be sensed 
and adjusted appropriately before those relay actions, the system stability might be 
sustained. So it is of great significance to develop a suitable protection scheme to identify 
and adjust those emergency states in advance before a cascaded blackout. 
In order to identify the diverse emergency states in the post fault stage, the distributed 
distance relays with upgraded settings, which take the capability limits into account, will 
be utilized in this thesis. Moreover, according to the variations of power system operation, 
an overload prediction algorithm based on impedance sensitivity is proposed here to 
distinguish the emergency states from a remote fault. These methods combined together, 
which can give a fast identification of the emergency states and a clear mapping of 
critical relays in the post fault stage. 
For the purpose of adjusting the identified emergency states timely and preventing the 
unexpected relay operations, a fast optimal control algorithm is proposed here to find the 
most effective control locations and reasonable control amount, which is based on 
sensitivity analysis and the extent of specific emergency states. At the same time, load 
restoration dynamics is taken into account to compensate sensitivity calculation and 
correct the control algorithm. Such control methods provides a direct and simple way 
from problems to solutions, which is suitable for real time implementation. 
On the other hand, with the aim of executing the control methods timely and 
implementing the whole protection strategy suitably, multi-agent system (MAS) with 
hierarchical structure is designed here. The distributed relays and controllers work as 
device agents in the lowest level of MAS. And the agents in higher levels will be used to 
build an effective cooperation environment. Therefore, those distributed agents can be 
systematically organized by MAS to effectively achieve the global goal on preventing the 





Moreover, in order to handle some unexpected failures of control methods’ execution 
or some unexpected disturbances when the power system is already operated in an 
emergency situation, the process control strategy is designed in this thesis to manage the 
execution progress of whole protection strategy in real time. If there is an unexpected 
situation emerging, the specific agents in higher level will be activated to solve this 
problem. Such methods improve the reliability of the proposed protection strategy to 
cope with more complex emergency situations than planned.  
Finally, in order to realize and testify the proposed protection strategy in this thesis, a 
real time simulation platform based on Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) and 
LabVIEW is built. In this platform, the cases of cascaded blackouts are simulated on the 
test system simplified from the East Denmark power system. For the MAS based control 
system, the distributed power system agents are set up in RTDS, while the agents in 
higher level are designed by LabVIEW toolkits. The case studies and simulation results 
demonstrate the effectiveness of real time application of the proposed MAS based special 







Denne afhandling omhandler udviklingen af en omfattende beskyttelse og 
kontrolordning, der kan levere effektive modforanstaltninger mod længerevarende 
ustabilitet af netspændingen, der fremtvinger mørklægninger i elsystemet. De fleste 
tidligere mørklægninger er forårsaget af uventede backup relæoperationer på grund af lav 
spænding eller uforudsete overbelastninger i tidligere tilstande af N-1 (eller N-k). Hvis en 
sådan tilstand vil kunne detekteres og justeres hensigtsmæssigt inden disse 
relæoperationer, kan systemets stabilitet opretholdes. Så det er af stor betydning for at 
udvikle en passende beskyttelsesordning at identificere og tilpasse disse nødsituationer på 
forhånd, før en mørklægning. 
For at identificere de forskellige nødsituationer i de tidligere fejltilstande vil de 
distribuerede afstandsrelæer med opgraderede indstillinger, som tager højde for 
kapacitetsbegrænsninger benyttes i denne afhandling. På grund af variationer af 
elsystemet er en overbelastningsestimeringsalgoritme baseret på impedansfølsomhed 
udviklet for at skelne fejltilstande fra en ekstern fejl. Disse metoder kombineret kan give 
en hurtig identifikation af undtagelsestilstande og en klar kortlægning af de kritiske 
relæer i de tidligere fejltilstande. 
Med henblik på at justere de identificerede nødsituationstilstande rettidig og forhindre 
uventede relæoperationer er en hurtigt optimal kontrolalgoritme foreslået for at finde de 
mest effektive kontrollokationer og rimelige kontrolomfang, som er baseret på 
sensitivitetsanalyse og omfanget af specifikke nødstilstande. Samtidig er dynamikken i 
genetableringsbelastningen medtaget for at kompensere for følsomhedsberegninger og 
korrektioner i styringsalgoritmen. Sådanne metoder giver en direkte og enkel måde fra 
problemer til løsninger, der er egnet til tidstro implementering. 
På den anden side, med det formål at udføre kontrolmetoderne rettidigt og 
gennemføre hele strategien for beskyttelsen er et multi-agent system (MAS) med 
hierarkisk struktur designet. De distribuerede relæer og styringer arbejder som 
enhedsagenter i laveste niveau af MAS. Agenter i højere niveauer, vil bruges til at bygge 
et effektivt interaktionsmiljø. Derfor kan de distribuerede agenter, systematisk 
organiseret af MAS, effektivt nå det globale mål om forebyggelse af fejltilstande og 





Desuden, for at håndtere nogle uventede fejl pga. kontrolmetodernes udførelse eller 
uventede forstyrrelser, når elsystemet bringes i en nødssituation, er kontrolstrategien i 
denne afhandling at styre udførelsen i real tid. Hvis en uventet situation opstår, vil 
agenterne i på det højere niveau aktiveres for at løse problemet. Sådanne metoder 
forbedrer pålideligheden af den foreslåede beskyttelsesstrategi til at håndtere mere 
komplekse nødsituationer end planlagt. 
Endelig, for at realisere og teste den foreslåede beskyttelsesstrategi i denne afhandling, 
er en realtidsplatform baseret på Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) og LabVIEW 
bygget. I denne platform, er de tilfælde af dominoeffekter simuleret på testsystemet; dog 
begrænset til  øst Danmark. For de MAS baserede styresystemer, er de distribuerede 
systemagenter oprettet i RTDS, mens agenter på højere niveauer er designet af LabVIEW 
toolkits. Casestudierne og simuleringsresultaterne demonstrerer effektiviteten af tidstro 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This chapter firstly presents the background and the motivations of the thesis. 
Secondly, problem statement and project objectives are briefly introduced. The scopes 
and limitations of this thesis are described in the third place. And finally, the outline of 
this thesis is presented. 
1.1 Project background and motivations 
In 1831, Michael Faraday discovered electromagnetic induction, which ushered a 
brand new era of electrical technology. And the first complete electric power system, 
which included a generator, cable, fuse, meter, and loads, was established by Thomas 
Edison in 1882 [1] [2].  Up to now, in order to meet the requirements of human society’s 
development, the power system becomes a wide area distributed and fast dynamic 
responded system with a complex structure and numbers of components. Monitoring and 
maintenance over such a big system are indeed challenging problems. 
Also, due to the requirements for the faster industrial and economic development, 
today’s power system is operated closer to planed limits of safe operation [3]. 
Consequently, in order to insure a secure and reliable delivery of power energy, the 
traditional protective relay system, which is built locally and dispersedly to protect the 
power system components from faults, is designed with faster reaction speed, better 
selectivity, higher sensibility and reliability [4]. However, from the view point of whole 
system, the stability and integrity of today’s power system in the post contingency stage 
become urgent problems, even though the power systems are designed with consideration 
of N-1 contingency sometimes [5]. 
In the post contingency stage, the power system becomes more vulnerable and may 
enter into an emergency operation situation. If this emergency situation cannot be timely 
adjusted, any small disturbance caused by an unexpected control will induce further 
deterioration of system operation condition [6]. When the critical relays are triggered by 
this worsen operation condition, the system will split up and collapse inevitably, which is 





but also makes a great influence on human’s daily life. There were many cascaded 
blackouts occurred in the past, such as the western U.S. blackout in 1996, the Brazil 
blackout in 1999, the North America blackout in 2003, the southern Sweden and eastern 
Denmark blackout in 2003, Europe blackout in 2006 and England blackout in 2009, etc 
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Fig. 1.1 The progress of cascading events and related protective controls 
So far, many research efforts have been taken to analyze the past blackouts and 
search the solutions against cascading events. The main concerns are focused on two 
aspects. One is advanced communication tools for wide area information monitoring, and 
the other is improved protective control algorithms for analyzing and resolving the 
complex situations in cascading events. 
With the development of communication and computer technology, phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) based wide area measurement system (WAMS) is proposed 
and developed with great significance, which can support a real time wide area 
monitoring on the varying system operation conditions [2]. Based on WAMS, the hidden 
failures and unexpected operations of relays and controls can be identified and traced 
more easily. Meanwhile, many intelligent algorithms are developed to improve the 
behaviors of traditional protections and controls against cascading events, such as fuzzy 
logic, expert system, artificial neural network, multi-agent system and etc [11]-[14]. 





smarter functions and flexible structures, e.g. the different control schemes (protection 
control, emergency control, recovery control and black start control) are designed 
suitably for diverse stages during the whole progress of cascading events in Fig. 1.1 [15].  
1.2 Statement of the problems and project objectives 
Under the circumstance described in the previous section, it would have been very 
valuable to have an advanced protection and control system against cascading events in 
power system. Such system can real time monitor and identify the emergency operation 
condition during cascading events, and timely supply a suitable control solution to adjust 
the related emergency operation condition. Thereby, the unexpected relay operations and 
cascading events can be prevented timely and successfully. 
In order to achieve the overall purpose of this PhD project, several sub objectives are 
defined: 
 To improve the traditional distance relay functions during voltage instability 
induced cascading events. 
 To develop methods for emergency states detection and identification of 
overloaded states from Normal state and faulty state. 
 To develop methods for fast analyzing the system wide operation state, while 
defining the relationships between vulnerable relays and other power system 
components under the emergency operation states. 
 To develop the special protection and emergency control strategies for timely 
adjusting the identified emergency states. 
 To build a real time hybrid simulation platform for the simulation of cascading 
events and the implementation of proposed special protection and emergency 
control scheme. 
 To improve proposed protection and control scheme based on multi-agent 
system and process control. 
1.3 Scopes and limitations 





 The long term voltage instability induced cascading events are mainly 
concerned; the angle instability, frequency instability and short term voltage 
instability have not been considered. 
 As for the design of traditional relay system, the Zone 3 distance relay is 
mainly considered, Zone 1, Zone 2 distance relay and other types of protective 
relay are not the focus in this thesis. 
 The sensitivity analysis based control strategy is fast enough but not that 
accurate when the specific system operation point cannot be reliably obtained 
or the operation state of power system is close to point of voltage collapse. 
 Inverse tap changer control, load shedding, generator reschedule are mainly 
adopted as special protection and control strategies, other strategies together 
with black start control schemes in Fig. 1.1 are not considered in this thesis. 
 Power system models are mainly developed in RTDS. Many standard models 
and functions in RTDS library have been used, e.g. distance relay, LTC and etc. 
Multi-agent based control system are mainly developed in LabVIEW based 
platform, also many standard functions have been used, e.g. data acquisition 
and analysis. 
 The communication of power system is assumed to be well developed in this 
thesis, the communication network and time day is less discussed. 
1.4 Thesis organization 
This PhD thesis is categorized into seven chapters and organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The background, motivations, main objectives and limitations of this PhD project are 
briefly introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter gives a literature review of related project objectives, which includes 
power system voltage stability, some past blackouts in power system, the behaviors of 
traditional protective relays in blackouts, basic processes of cascading events, 





Chapter 3 Emergency state detection for overloading situations 
Power system modeling is presented firstly in this chapter. Then the local detection of 
emergency states based on improved relay functions is introduced. Also, the fundamental 
identification of emergency states and basic processes during the progress of cascading 
events are described at first glance. 
Chapter 4 Sensitivity analysis for emergency states 
The sensitivity analysis based emergency state analysis method is proposed in this 
chapter. The sensitivity analysis is based on impedance principle, and then the system 
wide vulnerable relays and sensitive controllers can be grouped and mapped according to 
sensitivities and their performance indexes. Moreover, the emergency states caused by 
line outage and unexpected LTC operations can also be predicted and identified based on 
system wide sensitivity information. 
Chapter 5 Special protection and emergency control scheme design for 
emergency state prevention 
The proposed special protection and emergency control scheme (SPECS) is designed 
and presented in this chapter. As for the identified emergency states, the corresponding 
emergency control strategies will be defined to adjust those emergency states. The 
priorities of control strategies are defined by integrated sensitivity and the related state 
signals. 
Chapter 6 Implementation and improvement of SPECS 
In this chapter, MAS technology will be introduced firstly. Then implementation of 
SPECS based on MAS is presented. A real time hybrid simulation platform based on 
RTDS and LabVIEW is introduced to simulate the cascading events in power system and 
realize the MAS based SPECS. Moreover, the process control concept is adopted to 
improve the SPECS’s capability in dealing with possible control failures. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion and perspective 
The main contributions and conclusions of this thesis are given in this chapter. The 
topics of future work are also discussed. 
List of publications 






The detailed models and parameters of test system are listed in the appendix section, 
together with the pictures of control algorithms and simulation platform. 





Chapter 2  
Literature review 
This chapter details the long term voltage instability induced cascaded blackouts in 
the history. The definitions related to power system stability are presented firstly. And 
then the classic blackouts caused by voltage instability are briefly introduced. The 
behaviors of traditional protection relays in blackouts are highlighted and analyzed 
thirdly. And finally, basic ideas and solutions for preventing this kind of cascaded 
blackouts are presented in brief. 
2.1 Definitions of power system stability 
The classic definition of power system stability is proposed and given by 
IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on Stability Terms and Definitions in 2004 [17], which is 
widely accepted in the field of power system research and used in the following chapters: 
“Power system stability is the ability of an electric power system, for a given initial 
operating condition, to regain a state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a 
physical disturbance, with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire 
system remains intact.” 
Power system stability
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Based on the definition, power system stability is essentially a single problem [1]. 
However, when a complex power system experiences a physical disturbance, the single 
problem will generate many derivatives, which could be combined with each other and 
turn intro complex problems. Due to different causes, aims and manifestation patterns, 
the classic categories of power system stability can be depicted in Fig. 2.1. 
It can be seen from Fig. 2.1, the manifestation patterns of stability, which are 
expressed by different main system variables, are different due to the different driving 
forces. If the aims to maintain the equilibrium between opposing forces cannot be 
achieved, the instability will be induced [9]. The unbalance between synchronizing 
torque and damping torque, which is mainly at generator side, will induce rotor angle 
instability problems. The unbalance between transferring capability and load demand, 
which is mainly initiated from load side, will induce voltage instability problems. And 
the unbalance between active powers of generation and load, which could be initiated 
from generator side or load side, will induce frequency instability problems. 
Also, due to the sizes of disturbances and response speeds of system components, the 
three main categories can be divided into several subcategories, as shown in Fig. 2.1. 
For the large disturbance stability analysis, the detailed system model and its 
performance under a set of specified disturbances are required to be assessed. For the 
research and analysis on small disturbance stability, the linearized model of system 
around a system operation point is sufficient [16]. Normally, the large disturbance rotor 
angle stability is named transient stability, which is used to distinguish it from “steady 
state stability”. 
When the disturbances occur in the power system, the electromechanical dynamics is 
mainly referred with rotor angle stability in typically several seconds. Also the dynamical 
characteristics of excitation systems, turbine and governor system is in the same time 
scale. So the related stability is regarded as short term stability. 
In the post disturbance stage, when the system survived short term dynamics induced 
oscillation in several seconds, the system would experience long term dynamics, such as 
behaviors of transformer tap changers, generator limiters, boilers, etc., which is more 





2.1.1 Definition of voltage instability 
In this paper, the voltage stability problems will be mainly focused. The definition of 
voltage instability is proposed and discussed in Thierry Van Cutsem and Costas 
Vournas’s book in 1998 [16]: 
“Voltage instability stems from the attempt of load dynamics to restore power 
consumption beyond the capability of the combined transmission and generation system.” 
Based on this definition, the key factors of voltage instability can be inferred: 
 Load dynamics is the main driving force of voltage instability, which breaks 
the balance between load and combined transmission and generation system. 
 The unbalance between load consumption and combined transmission and 
generation system is the total effect made by both of them. 
 The transmission system has a limited capability to support the power 
transferring from generation to load consumption.  
 The generation system also has a limited capability to supply the power 
demand at the load side. The limiters should be considered in the modeling. 
As an important concept related to voltage instability, the term “voltage collapse” is 
frequently used in different phases to explain the progress of voltage instability. In early 
days of voltage stability research, voltage collapse and voltage instability almost had the 
same meaning and were used interchangeably [9] [18]. In the end of 20th century, many 
efforts were made to further investigate the voltage stability problems, an importance 
mathematic theory - bifurcation analysis are adopted in this field. The voltage collapse 
was no longer present the voltage instability or system wide spread voltage instability, 
but it is defined as a sudden catastrophic voltage transition [16] [18].  
Based on voltage stability analysis in [16] [19], except the voltage collapse, the long 
term slow decrement of voltage could also be one final outcome of voltage instability, 
which is defined by dynamic characteristics of system components, especially load 
dynamics. The related component behaviors and phenomenon with time scales are shown 
in Fig. 2.2. The underline of each phenomenon represents the related time scale. The 
phenomenon in red box represents load side dynamic behaviors while the one in blue box 






In this thesis, the long term voltage instability induced cascading events will be 
focused, so the related dynamic models and behaviors will be carefully investigated. 
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Fig. 2.2 Diverse time response of voltage stability related phenomenon [9] 
2.2 Voltage instability induced blackouts in Power Systems 
The power system blackouts are regarded as devastating disasters for the power 
system operators and customers. The India blackout in July 2012 affected over 620 
million people, about half of India’s population, and spread across 22 states in Northern, 
Eastern, and Northeast India [20]. The overload operation condition caused by load flow 
transferring in the post fault stage, and related unexpected backup relay operations are 
regarded as the main reasons of this huge event. Actually there are many blackouts 
occurred over the world in the past years, some of them during 1987-2012 are shown in 
Table 2.1 [6]-[9] [20]-[30]. 
Some of them collapse very fast, e.g. Europe blackout 2006 collapsed in about 20 
seconds; some took longer time to whole blackout, e.g. U.S. and Canada blackout 2003 
collapsed after one hour following the initiated event [31]. For analyzing the causes and 
progress of these blackouts, two problems may be involved. One is that plenty of 





operation conditions. The other is to distinguish between different causes which induce 
those emergency conditions, such as short term voltage instability and transient angle 
instability, or long term voltage instability and remote fault [31]. Normally, these 
problems will be combined and triggered each other to compose the whole progress of a 
cascaded blackout. 
Table 2.1 Blackouts in the history 
AREA BLACKOUT EVENTS 
U.S. and Canada Western U.S. blackout 1996, U.S. and Canada blackout 2003 [6] 
European 
Southern Sweden and eastern Denmark blackout 2003 [21],  
Italy 2003 [22], Europe blackout 2006 [23] 
Oceania Australian blackout 2007 [24], New Zealand 2009 [25] 
Asia Tokyo 1987 [26], India blackout 2011, 2012 [20]  
Southern America Brazil blackout 1999 [27], 2007 [28], Colombia 2007 [29]  
Africa Tanzania 2008 [30]  
In this thesis, in order to investigate the relationships between cascaded events caused 
by long term voltage instability. Two classic voltage instability induced cascaded 
blackouts are presented with time frames. 
2.2.1 U.S. and Canada blackout in 2003 
The U.S. and Canada blackout on August 14th, 2003 affected about 50 million people 
in eight states of U.S. and two provinces of Canada. About 531 generator units and 400 
transmission lines were tripped off line, and approximately 63GW of load was lost. The 
progress and phenomenon of cascading events in this blackout are shown in Fig. 2.3 and 
Table 2.2 [6]. 
 





Based on the U.S. and Canada Power System Outage Task Force report [8] [32], the 
critical event leading to fast propagated cascading was the event 5 at 4:05:57 pm, i.e. 
tripping of the Sammis-Star line by Samis end Zone 3 relay. This unexpected relay 
operation and consequent cascaded blackout could have been prevented by load shedding 
in northeast Ohio prior to the tipping time. Also, if the Energy Management System 
(EMS) is reliable, the emergency condition could have been corrected earlier in the 
second event. 





5 generation units trip and 
shut down 
Several remote and local generators were generating high 
level of reactive power. 5 voltage regulator tripped to manual 
mode because of over excitation limits 
2 
3:05:41 pm-3:57:35 pm, three 
345kV lines trip due to 
contact with trees 
This overloaded the underlying 138kV system and depressed 
voltages. No proper operational actions due to EMS failure. 
3 
3:39:17-4:08:59 pm, 16 
138kV lines trip due to 
overloading situation 
The loss of 138kV lines overloaded the Sammis-Star line 
4  
4:05:57 pm, the Sammis-Star 
line tripped by Sammis end 
Zone 3 relay 
Further overload and trips were induced on the additional 
lines in Ohio and Michigan by operations of Zone 3 relays or 
Zone 2 relays set similar to the followed Zone 3 relays. 
5 
4:08:59 pm, Galion-Ohio and 
Central Muskinghun 345kV 
lines trip on Zone 3 
This Caused major power swings through New York and 
Ontario and into Michigan. Low voltage/high load conditions 
propagated through the system. 
6 
4:13 pm, most of the North 
East of U.S. and parts of 
Canada blackout. 
There were only a few islands which remain operating. 
2.2.2 The blackout case in Sweden and Denmark 2003 
The basic progress of this blackout is shown in Fig. 2.4 and Table 2.3 [10]. Before the 
blackout, the Nordel power system was operated in a secure and stable scope. Two 400-
kV lines and the HVDC links connecting Nordel system with continental Europe were 
out of service due to scheduled maintenance activities. However, the system loading 
situation was still not stress even considering these scheduled outages. 
At 12.30 pm of September 23, the first contingency occurred. A 1200 MW nuclear 
unit was lost due to mechanical failure, which induced some load flow transferring in 





condition within a minute. However at 12.35 pm, a double bus bar fault occurred, which 
resulted in the loss of two nuclear units and several transmission lines along the west 
coast of southern Sweden. These outages triggered a heavy power oscillation and a big 
load flow transferring from north to south on the remaining lines. Due to some existing 
frequency based control measures, such as under frequency load shedding, the system 
frequency recovered into the secure scope within two minutes. But in the main loading 
areas of southern Sweden, the voltages decreased, which induced a number of load tap 
changers (LTC) activated to recover the distribution side voltages. Then the voltages at 
the transmission side decreased further inevitably. 
 
Fig. 2.4 The blackout in Sweden-Denmark in 2003 [33] 
Thereafter, the distance relays on the remaining transmission lines detected the 
heavily overload condition violating the impedance criteria, and unexpectedly tripped the 
breakers in the critical grid section between central and south Sweden. Then the whole 
grip split up into two parts. The upside part including north and central Sweden was 





eastern Denmark, experienced further cascading trips due to a massive inadequacy of 
generation. And this subsystem collapsed within seconds both on voltage and frequency. 
In this blackout, the total loss of supply was about 1850 MW in Denmark and 4500 
MW in Sweden. Moreover, it took about 7 hours to restore all the power equipments in 
this part of Nordel power system. The total non-supplied demand due to this blackout 
was about 8 GWh in Denmark and 10 GWh in Sweden. 




12:30 pm, 1200 MW 
nuclear unit outage 
The system resumed to stable operating conditions within less than a 
minute. 
2 
12:35 pm, a double 
bus bar fault 
occurred. 
Two nuclear units (1750MW) and several transmission lines along the 
west coast of southern Sweden were lost, which induced a big load 
flow transferring from north to south. 
3 
12:35:20, action of  
numerous load tap 
changers 
The load demand recovered around the capital city of Stockholm, but 
the voltage decreased further on the 400 kV grids to critical levels 
(320kV). 
4  
12:36 pm, distance 
relays trip lines in 
the critical grid.  
The heavily overload conditions violated the impedance criteria on the 
lines between central and south Sweden. Then the whole grid split up 
into two parts. The upside part was recovered soon and kept intact.  
5  
12:37 pm, voltage 
collapse in downside 
subsystem  
The downside part, comprising southern Sweden and eastern 
Denmark, experienced further cascading trips due to a massive 
inadequacy of generation.  And within seconds, this subsystem 
collapsed on voltage and frequency.  
2.2.3 The anatomy of voltage instability induced blackouts 
Based on those classic cases of voltage instability induced cascading events in the 
past blackouts, some common involved mechanism and basic processes can be observed 
in Fig. 2.5, which are derived from [18] [34] [35].  
2.2.3.1 Common mechanism 
Normally, before the voltage instability related problem emerging, the power system 
is in a normal operation condition but gets weaken due to some scheduled maintenances 
or normal fault clearing induced outages. The EMS and communication failure can be 
also regarded as an extra weaken operation condition, such as the situation in the case of 
U.S. and Canada blackout in 2003. The weaken conditions represent less margin in 
system voltage stability, i.e. generators are operated close to its capability limits, and 





under the weaken conditions, a tiny initial event is more likely to trigger enough load 
flow transferring and drive some system components cross the capability limits for 
maintaining the system voltages, which is the occurrence of voltage instability, based on 
definition of voltage instability in the yellow block in Fig. 2.5. 
As for the system components which already hit their capability limits, they are 
operated in overloading situation with higher currents, lower voltages and increased 
reactive power demand, etc. The controllers on these system components would be 
triggered to protect the related components or restore the load demand and load side 
voltage as their normal functions, e.g. current limitation of generators, thermostatic load 
restoration and load tap changer operation (when long term voltage stability is concerned). 
These normal functions of controllers would deteriorate the overloading situation further. 
Moreover, if the backup relays on these components detect overloading situation 
violating its settings and trip the related components, then the system structure will be 
changed and normally a big load flow will be transferred to the neighboring area and 
remaining system components. These operations of controllers and relays are obviously 
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When overloading situation is propagated from local to system wide, more 
unexpected operations of controllers and relays will be involved subsequently, and the 
system will be split up uncontrollably, which is so called cascading events. If there is no 
reliable and timely regulation control during this propagation progress, the blackout will 
occur inevitably. 
 Besides, the rotor angle instability and frequency instability problems could be 
triggered during cascading events when the overloading situation induces the rotor angle 
and frequency approaching the related limits. They also contribute to cascaded blackout 
apparently but not the primary cause of voltage instability induced cases, which are 
consequently not in the research scope of this thesis. 
2.2.3.2 Basic processes 
Based on above discussions, it can be found that the causes of cascading events 
leading to cascaded blackouts are diverse, which normally involve faults, unexpected 
relay operations, controller malfunctions, power component failures, communication 
problems, operation errors and etc [36]. The complexity of those causes makes it difficult 
to catch and predict the exact sequence of cascading events. But in the progress of 
cascading events, the basic patterns with specific characteristics, which may trigger other 
events, can be easily identified and benefit for monitoring the whole progress of the 
cascading events [37]-[39]. In this thesis, in order to link the cause-effect relationship 
between different events, the basic processes of cascading events considering the long 
term dynamics are list similarly, as follows: 
 Transmission Line or generator tripping due to faults 
 As we know, the traditional protective relay system is indispensable for system 
operation security and should reliably trip the breakers on related components to clear the 
fault timely. But those actions will unplanned weaken the original power system to a 
maybe N-1 or N-k condition, and make it vulnerable to endure one more disturbance, 
which will help to make a “breeding ground” for cascading events. 
 Overload due to line or generator outage induced load flow transferring 
Due to the unplanned outages of transmission lines and generators, the load flow will 
be redistributed to the remaining lines and generators. If there are no predesigned suitable 
regulation methods, the large amount of load flow transferring will be a big challenge for 





 Overload due to load side voltage control induced load increment 
Sometimes, in the post fault stage, the outage induced load flow transferring doesn’t 
cause any emergency state but makes the voltage lower, which will induce load side 
voltage control operation, such as LTC operation and load restoration characteristics in 
the blackout cases mentioned in the former section. The continual LTC operations and 
load restoration characteristics will strengthen the trend of load flow transferring and 
induce the long term voltage instability. 
 Transmission line or generator tripping due to overloading 
Owing to load flow transferring induced overloading situations, namely, the loading 
level of transmission lines or generators violates loadability limits or capability limit 
settings, these overloading situations could cause transmission line tripping or generator 
tripping unexpectedly. 
 Generator tripping due to abnormal frequency 
When some important inter-area transmission lines get tripped, the power system will 
be unexpectedly separated into several islands, which may induce a big power unbalance 
in those islands. Then both voltage and frequency will be deviated from a normal level to 
an emergency level. Some important generator groups will be tripped under this situation 
which will deteriorate islanded power systems and finally induce whole system collapse. 
 Under frequency and voltage load shedding 
The normal under frequency load shedding (UFLS) and under voltage load shedding 
(UVLS) scheme may be triggered when the system frequency and voltage fall below the 
preset values to prevent the frequency instability and voltage instability. But the 
traditional UFLS and UVLS sometimes cannot give a sensitive and precise reaction to the 
system frequency and voltage deviation, which could make a big amount of load lost and 
also a big disturbance to the local system.  
In this thesis, the UVLS scheme and voltage related regulations during the long term 
voltage instability induced cascading events will be mainly focused. 
2.3 The behaviors of traditional protective relays in blackouts 
2.3.1 Traditional protective relays 
The traditional protective relays are normally set with each distributed power system 





breakers in order to prevent possible component damage [4]. The protective device is 
usually comprised by several elements that are designed to detect system condition, make 














Fig. 2.6 Protective device functional elements 
The local protective system firstly measures certain system variables, such as voltages 
and currents; and compares these system variables or their derivatives with preset 
threshold settings. If the comparison indicates a violation condition, the decision element 
will be initiated with time element to determine the related condition and time delay. 
Finally, when the time delay is run out and violation condition is still hold, the action 
element will be released to operate, i.e. the related circuit breakers are ordered to trip the 
related component from network [40]. 
With development of protection technology, the protective relays can be categorized 
into many types based on protected objects, detection methods, detected system variables, 
characteristics of threshold settings, comparison methods, decision algorithms and 
hardware conditions [40]. In this thesis, due to research requirement and the obvious 
performances in historical cascading events, the zoned distance relay with direction circle 
characteristics [4] will be adopted as the study example in this thesis. The Relay 1 on the 
transmission line ij between Bus i and Bus j in Fig. 2.7 is chosen as a research object. The 
classic characteristic circles of a three zone distance relay can be observed in this figure.  
The first Zone of Relay 1, designated as Zone 1, is set to trip the related line 
immediately with no time delay. Zone 1 is set for approximately 80-90% of the related 
line impedance in order to avoid unnecessary trips for the faults occurred beyond the 
remote bus j. Zone 2 is set to protect 100% of the protected line with adequate margin, i.e. 
extra length about 50% of the shortest adjacent line, and is set with time delay T2. T2 is 
typically set to about 15-30 cycles. Technically, Zone 3 of Relay 1 is applied as a local 
backup for Zone 1 and Zone 2 of Relay1 and a remote backup for Zone 1 and Zone 2 of 





two lines and 25% of the third line kl. The time delay T3 for Zone 3 is normally set to 
about 25-90 cycles [4] [41]. The application of the timers, such as T2 and T3, provide 
coordination time intervals for the relay operation in the end zone of each line. 
Bus i Bus j

























Fig. 2.7 Step time and impedance zones for distance relays 
The measured impedance of Relay 1 will depend on the load flow on the transmission 
line ij. And the permitted line loading is defined by thermal ratings and voltage instability 
criteria of the related power components [42]. Then the possible loci of the measured 
impedance in the first quadrant of impedance plane can be depicted by two red curves in 
Fig. 2.8, when the apparent load power is fixed to two specific values. 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗  is one 
measured point of impedance, 𝜑𝑖𝑗  is the power factor angle of load flow. It can be 
inferred that the radius of red curve gets smaller when the load power gets larger; 
meanwhile, the measured impedance will move in the d1 direction when the power factor 
gets decreased and the magnitude of load flow is fixed. When the power factor is fixed, 
the 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 will move in d2 direction with constant 𝜑𝑖𝑗 as the load flow power gets larger. 
Also based on the deduction in [38] [42], when the active load power is fixed, 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 





increased. Similarly with fixed reactive power, 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗  will move in d3 direction as the 
active power gets increased. Therefore, any increment in real or reactive power may 
















Fig. 2.8 The possible loci of measured impedance during load power variations 
2.3.2 The behaviors of distance relays in cascading events 
It can be easily found in those past blackouts, Zone 3 distance relay played an 
important role in the propagation progress of cascading events and overloading condition, 
as shown in Fig. 2.9. The overloading situation would be detected by Zone 3 distance 
relay firstly, and this situation will be propagated quickly to neighboring area if Zone 3 
relay trips the related power component. Then the Zone 3 relays in neighboring area will 
detect the overloading situation and start a new round of cascading trips.  Hereby, some 
researchers even suggested to completely eliminating the Zone 3 relay, to remove the 
possibility of the unexpected Zone 3 relay operations forever [41]. However, as a backup 
to zone 1 and zone 2 protections, Zone 3 relay with higher setting and longer reach is an 
indispensible part of zoned distance protection to protect transmission and distribution 
lines. Whether it should be replaced by other relays needs to be carefully evaluated.  
However, from the view point of cascading events prevention, the Zone 3 relay can 





settings are designed considering the stability boundaries [43]. Furthermore, if the Zone 3 
functions can be make immune to tripping under overloading situations, then Zone 3 
relay will not be an “accomplice” to cascading events any more, and it can be a good 
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Fig. 2.9 The flowchart of voltage instability induced cascading blackouts 
So, if in the early stage of cascading events, the distance relays could online 
differentiate those overloading situations from short circuits, then those unexpected relay 
operations can be blocked for a short period which will give time for execution of 
emergency controls. Meanwhile, according to identified different overloading situations, 
the corresponding emergency control strategies can be defined more specifically. In this 
way, the cascading relay operations will not be triggered unexpectedly, and the total 
blackout can be effectively prevented. 
2.4 Solutions for voltage instability induced cascading events 
In order to prevent the voltage instability induced problems, there are two aspects can 





 Considering the voltage stability in the construction of power system network 
Namely, in the power system planning level, the reactive power dispatching is 
required to be considered together with active power. The increasing remote power 
demand with slow transmission system construction or maintenance should be tried to 
avoid. Also the emergency reactive reserve and related compensators may be planed 
considering the situation of N-2 contingency. Direct current (DC) network may become 
an important part in future power system with less voltage problems. 
 Considering the voltage stability in the operation and control of power system 
Since most of power systems with traditional protection and control devices are 
already built up and operated, the new technologies are required to improve the functions 
of supervisory, protection and control on the power systems in a wide area, such as wide 
area measurement system (WAMS) based on phasor measurement units (PMU), special 
protection and emergency controls against specific voltage instability problems, etc. 
In this thesis, the design of special protection and control strategy in the second 
consideration is the main focus. 
2.4.1 Wide area measurement system 
Since the 1970s, synchronized-measurement technology (SMT) has been developed, 
and then wide area measurement system (WAMS) starts to emerge [2]. Unlike traditional 
measurement systems, the phasor measurement units (PMU), which are the key elements 
of WAMS, provide accurate measurement of system dynamics in real time based on 
global positioning system (GPS) and SMT. With the precise and fast measurements with 
synchronized time stamps, the Control center is able to initiate proper response timely 
and protect a system wide network from big disturbances [36].  
As a development trend of WAMS’ application in power system [44][45], a 
multilayer structure is adopted to build the WAMS based system wide monitor, 
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Fig. 2.10 WAMS based system wide monitor, protection and control system 
The PMUs or PMUs with protection and control functions compose the bottom layer. 
The middle layer consists of several local Control centers (LCCs) which protect and 
control local power system and PMUs. The System Control center is in the top level and 
behaviors as the coordinator for all the elements in the lower layers. Actually there is a 
wide range of WAMS’ application, some important research fields are list as follows: 
 Real time situation awareness of power systems [46][47] 
 Advanced early warning system [48] 
 Dynamic security assessment [49] 
 Real time state estimation [50][51] 
 Real time congestion management [52] 
 Real time protection and control strategy [53][54] 
 Others [53][55] 
Some applications could have been contained in original functions of supervisory 
control and data acquisition system (SCADA) and energy management systems (EMS). 





cascading events prevention [44]. Based on WAMS, the traditional monitor, protection 
and control functions in different time scale can be improved and cooperate with each 
other, which can help to define the suitable system wide protection and control strategies 
against cascaded blackouts [56]-[58]. The relationship between WAMS in protection and 
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Fig. 2.11 WAMS application in power system 
In those local information based protection and controls, the communication delay is 
very small and can be neglected normally. But when system wide information is 
concerned, the communication delay sometimes cannot be neglected, which is depend on 
communication modes and medium. Considering a remote signal used in feedback 
control, the communication delay time may be varied from several milliseconds to above 
hundreds of milliseconds, which could be a problem in a transient situation. In U.S BPA 
power system, the communication delay of fiber optical system is about 38ms, and 
microwave communication delay time is above 80ms [59]. Furthermore, considering the 
feedback signal to the remote device or Control center, it will be delayed by diverse 
measurement devices, routers in the network, waiting for signal synchronizing and mass 
data processing, the actual communication delay time is generally more than 100ms [60]. 
2.4.2 Special protection and emergency control 
Since 2004, the U.S- Canada Power System Outage Task-Force has been established 
to investigate the causes of the blackouts and the solutions to prevent the possible 





of cascaded blackout prevention. Except the related operation standards and policies, 
“employing special protection” and “resolving issues related to Zone 3 relays” are 
strongly recommended, which belongs to strategy improvements in protection control 
level, emergency control level and recovery control level in Fig. 1.1. 
As for resolving issues related to Zone 3 relays, one idea is to adjust the settings of 
those involved relays to match power system conditions in real time. The information 
from wide area measurement system (WAMS) could be utilized for this idea realization 
[61][62]. The other idea is to prevent cascaded events by identify potential unexpected 
relay operations ahead of time. In [63][64], a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) based 
method was proposed to identify successive line and generator outage events due to those 
unexpected relay operations in the post contingency stage. Also, many fast identification 
algorithms were developed based on dc load flow sensitivities, including line outage 
distribution factor (LODF) and generator shift factor (GSF). The method predicted the 
component outage caused by load flow transferring and distinguished the overload 
situation [65]. Moreover, the variation of system state variables during transient period 
after an outage has also been studied over the whole system [66] [67] or by local 
measured information [68]. However, those dc load flow based predicting methods only 
consider the flow of active power and assume bus voltages and reactive power flow being 
constant, which is not the case in real situation, especially in the cascading events. 
Moreover, these methods related to Zone 3 relay may fail when the system is already 
operated close to the collapse point. So, further investigation in this area is very necessary. 
On the other side, special protection system and emergency control strategy are 
recommended to detect the emergent system state (which may result in the unexpected 
relay operations), adjust the abnormal state and keep the system operated in the stable 
region. According to North American electric Reliability Council (NERC) planning 
standard [69], Special protection system can be defined as: 
“A special protection system (SPS) or remedial action scheme (RAS) is designed to 
detect abnormal system conditions and take preplanned, corrective action (other than the 
isolation of faulted elements) to provide acceptable system performance.” 
And the emergency control represents the related control strategy against power 
system emergency which is a condition or state of system operation characterized by one 





control schemes against long term voltage instability induced cascading events include 
phase angle regulator, control area interchange, capacitors, generator reschedule, load 
shedding, LTC emergency control and etc [37] [70]-[73]. 
Moreover, based on WAMS based system wide information, the basic event patterns 
or processes of cascading events can be identified and traced timely [61]; the composition 
and progress of cascading events in a blackout can be easily figured out. Then the 
combined protection and control strategies will be accordingly designed for different 
patterns to timely prevent the propagation of cascading events and mitigate the whole 
catastrophic outages. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter reviews the relevant topics in the literature, including the power system 
stability, classic blackouts in the history, the common mechanism of voltage instability 
induced cascaded blackouts, the behaviors of traditional protective relays in cascading 






Chapter 3  
Emergency state detection for overloading situations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to finally find the suitable solutions against the voltage instability induced 
cascaded blackouts, the first step is to model the critical system components and simulate 
the progress of voltage instability induced cascading events. Then the detection methods 
for those overload emergency states will be investigated subsequently. 
In this chapter, the modeling of key power system components will be firstly 
introduced, which contains generation system (including its controllers), restoration load 
model, load tap changer model and distance relay models. Based on the reviews of past 
voltage instability induced cascaded blackouts, the power system of eastern Denmark, 
which experienced a blackout in 2003, is suitable and adopted for simulating the 
cascading blackouts. Then, the simulated scenarios of the long term voltage instability 
induced cascading events based on real time digital simulator (RTDS) are presented. 
On the other side, based on distance relay models with the consideration of 
loadability, the detection of emergency states is primarily designed to sense the 
emergency states locally. As for complex situations, i.e. cascading events, the basic 
process identification based on system wide information is briefly introduced. 
3.2 Power system modeling 
In this thesis, modeling work of power system is mainly conducted in RTDS [75], 
which can simulate the whole progress of cascaded blackouts and help execute effective 
control measures in real time. 
3.2.1 Generation system 
As a primary source of active power and reactive power in the power system, 
synchronous generators are mainly responsible for maintaining the bus voltages and 
system frequency. Their characteristics, capabilities and limitations define the strength of 




power system to a large extent. The excitation system and governor/turbine system are 
normally installed together with synchronous generators to control the bus voltages and 
system frequency in a secure scope [1], as show in Fig. 3.1 (a). 𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑉 and 𝐼 are active 
power, reactive power, voltage and current respectively which are sent from the related 
generator to the system network. 𝑇𝑚 and 𝑃𝑚 are mechanic torque and power, 𝐸𝑓𝑑 and 𝐼𝑓𝑑 
are excitation voltage and current, 𝑃0 and 𝑤0 are specific set points of active power and 





























(a) Generator and related controls        (b) The generator and control models in RSCAD/RTDS 
Fig. 3.1 Field thermal capability and over excitation limit 
The synchronous generator is modeled by standard RTDS model with two Q-axis 
rotor windings, the governor and turbine system in the dashed box are modeled by IEEE 
type 1 speed governor and steam turbine model [76]. While, the excitation systems, 
including exciter and regulator, power system stabilizer (PSS), stator current limiter (SCL) 
and field current limiter (FCL) are modeled by standard RTDS models together with user 
defined models (i.e. FCL), as show in Fig. 3.1 (b). 
3.2.1.1 Governor and turbine system 
The role of governor is to realize the frequency control, which keeps the related 
generator run closely to the nominal speed (𝑤0) and produce preset active power (𝑃0). In 
Fig. 3.1, it can be seen when the difference between the rotating speed and the nominal 
one has been detected by governor, it will adjust the steam or water input (valve position) 
to the Turbine. As a primary frequency control, the governor will keep the frequency 





If the system experiences a big disturbance, such as a line or generator outage, the 
primary frequency control as a local control method may be not enough to keep the 
scheduled power transferring between areas. Moreover, in the post stage of N-1 or N-k 
contingency, a large power transferring may drive the transmission system closer to its 
loadability limits, which will cause the problem of voltage instability. In order to strength 
the ability of governor system to compensate the system power unbalance or regulate the 
power transferring within system loadability limits, the set point of active power will be 
adjusted by an upper controller, which use system power differences as inputs. This kind 
of control scheme can be regarded as one kind of fast generator reschedules (GR) at the 
second frequency control level [1], which will be discussed in Chapter V and VI. 
3.2.1.2 Excitation control system 
The excitation systems normally include exciter and regulator, PSS, SCL, FCL and 
load compensator. The load compensator is not considered in this thesis for the sake of 
simplicity. The exciter and regulator are modeled by Brown Boveri Static Exciter model 
(BBSEX1) in RTDS [1]. It is responsible to provide and quickly adjust the field current 
of synchronous generator to maintain the generator terminal voltage when the output 
varies due to outside disturbances. The excitation power of the static exciter is provided 
by a transformer connected to the local bus or an auxiliary bus, and the DC power 
required by the generator is produced through a thyristor-controlled rectifier. 
The PSS is modeled by IEE2ST model in RTDS [77]. It is a compensation circuit 
providing additional input signal to the exciter, which aims to damp power system 
oscillations. In the test system used in this thesis, all the generators are equipped with 
governors and PSS with normal gain and response time, which is important to obtain 
more stable and fast-damped system frequency in the simulation cases of voltage 
instability induced cascaded blackouts. 
The SCL is modeled inside the exciter model. It is used to prevent excessive current 
in the generator stator winding. Normally, the stator winding with larger thermal inertia 
allows overload to some extent and sends an alarm (the operator will decrease the output 
of reactive power or sometimes active power), which will be regarded as a detection 
method for overloading situations in the later contents. 
The FCL is modeled by basic functions in RTDS, and the schematic diagram and 
functional characteristics are shown in Fig. 3.2 [1]. The FCL typically detects the high 




field current and limits it to a pre-set value after a time delay. The FCL produces a 
voltage signal that is added to the main summing junction of the exciter. In normal 
operation states, this signal is equal to zero; when FCL activates, the signal will 
participate the exciter control to limit the field current. In Fig. 3.2, the higher setting 
𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥2 provides an instantaneous limiting action when full load current becomes 1.6 
times. A lower setting  𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥1 provides a limiting action with time delay, which is a 
ramp time function of the detected actual field current [78]. In this way, the limitation 
mechanism is run in two layers with different time responses which make generator with 
the ability to endure the temporary overloading situation. 


















Ifdmax2 = 1.6* IFL
Ifdmax1 = 1.05* IFL
IFL = full load current
 
(b) Functional characteristics of FCL 
Fig. 3.2 Block diagram and functional characteristics of FCL 
If the FCL fails to limit the excessive field current in a long time delay, according to 
the ANSI standard C50.13-1977 reproduced in Fig. 3.3 [79], the limiter will initiate an 
exciter field breaker trip and a generator unit trip. The detailed parameters can be found 









































Fig. 3.3 Field thermal capability and over excitation limit 
3.2.2 Restoration load 
In this thesis, the lumped restoration dynamics of load for long term voltage stability 
study is modeled as follows [16]: 
 































where 𝑃𝐿, 𝑄𝐿 are the active and reactive power of the load respectively; 𝑃𝐿0, 𝑄𝐿0 are the 
active and reactive power respectively at the nominal voltage 𝑉0 ; 𝑧𝑃 , 𝑧𝑄  are 
dimensionless state variables associated with load dynamics; 𝛼𝑡, 𝛽𝑡 represent the transient 
load exponents respectively, and 𝛼𝑠, 𝛽𝑠  are the steady state ones; 𝑇𝑃, 𝑇𝑄  are the load 
restoration time constant respectively. In steady state, the voltage characteristics can be 
given by (3.5) and (3.6): 
 















The classic parameters are adopted normally: 𝛼𝑠 = 𝛽𝑠 = 0 , 𝛼𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 = 2  and  𝑇𝑃 =
𝑇𝑄 = 100𝑠 [16]. And this load model is initialized with 𝑧𝑃 = 𝑧𝑄 = 1.  
When a big voltage variation is experienced on the load bus i, the load will firstly 
respond with its transient characteristics (3.1) (3.2), and then slowly recover based on 
(3.1)-(3.4). Finally the load will reach its steady state characteristics (3.5) (3.6). This 
restoration load represents the aggregate behavior of a number of voltage controlled loads 
or the consumer reaction following a disturbance, e.g. switching on more devices to 
compensate for the reduced power supplied. 
3.2.3 Load tap changer 
As one of the key mechanisms in long term load restoration, the load tap changers 
(LTC) are modeled on some critical load side transformers in the test systems; which can 
be mathematically expressed by (3.7) and (3.8) [16]. 
 𝑡𝑘+1 = 𝑡𝑘 + ∆𝑇𝑘,        𝑘 = 0, 1, … (3.7) 
 
𝑟𝑘+1 = {
𝑟𝑘 + ∆𝑟         if    𝑉2 > 𝑉2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑑  and 𝑟𝑘 < 𝑟
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑟𝑘 − ∆𝑟         if    𝑉2 < 𝑉2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑  and 𝑟𝑘 > 𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝑟𝑘                   else                                                
 (3.8) 
where the tap ratio of LTC transformer is 𝑟: 1, the size of each tap step is denoted by ∆𝑟, 
∆𝑇𝑘 is the time delay to perform the tap change, 𝑉2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑉2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 are the upper and lower 
limits of voltage 𝑉2 at the distribution side of related transformer, 𝑑 is half the LTC dead 
band, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 are the limits of related tap.  
If the inverse tap control function is activated, the equation (3.8) will be changed into 
(3.9), namely, the LTC will be changed to control and restore the transmission side 
voltages rather than the load side voltages. 𝑉1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑉1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 are the upper and lower limits 
of voltage 𝑉1 at the transmission side of related transformer. 
 
𝑟𝑘+1 = {
𝑟𝑘 − ∆𝑟         if    𝑉1 > 𝑉1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑑  and 𝑟𝑘 < 𝑟
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑟𝑘 + ∆𝑟         if    𝑉1 < 𝑉1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑  and 𝑟𝑘 > 𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝑟𝑘                   else                                                
 (3.9) 
The initial time delay ∆𝑇0  is usually longer than ∆𝑇𝑘 , and then the tap changes 





limits are reached. ∆𝑇0 will not be counted in the case of inverse tap control. The detailed 
parameters can be found in Appendix. A.1. 
3.2.4 Distance relay considering Loadability 
In this thesis, in order to better analyze the behaviors of distance relays during 
cascading events, the distance relays are modeled based on classic three zone 
characteristics, and with the consideration of loadability of related power components. 
3.2.4.1 Zoned distance relay for transmission line 
(a) Loadability and operation margin of distance relay 
The loadability of transmission line is generally used as a concept for developing a 
fully understanding of power transfer capability which is influenced by voltage level and 
line length [1]. In order to make sure that the unexpected Zone 3 relay trips will not occur 
due to extreme loading conditions, NERC guidelines [80] in 2006 specified that the 
relays should not operate at or below the line emergency rating of the line. And the 
“extreme” emergency loading was defined as 150% of emergency load rating of a line as 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥, assuming a 0.85 per unit relay voltage 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 and a load power factor angle 𝜑 of 30°. 
Thus, the relay loadability limit can be easily obtained, taking Relay 1 in Fig. 3.4 as an 
example. 𝑉𝑖, 𝑉𝑗, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗  represent the bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles respectively; 
𝑍𝑖𝑗∠𝜑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the impedance of line ij;  𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗∠𝜑𝑖𝑗 is the measured impedance by Relay 1; 
𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 are the values of relay settings at the impedance angle 𝜑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗  and power 
factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑗 respectively. 
Assuming the power factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑗 = 𝜑𝑚𝑎𝑥, the loadability limit of this relay can 










𝑐𝑜𝑠 (𝜑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝜑𝑚𝑎𝑥)
 (3.11)  
where 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗, 𝜑𝑚𝑎𝑥 represent the emergency rating of the related line, low 
voltage limit of the bus, impedance angle of the line and maximum allowed power factor 
angle respectively. 
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(b) The distance relay with three zone characteristics  
Fig. 3.4 Traditional Zoned distance relays on transmission lines 
In order to evaluate the extent of emergency load conditions to violate the Zone 3 
relay, it is not sufficient to merely detect the time when the limit boundary is touched. 
The relay operation margin, which represents the distance from an observed operating 
point to its corresponding loadability limit, can be an effective indicator [57]. At power 
factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑗, the operation margin of Relay 1 can be expressed as: 











In normal operation states, the measured impedance 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗  should be located outside 
the Zone 3 area and the operation margin is positive as expressed by 𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗 in Fig. 3.4 (b). 
If 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 enters the Zone 3 area and come to 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
′ , Relay 1 will be initiated to trip the line 
with a preset delay. At this situation, the sign of operation margin (𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗
′ ) is negative. If 





regarded as unexpected one because it will weaken the stressed transmission system 
further and might result in cascaded trips. 
(b) Operation margin for distance relays with the load blinders 
Technically, relay engineers must ensure that a distance relay does not trip under 
heavy load conditions in order to give system operator enough time to mitigate the related 
system wide disturbances. Therefore, many efforts have been taken to improve the 
loadability of distance relay to ride through the extreme loading conditions. There are 
several methods to increase loadability of distance relay locally [80]: 
 Increase the angle of maximum torque 
 Change the distance relay characteristics form a circle to a lens 
 Add blinders to the characteristics to limit reach along the real axis 
 For remote Zone 3 protection, use an distance relay offset into the first quadrant 
 For a quadrilateral characteristics, reset the relay 
 Enable the load encroachment function of the relay 
All these method try to adjust the operation region of Zone 3 distance relay, so the 
margin will be also adjusted. For an example in Fig. 3.5, the Zone 3 operation region of 
Relay 1 in Fig. 3.4 is restrained by load encroachment element formed by two lines and 
one circle, where 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗′  and 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗′  are the settings of load encroachment 
element. The setting value of them can be easily obtained based on NERC report [80], 


















Fig. 3.5 Zone 3 distance relay with load encroachment function 
Obviously, it can be seen from Fig. 3.5, the operation region of Zone 3 is changed 
from original Zone 3 to Zone 3 ∩ A1 ∪ A2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where the blinding area A1 and A2 are given 
by (3.13) and (3.14). 




 𝐴1 = {𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗} ∩ {𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗
′ } (3.14)  
 𝐴2 = {𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≤ −𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗} ∩ {𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗











Then the operation margin can be defined according to different parts of the revised 
operation region at the specific power factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑗 . Suppose the power flow is 
positive on Relay 1, then in the first quadrant of R-X plane, the 𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗 of Zone 3 of Relay 1 
can be expressed as: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗,        𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗
′
𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 𝑍𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗′ ,                      𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗
′  (3.17)  
where 𝜑𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗
′  is the angle of intersection point between the circle element and Zone 3 
border in the first quadrant. Obviously, if the settings of load encroachment elements are 
set suitably, the loadability of Zone 3 can be improved in the region containing normal 
power factor angles of power flow, which is shown with blue arrows in Fig. 3.6. 
3.2.4.2 The distance backup relay for generator 
Technically, the protection system of generators is complex and based on diverse 
principles [81]. In this thesis, the distance backup relay on generator is chosen to be 
studied, which is convenient for the system wide impedance criteria analysis. A distance 
backup relay for the generator has been shown in Fig. 3.6, Relay 3 is the concerned 
generator backup relay. The outmost backup setting curve of Relay 3 in R-X plane is 
transferred from capability curves of the synchronous generator, which are field current 
limit curve (FCL) and stator current limit curve (SCL) [82]. These two curves intersect at 
the points with the rated power factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑟. And the solid parts of the two limit 
curves with 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.9𝑝𝑢 in Fig. 3.6 (b) and (c) are chosen as setting curve of Relay 3, 
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(a) Relays on generator and transmission line 
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(b) Capability curves of generator                      (c) Setting values of backup relay 
Fig. 3.6 Impedance backup relay on Synchronous generator 
At the power factor angle 𝜑𝑖, 𝑍𝑎𝑖 , 𝑍𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖are the measured impedance and setting value 
of the backup relay; then the operation margin of this relay can be expressed as: 
 𝑀𝐺𝑖 = 𝑍𝑎𝑖 − 𝑍𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 (3.18)  
Also according to the classic generator equations of active power and reactive power 
(𝑃𝑔𝑖 and 𝑄𝑔𝑖), as expressed by: 
 
𝑃𝑔𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑖 =
𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑖𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖
𝑋𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝛿𝑖 (3.19)  
 







 (3.20)  













2 − 2𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑖𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝛿𝑖
 
(3.21)  




where 𝑋𝑠𝑖, 𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑖 are synchronous impedance and mutual reactance of the generator i; 𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖 
and 𝐼𝑠𝑖  are the field current and stator current; 𝛿𝑖  and 𝜑𝑖  are the load angle and power 
factor angle.  
In Fig. 3.6 (c), due to the transformation of FCL and SCL, the setting curve of Relay 
3 has two parts divided by the point with related power factor angle 𝜑𝑖𝑟, which is the 
intersection point of FCL and SCL. So 𝑍𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 at 𝜑𝑖 can be given by: 
 
𝑍𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 = {
𝑍𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑖 , 𝜑𝑖 > 𝜑𝑖𝑟
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑖 ,         𝜑𝑖 ≤ 𝜑𝑖𝑟






2 − 2𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝛿𝑖𝑠
 
(3.23)  
 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛/𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 (3.24)  
𝑍𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑖  and 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑖  represent the setting values on the FCL and SCL respectively; 𝜑𝑖𝑟  are 
rated power factor angle; 𝐸𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥(= 𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥) , 𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥  represent the 
maximum values of field voltage, field current and stator current respectively; 𝛿𝑖𝑠 is the 
load angle if the generator active power  𝑃𝑖𝑔, the low voltage limit 𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝐸𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 are 
specified according to classic generator power equations [1]. 
3.2.5 Eastern Denmark power system 
In this thesis, the 19-bus test system model which is simplified from eastern Denmark 
is built in RTDS with two racks and depicted in Runtime/RTDS, as shown in Fig. 3.7. 
This model contains 19 buses with voltages from 0.7 kV to 400 kV, four central power 
plants and their control (G01, G11, G21 and G22), a Static VAR compensator (SVC), 
several consumption centers modeled by constant power load, a lumped equivalent of 
local wind turbines and an equivalent of a large offshore wide farm [83]. The wind farms 
are equipped with fixed-speed conventional asynchronous generators. The generation and 
load consumption level can be observed in Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix. 
All the four central power plants have applied the governor/turbine model and the 
excitation model (including PSS, SCL and FCL models), which are already introduced in 





backup relay settings in the impedance plane, which are used to initiate alarms to Control 
center and will be explained concretely in the following content. The FCL settings 
apply 𝐼𝑓𝑑01𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐼𝑓𝑑11𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐼𝑓𝑑21𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2.68 𝑝𝑢 , 𝐼𝑓𝑑22𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2.85 𝑝𝑢  and 𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
0.9 𝑝𝑢. The restoration load model is applied for consumption center Load 1 and Load 2. 
And Load 3 and Load 4 are modeled by constant power load. The LTCs are modeled on 
transformer TX0811 (between bus 8 and bus 11) and TX0912 (between bus 9 and bus 12). 
The power components are named based on node numbers, e.g. TL0607a represent one of 
the two lines between bus 6 and bus 7. The detailed parameters can be found in Appendix. 
It should be noted that the SVC (±50Mvar) is placed at bus 16 with the aim to hold 
the voltage at bus 13, which is the connection point between main power system and 
wind farm system. If the SVC is operated in normal control scope, the load variation in 
main power system will not influence the operation of wind farm system. But if the SVC 
hits its capability limit during an overloading situation, it will behavior as same as a 



















Fig. 3.7 The simplified eastern Denmark system model in Runtime/RSCAD 




3.3 Detection of overloading situation in cascading events 
3.3.1 Emergency state detection 
In order to detect the long term voltage stability associated overloading situations 
without disturbing the normal functions of relays, the diverse operation states will be 
defined hereby, which can be explained by Fig. 3.8. 
As for the generator back up relay, the impedance plane in the first quadrant can be 
divided into four areas, which are labeled as Normal area, Urgent area, Zone 3 area and 
Zone 12 area respectively. Zone 3 area is the operation region of Zone 3 element in well-
known zoned distance relays. Similarly, Zone 12 area is the operation regions of Zone 1 
and Zone 2 elements. Normal area represents the Normal state that no limits of the 
generator are reached, and the area between Normal area and Zone 3 area is named 























Fig. 3.8 Areas for operation states of an distance relay on a generator 
Comparing the measured Zai with the setting values of zone circles and capacity limit 
curves, five states can be defined by the relay state signals named Dg1i, Dg2i, Dg3i and 
breaker state signal named Dbi as follows: 
 Normal state, if Zai is in the Normal area, MGi>0, Dg1i= Dg2i=Dg3i=0, Dbi=1. 
 Urgent state, if Zai is in the Urgent area, MGi≤0, Dg1i=Dg2i=0, Dg3i=1, Dbi=1. 
 Zone 3 start state, if Zai is in the Zone 3 area, MGi<0, Dg1i=0, Dg2i=Dg3i=1, Dbi=1. 
 Tripping state, if Zai is in the Zone 12 area, MGi<0, Dg1i= Dg2i=Dg3i=1 and Dbi=1. 





For a distance relay on transmission line ij, the R-X plane can be similarly divided 
into four areas, i.e. Zone 12 area, Zone 3 area, Urgent area and Normal area. Due to the 
different blinders or loadability curves, the urgent area will be different. For an example, 
the distance relay with load encroaching element is shown in Fig. 3.9. In the first 
quadrant of impedance plane, the area circled by blue lines is named as Urgent area in 
which the loading condition is still normal but it is already inside the original Zone 3 area 
and very close to the loadability limit. So in the Urgent area, the trip signal of Zone 3 
relay will be blocked. Three relay state signals named DL1ij, DL2ij, DL3ij will be generated 
together with one breaker state signal named Dbij. So there are also five states for the 
relay on transmission line can be defined accordingly, i.e. Normal state, Urgent state, 























Fig. 3.9 Areas for operation states of an distance relay on a transmission line 
Obviously, the Urgent state and Zone 3 start state will be easier to be initiated under 
the overloading situations. These two states, which are defined as emergency states in 
this thesis, will be mainly focused in following chapters. 
3.3.2 Complex situations related to cascaded blackouts 
All the blackouts initially occurred from some local failures, such as power 
component failures, unexpected protection and control operation, and etc. After the initial 
event, when the system becomes weaker and gradually loses its operation equilibrium 
which will be represented by abnormal voltage and frequency over the system, then the 
local component failures will be propagated from one to another, and a final blackout will 




occur if no suitable prevention measures are taken in time. This kind of disaster is so 
called cascading events and more complex than local ones. In order to easily analyze the 
cascading events and find the solutions to prevent the whole blackouts, the long term 
voltage instability induced cascading events have been simulated in RTDS with above 
described 19-bus test system. 
3.3.2.1 Voltage instability induced blackout scenarios 
As for the 19-bus test system in Fig. 3.10, a severe case of post fault voltage 
instability was initiated by a three phase short circuit fault applied on bus 6 at about 11s. 
The local relays cleared the fault within 0.1s immediately tripping all the lines and 
transformers connected to bus 6. The red cubes represent the breakers are on, and the 
blue ones are off. Then, this system survives an oscillation within about 24s. Due to load 
restoration by the loads and the LTC on transformer TX0912, the stressed network cannot 
support the continually load demand increment. Depending on the diverse states of relay 











Fig. 3.10  The 19-bus test system for cascading events simulation 
(a) Voltage collapse scenario with relay blocked 
The voltage collapse progress with all the Zone 3 relays blocked in the post fault 





in the post fault stage, the normal LTC operations on TX0912 were started to operate at 
about 65s, which tried to recover the voltage on bus 12. Meanwhile, the restoration load 
(described in section 3.2.2) at bus 12 also tried to recover itself. Then after a long time 
voltage decreasing, voltage collapse still occurred at about 210s since all the generators 
hit the capability limits to support prevailing load flows.  
 
(a) Bus voltages                            (b) Field currents of synchronous generators 
Fig. 3.11 Voltage collapse scenario with relays blocked in the post fault stage 
  
(a) The rotor speeds of synchronous generator        (b) Impedance locus of relay RG11 on G11 
   
(b) Impedance locus of relay RTL0809 on TL0809 (d) Impedance locus of relay RTL1009 on TL1009 
Fig. 3.12  Speeds of generator, impedance loci of critical relays during voltage collapse 
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Initial fault at 11s
System recover after oscillation
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Zone 3 with blinder
Initial fault at 11s
Initial trip at 11.1s
System oscillation
Collapse at 210s
LTC operations on TX0912 
LTC operations 




From Fig. 3.12 (a), the speeds of generators are around its nominal values, but voltage 
waveforms in Fig. 3.11 have bigger derivations. When voltage collapse occurred, the 
rotors of generator also run away, which is a classic phenomenon of long term voltage 
instability induced rotor angle instability. 
From Fig. 3.12 (b)-(d), the behaviors of critical relays can be observed. In the 
beginning of post fault stage, G11 was still in the normal region but almost run out of its 
reactive power reserve; the impedance locus was close to its FCL (blue circle in Fig. 3.12 
(b)). During continual LTC operation and load restoration, G11 firstly hit its FCL and the 
state of RG11 was changed from Normal state (0001) to Urgent state (0011) immediately, 
when voltage collapsed, Zone 3 start state was also triggered with state signal as “0111”. 
The relay RTL0809 on transmission line TL0809 was triggered secondly when 
impedance locus entered Zone 3 area at about 86s. From Fig. 3.12 (b), the power factor 
changed a lot compared with the one in the pre fault stage, so the load encroachment 
blinder in brown color could not block this kind of load restoration. The state of RTL0809 
was changed directly from Normal state (0001) to Zone 3 start state (0101). 
When loading level got deteriorated, the relay RTL1009 on transmission line TL1009 
was triggered thirdly when the impedance locus entered its Zone 3 circle. The power 
factor angle on TL1009 was still small, so the blinder could block the load increment 
until the voltage collapsed. So the state of RTL1009 was changed from Normal state (0001), 
then Urgent state (0011) to Zone 3 start state (0111). 
(b) Voltage collapse scenarios with relay activated 
When the traditional relay system is activated in the post fault stage, the different 
voltage collapse progress with cascaded trips can be observed in Fig. 3.13 and Fig. 3. 14. 
In the post fault stage, since load restoration and LTC operations started at about 65s, 
the Zone 3 distance relay RTL0809 on the line between bus 8 and bus 9 was triggered at 
about 86s to trip this important line at 87s unexpectedly. Then the part Area 1 (including 
bus 1, bus 5 and bus 8) was separated from whole network and survived. Thereafter, due 
to about 70% of total load in Area 2, a large amount of power flow was transferred from 
Area 3 (including bus 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) to Area 2 (bus 2, 9, 12) 
through the line (TL1009) between bus 10 and bus 9 to meet the power difference and 
load restoration demand, TL1009 was thus heavily overloaded and tripped by the backup 





to big unbalance between generation and consumption in Area 3 and Area 2, frequency 
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Fig. 3.13 The test system during cascading events 
 
Fig. 3.14 Voltage collapse scenario with relays activated in the post fault stage 
The bus voltages are shown in Fig. 3.14. Apparently, due to the deteriorating effect of 
those unexpected relay operations, the voltage collapsed much faster than the former 
scenario. The relay RG11 on G11 firstly hit its capability limit (FCL), which would send 
alarm state signal to Control center. Also, it had been set with about 5s delay when it 
enters Zone 3 start state. So the relay RTL0809 and RTL1009 tripped the related transmission 







































lines TL0809 and TL1009 firstly. If there was no timely execution of emergency controls, 
G11 in the islanded part Area 2 was tripped finally at about 100s.  
From the waveforms of excitation currents in Fig. 3.15 (a), except G11, other 
generator could output more reactive powers in the post fault stage. But unexpected relay 
operations accelerated the speed of voltage collapse. And the rotors of all the generators 
ran away from nominal values in different directions firstly when the system separated 
into islands, finally ran far away and get cut when voltage collapsed, which can be 
observed in Fig. 3.15 (b).   
The impedance loci of critical relays can be seen in Fig 3.15 (c)-(e). The loci in blue 
color represent the cascaded blackout scenario. RTL0809 tripped TL0809 firstly when 
impedance entered Zone 3 area. RTL1009 was triggered secondly and it could sense the 
effect of the line TL0809 outage, which is shown in Fig. 3.15 (e). The outage of TL0809 
induced the impedance locus of RTL1009 change the direction a little at 88s, and then the 
locus quickly entered Zone 3 circle beyond the blinder, which made RTL1009 change into 
Zone 3 start state and tripped the line TL1009 unexpectedly. Based on the blue locus of 
RG11 in Fig. 3.15 (c), the effects of RTL0809 and RTL1009 operations can be also observed.  
  
(a)  Field currents of generators                         (b) The rotor speeds of generators 
 
(c) Impedance locus of relay RG11 on G11 























































































Initial trip at 11.1sR2 trip at 93s
Collapse at 210s Initial fault at 11s






 (d) Impedance locus of relay RTL0809 on TL0809 
 
(e) Impedance locus of relay RTL1009 on TL1009 
Fig. 3.15 The critical system variables during voltage collapse 
Under the extreme loading situations, these relay operations affect each other and 
make the system condition deteriorated further, which finally form the cascaded 
blackouts. Moreover, the blinder sometime doesn’t work when the power factor change a 
lot. In order to find more effective methods to prevent the overload induced unexpected 
relay operations, the relationships between these cascaded operations need to be carefully 
investigated. 
3.3.2.2 Basic processes of cascading events 
Based on the simulated cascading events and the practical blackouts discussed in 
former chapters, it can be found that the causes of cascading events leading to blackouts 
are diverse, but the basic process seems easy to be identified. The concerned basic 
processes of long term voltage instability induced cascading events are list as follows: 
 Transmission Line or generator tripping due to faults or temporary maintenance 
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  The state signals of related relays on the faulty components will be changed from 
“0001” (Normal state) to “1111” or “1101” (Tripping state) and finally to “XXX0” 
(tripped state, X means “1” or “0”). Or the state signals will be directly changed from 
“0001” to “0000” when the temporary maintenance is required. This basic process 
belongs to the normal operation of relay system, which will be collected and recorded in 
Control center for updating the network data.    
 Overload due to line or generator outage induced load flow transferring 
If the amount of load flow transferring is not that big, then the system can be still run 
in a normal situation. However, if the load flow transferring is big enough to induce the 
related power components and relays violating their setting or loadability limits, then this 
process, which causes the overloading situation and could trigger the cascading trips, 
should be identified. The state signals of related relays will be changed from “0001” 
(Normal state), to “0011” (Urgent state) or even “0111” or “0101” (Zone 3 start state), 
sometimes even to “1111” or “1101” (Tripping state). 
These transitions of state signals can be used for state confirmation and emergency 
control initiation in Control center. Sometimes, when the related relay gets into Zone 3 
start state or Tripping state very fast, it is hard to tell this situation caused by an outage 
induced load transferring or a fault. Then the more accurate identification method should 
be developed to quickly differentiate the overloads from the fault, which will be 
discussed further in next chapter. 
 Overload due to load side voltage control induced load increment 
In this process, the overloading situation is caused by long term load side voltage 
control, i.e. LTC operation and long term load restoration dynamics. The transition of 
state signals will be similar to the former one, except with slow time responses. Together 
with the former process, these two load flow transferring induced overloading situations 
can be seen in Fig. 3.16, the basic events are denoted with black letters while the 
processes are denoted with red letters, and the impedance locus of RTL1009 in blue color 
reflects the processes (red arrows). Before it got tripped at 93s, there were several 
scenarios of load flow transferring. It can be seen that the outage induced load flow 
transferring is faster than LTC induced load increment, and the outage induced load flow 
transferring from 11.1s to 35s did not caused any violation of relays, which belongs to 






Fig. 3.16 Basic processes on the impedance locus of relay RTL1009 
 Transmission line or generator tripping due to overloading situation 
This process were the result of the former two overload processes, and the result of 
this process will induce further load flow transferring if no emergency control gets 
executed. The state signals will be changed from “0011” (Urgent state), “0111” or “0101” 
(Zone 3 start state) to “0010” or “0110” (Tripped state). The example based on former 
simulation case is shown in Fig. 3.17. The state signal of RTL1009 was changed from “0111” 
to “0110” at 93s. 
 
Fig. 3.17 State signals and Basic processes on the impedance locus of relay RTL1009  
 Generator tripping due to abnormal voltage and frequency 
This process can also be regarded as a result of overload processes, if the load is more 
than generation in the island. However, if the generation is more than load in the island, 
then this situation will not belong to voltage instability case. The over frequency relay 
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will be responsible for this situation in the simulation, and state signals of this kind of 
relay can be similarly defined. Since the frequency or angle stability issues are out of the 
scope of this thesis, so it will not be mainly focused. 
Based on identification and analysis of these basic processes of cascading events, the 
composition and progress of whole cascading events in a blackout can be easily figured 
out, as well as the cause-effect relationships between these basic processes can be 
clarified and visualized. Then the related emergency analysis can be taken in different 
stages to produce the early warning information for next event, as well as the suitable 
protection and control strategy will be accordingly designed for those overload processes 
and timely prevent the propagation of cascading events. 
3.4 Summary 
In order to have an in-depth analysis and understanding on cascading events, the 
practical 19-bus eastern Denmark test system have been modeled in RTDS, the detailed 
models of those concerned power components are described, such as FCL model, LTC 
model, restoration load model, distance relay model and etc. Due to the contribution of 
distance relays on cascading events, the loadability of distance relay has been discussed. 
The relay operation margin on impedance plane and related state signals are used as 
effective indicator to express the loadability level locally.  
Based on the appropriate design of test system together with relay system, the 
emergency states of local components can be easily identified by improved distance 
relays. As for the complex situations of cascading events, the basic simple processes are 
used to decompose the whole progress of cascading events and find the cause-effect 
relationships between them. Hereafter, the suitable assessment and preventive protection 
strategy can be implemented in place. 
The load blinder is used in the line distance relay to prevent overload situation, which 
is not that dependable if power factor angle changes a lot. Moreover, in order to effective 
trace the progress of cascaded blackout, identification of those overload induced 
unexpected relay operation is very necessary. So the discrimination of overload situations 






Chapter 4  
Sensitivity analysis for emergency states 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, two defects of load blinders for distance relay can be found: 
 Although the load blinders can improve loadability of Zone 3 relay to some extent; 
the sensitivity of Zone 3 relay as a remote backup protection element will be 
sacrificed at the same time. 
 If a large amount of reactive power is transferred to the critical transmission line 
in the post stage of N-1 (or N-k) contingency, then the power factor angle may not 
always be a dependable indicator to distinguish a heavy load situation from a 
faulty situation. 
In this chapter, in order to better identify the emergency overloading situations in the 
whole system, a sensitivity method will be adopted to online analysis the system 
operation states. The impedance margin sensitivity is proposed to discover the vulnerable 
relays and sensitive controllers under different operation states, which will help online 
monitor system operation states and timely define the effective emergency control 
measures. Also based on the impedance sensitivity, the related identification and 
prediction methods are proposed to fast differentiate load flow transferring induced 
emergency states from the faulty state, i.e. effectively identify the unexpected relay 
operations under the emergency overloading situation. 
The sensitivity method will be briefly introduced in next section; based on impedance 
sensitivity, the emergency state analysis including detection, prediction and identification 
will be described in section 4.3; the case study on the blackout scenarios will be given in 
section 4.4; and finally, the conclusion is made in section 4.5. 




4.2 Brief discussion of sensitivity method 
4.2.1 Sensitivity in Power system 
4.2.1.1 Definition of sensitivity 
Assume that the power system in a steady state can be described by a set of algebraic 
equations in a function form as [84]: 
 𝝈(𝒖, 𝒑) = 𝟎 (4.1) 
where 𝒖  is an n dimension vector of algebraic variables, 𝒑  represents a vector of 
parameters. If the system is operated at a specific point (𝒖𝟎, 𝒑𝟎) , then (4.1) can be 
rewritten as: 
 𝝈(𝒖𝟎, 𝒑𝟎) = 𝟎 (4.2) 
When there is a variation on system operation state, the operation point will be 
changed from (𝒖𝟎, 𝒑𝟎) to (𝒖𝟎 + ∆𝒖,𝒑𝟎 + ∆𝒑), then the equations can be expressed as: 
 𝝈(𝒖𝟎 + ∆𝒖,𝒑𝟎 + ∆𝒑) = 𝟎 (4.3) 
The (4.3) can be expanded at the operation point (𝒖𝟎, 𝒑𝟎) in the form of Taylor series 








∆𝒑 ≈ 𝟎 (4.4) 






∆𝒑 ≈ 𝟎 (4.5) 
The equation (4.5) is the basis of sensitivity analysis, and the coefficient matrices 
𝝏𝝈 𝝏𝒖⁄  and 𝝏𝝈 𝝏𝒑⁄  are so called Jacobian matrices. 








∆𝒑 = 𝓛∆𝒑 (4.6) 
where 𝓛 = −(𝝏𝝈/𝝏𝒖)^(−𝟏) ∗ 𝝏𝝈/𝝏𝒑, is denoted as sensitivity matrix between variable 





Due to the sensitivity information, the direct relationship between 𝒖 and 𝒑 can be 
approximately quantified in the steady states [1]. Based on theories and analysis in [16], 
the long term voltage instability scenarios before the point of collapse commonly present 
the quasi-steady state characteristics. Since the WAMS based data collection and model 
verification is fast enough, the “early warning” on long term voltage instability based on 
sensitivity analysis can be anticipated. 
4.2.1.2 Power flow sensitivity 
Firstly, the related concepts of power flow sensitivity in the area of power system are 
introduced. According to Kirchhoff’s circuit laws [85], the injecting current on bus i can 






where 𝑉𝑗  is the voltage at bus j, 𝑌𝑖𝑗  represents the related element of bus admittance 
matrix, n is the number of buses. This equation can be expressed in polar form: 
 




where 𝜑𝑖𝑗 is the voltage angle difference when current flow through 𝑌𝑖𝑗, 𝜃𝑗  is the voltage 
phase angle at bus j. Then according to the formula (4.9) and (4.10) of complex power at 
bus i, the active power 𝑃𝑖  and reactive power 𝑄𝑖  can be given by (4.11) and (4.12) 
respectively, where 𝜃𝑖 is the voltage phase angle at bus i. 
 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑗𝑄𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖
∗𝐼𝑖 (4.9) 
 
𝑃𝑖 − 𝑗𝑄𝑖 = |𝑉𝑖|∠−𝜃𝑖∑|𝑌𝑖𝑗||𝑉𝑗|∠𝜑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (4.10)  
 
𝑃𝑖 =∑|𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑗||𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜑𝑖𝑗 − 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (4.11)  
 
𝑄𝑖 = −∑|𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑗||𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜑𝑖𝑗 − 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (4.12)  




As for a power system, a set of nonlinear algebraic equations can be composed by 
(4.11) and (4.12), which are classic power flow equations for power system analysis. 




























































































































 (4.13)  
where the variables or parameters with superscript “0” represent initial values of related 























] (4.14)  
where the submatrices 𝑱𝟏, 𝑱𝟐, 𝑱𝟑, 𝑱𝟒 represent derivative matrices of ∆𝑷, ∆𝑸 to ∆𝜽, ∆|𝑽| 






] (4.15)  
There are several simplification methods for power flow Jacobian calculation, such as 
decoupled method, direct current method and etc [85]. If the more accurate information 
under the overloading situation is the aim to be pursued, the basic calculation method 
expressed by (4.14) is better but with slower calculation speed than those simplified 
methods. 
4.2.2 Impedance margin sensitivity to power system variables 
4.2.2.1 Sensitivity of relay margin to bus voltage 
(a) Sensitivity of relay operation margin on transmission lines 
According to equation (3.12) and the linearization method, the sensitivity of 





based on power flow of the current operation point. 𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑗  is the sensitivity vector 
including the sensitivities of  the relay margin 𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗 to related bus voltages (𝜃𝑖, 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑉𝑖, 𝑉𝑗). 
 ∆𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑇𝜃𝑖∆𝜃𝑖 + 𝐶𝑇𝜃𝑗∆𝜃𝑗 + 𝐶𝑇𝑣𝑖∆𝑉𝑖 + 𝐶𝑇𝑣𝑗∆𝑉𝑗 (4.16)  












So at a specific operation point, taking all the concerned relays into consideration, the 
linearized sensitivity of relay operation margin can be given in matrix form as (4.18), 
where 𝑪𝑻𝜽  and 𝑪𝑻𝑽  are submatrices of sensitivity matrix 𝑪𝑻  related to the relays on 
transmission lines. 
 ∆𝑴𝑻 = 𝑪𝑻 [
∆𝜽
∆𝑽
] = [𝑪𝑻𝜽 𝑪𝑻𝑽] [
∆𝜽
∆𝑽
] (4.18)  
(b) Sensitivity of relay operation margin on generators 
Similarly, sensitivity calculation can be taken on generator backup relay operation 
margin. Based on the analysis in the section 3.2.4.2, the generator relay operation margin 
is mainly related to bus voltages together with some other variables, such as 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖. 
For the operation margin sensitivity of the relays on synchronous generators, there are 
two situations to be considered according to the equations (3.18)-(3.24). Also, the active 
power and reactive power of the generator i can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑔𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜑𝑖 =
𝑉𝑖𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑖𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖
𝑋𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝛿𝑖 (4.19)  
 







 (4.20)  
 Under field current limiter 
When 𝜑𝑖 > 𝜑𝑟, the FCL is the first constraint to be violated under the overloading 
situation, so the generator relay margin 𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙
 can be given by (4.21). Then the linear 
relationship and sensitivity vector 𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙
 of the relay operation margin are given by (4.22) 
and (4.23), where ∆𝑉𝑖, ∆𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖, ∆𝛿𝑖 are variations of the related voltage, field current and 






 are the sensitivities of 𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙
 to the variables 
𝑉𝑖, 𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖, 𝛿𝑖 respectively. 



































] (4.23)  
When the generator i hits the FCL, i.e. 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑑 = 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥  and 𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙
≤ 0, suppose the 
active power 𝑃𝑔𝑖 is constant, then from (4.19), the angle 𝛿𝑖 is a function of 𝑉𝑖. Also from 
(4.20), 𝑄𝑔𝑖 will also change with 𝑉𝑖, so this type of node can be regarded as PIf  node 
[86]. Considering 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑑 = 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 in a long run, i.e. ∆𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑖 = 0, the equation (4.22) can be 
accordingly simplified as (4.24). The related sensitivity 𝐶𝐺𝑉𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙′
given by (4.25), indicates 
that this generator is mainly related to bus voltage in the prevailing state; 𝐶𝐺𝛿𝑖𝑉𝑖
𝑓𝑐𝑙
 is the 






























 (4.25)  
 Under stator current limiter 
When 𝜑𝑖 ≤ 𝜑𝑟, the SCL will be the first constraint to be hit during load restoration. 










Then the measured impedance 𝑍𝑎𝑖 and relay margin 𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙 can be given by (4.27) and 
(4.28) respectively. Similarly, the linear relationship and sensitivity vector 𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙  of the 
relay operation margin are given by (4.29) and (4.30), where ∆𝑉𝑖 and ∆𝐼𝑠𝑖 are variations 
of the related voltage and stator current respectively; 𝐶𝐺𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙  and 𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙 are the sensitivities of 
𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙 to the variables 𝑉𝑖  and 𝐼𝑠𝑖 respectively. 
 𝑍𝑎𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖/𝐼𝑠𝑖  (4.27)  
 𝑀𝐺𝑖




















] (4.30)  
When the generator hits the SCL, i.e. 𝑀𝐺𝑖
𝑠𝑐𝑙 ≤ 0, 𝐼𝑠𝑖 = 𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥, ∆𝐼𝑠𝑖 = 0; and its linear 





𝑠𝑐𝑙∆𝑉𝑖 (4.31)  
So in the Normal state, taking all the concerned relays into consideration, the 
sensitivity of relay operation margin can be given in matrix form as (4.32), where 𝑪𝑮𝑽, 
𝑪𝑮𝑰𝒇𝒅 , 𝑪𝑮𝑰𝒔 , 𝑪𝑮𝜹  are submatrices of sensitivity matrix 𝑪𝑮  related to the relays on 
generators. Also, with the division angle φr , sensitivity matrices will be calculated 

































] ,                             𝝋 ≤ 𝝋𝒓
 (4.32)  
But in those emergency operation states, the linear form of 𝑴𝑮
′  and sensitivity 𝑪𝑮
′  on 




′ ∆𝑽 = {
𝑪𝑮𝑽
𝒇𝒄𝒍′
∆𝑽, 𝝋 > 𝝋𝒓
𝑪𝑮𝑽
𝒔𝒄𝒍∆𝑽,          𝝋 ≤ 𝝋𝒓
 (4.33)  
4.2.2.2 Sensitivity of relay margin to injection power 
Suppose that the power flowing into the bus is positive. Based on load flow Jacobian 
𝑱, the sensitivities of relay margins to bus powers can be derived from (4.34) and (4.35) at 
the current operation point, where 𝑯𝑻, 𝑯𝑮 are sensitivity matrices of impedance margins 
of relays on transmission lines and generators respectively; 𝑯𝑻𝑷, 𝑯𝑻𝑸 are the submatrices 
of 𝑯𝑻; 𝑯𝑮𝑷, 𝑯𝑮𝑸 are submatrices of 𝑯𝑮; ∆𝑷, ∆𝑸 are the variations of  active and reactive 
powers;  𝑱𝑻
−𝟏 and 𝑱𝑮
−𝟏 are submatrices of 𝑱−𝟏. 
 
∆𝑴𝑻 = 𝑯𝑻 [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] = [𝑯𝑻𝑷  𝑯𝑻𝑸] [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] (4.34)  
 
∆𝑴𝑮 = 𝑯𝑮 [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] = [𝑯𝑮𝑷  𝑯𝑮𝑸] [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] (4.35)  
where 




 𝑯𝑻 = 𝑪𝑻𝑱𝑻
−𝟏 (4.36)  
 𝑯𝑮 = 𝑪𝑮
′ 𝑱𝑮
−𝟏 (4.37)  
If the injection powers are with constant power factor 𝒄𝒐𝒔∅ and the node types are 
neglected, then based on (4.34)-(4.37) and online data of injection powers, the sensitivity 
matrix 𝑯𝑺  between the relay margins 𝑴  and the apparent injection powers 𝑺  can be 
deduced by (4.38).   
 
∆𝑴  = 𝑯 [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] = [𝑯𝑷  𝑯𝑸] [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] = 𝑯𝑷∆𝑷 + 𝑯𝑸∆𝑸 
= (𝑯𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒔∅ + 𝑯𝑸𝒔𝒊𝒏∅)∆𝑺 = 𝑯𝑺∆𝑺 
(4.38)  
where 𝑯 is the sensitivity matrix of impedance margin 𝑴 to 𝑷 and 𝑸; 𝑯𝑷 and 𝑯𝑸 are the 
submatrices of 𝑯. ∆𝑷 and ∆𝑸 can be injection power variations of generators or the ones 
of loads. 
4.2.2.3 Sensitivity of relay margin to tap ratio 
Assume the variation of tap ratio on a transformer is ∆𝑟, if other control parameters 
keep unchanged, then the bus voltages will change as well as line currents, so the 
measured impedances by relays will change. Then the sensitivity matrix ℒ𝑴𝒓 between 
load bus voltages 𝑽 and tap ratios 𝒓 can be given by: 
 ∆𝑽 = ℒ𝑴𝒓∆𝒓 (4.39)  
As for the branch ij with a tap changing transformer, as shown in Fig. 4.1, when the 
tap ratio 𝑟 is at the nominal value, the transformer is represented by a series impedance 
𝑧𝑡(= 1/𝑦𝑡). With an off nominal ratio, the impedance on this branch is different due to 
















 (a)Transformer with tap ratio r:1          (b)  Equivalent circuit for tap changing transformer 





The Π model equivalent circuit considering the off nominal tap ratio is shown in Fig. 















                     𝑡𝑎𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (4.40)  
When the tap ratio is changed by ∆𝑟, the node admittance matrix Y will be changed, 
and power flow on this branch will be changed accordingly, which induce the injection 
powers at related nodes change. Assume 𝑦𝑖𝑗∠𝜑𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗 , then based on power 














































)𝑉𝑖𝑉𝑗(𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑖𝑗 + 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑖𝑗)                          
𝜕𝑄𝑘
𝜕𝑟
= 0                                                               (𝑘 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗)
 (4.41)  
where 𝜃𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑖, bus i is at the tap side. 












] (4.42)  
where 𝓛𝑷𝒓𝟏… 𝓛𝑷𝒓𝒏 and 𝓛𝑸𝒓𝟏… 𝓛𝑸𝒓𝒏 are the submatrices of 𝓛𝑺𝒓. 
From equations (4.41) and (4.42), the 𝓛𝑺𝒓 is a sparse matrix, there are at most two 
non-zero elements in each column, which is related to the nodes of tap changing 
transformer branch. 
Therefore, according to the equations (4.34) and (4.35), the linear form of  ∆𝑴 to tap 
ratios can be given by: 








] = 𝓛𝑴𝒓∆𝒓 (4.43)  
and the related sensitivity matrices can be obtained by: 
 𝓛𝑴𝒓 = 𝑯𝓛𝑺𝒓 (4.44)  
4.3 Emergency state analysis 
4.3.1 Detection of vulnerable relays 
Detection of vulnerable areas and main supply paths in a power system is very 
significant for power system secure operation, which is a precondition for an effective 
implementation of special protection and emergency control. 
Based on online sensitivity analysis between relay operation margins and power 
system variables, the sensitive relays and related main supply sets to critical loads can be 
quickly and easily defined. Also in Chapter III, the backup setting of distance relay is 
designed with the consideration of loadability, so the dispersed relays can provide prompt 
and accurate information locally related to overload emergency situations. 
4.3.1.1 The supply sets to critical loads  
(a) Critical load searching 
Since the load variations on different load buses will make different effects on the 
margins of dispersed relays, in order to search the critical loads which have bigger effects, 
a performance index related to load effect on relay is proposed here. 
Suppose all the distributed relays in a power system are collected as set A, power 
components are collected as set B (in which 𝐵𝐺 denotes the set of generators, 𝐵𝑇 denotes 
the set of transmission lines and 𝐵𝐿 denotes the set of loads). Based on prevailing system 
data, a performance index 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿  is defined by (4.45) to evaluate the total effect of a 
variation of load i on all the relays in the positive direction.  
 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑗
𝑗∈A+
 (4.45)  
where 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑖 is the performance index of load 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ 𝐵𝐿); 𝐻𝑀𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the impedance margin 
sensitivity between load 𝑖  and relay 𝑗; A+  represents the all the relays in the positive 










 (4.46)  
In (4.46), 𝑀𝑗 is the operation margin of relay 𝑗, and 𝑀𝑘 is the operation margin of relay 𝑘, 
𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ A+. Obviously, the weight of relay 𝑗 is inverse proportional to its prevailing relay 
operation margin. Based on the performance indexes 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿, the critical loads which have 
bigger influences on impedance margins can be found and grouped as 𝐵𝐿
′  with a preset 
threshold 𝜉2. 
(b) The supply sets to critical loads 
Then according to the equation (4.38), the sensitivity matrix 𝑯𝑴𝑩′𝑳  between all 
related relay operation margins 𝑴𝑨 and selected load powers 𝑺𝑩′𝑳 of loads in 𝐵𝐿
′  can be 
obtained by: 
 ∆𝑴𝑨 = 𝑯𝑴𝑩′𝑳∆𝑺𝑩′𝑳 (4.47)  
Based on 𝑯𝑴𝑩′𝑳, the related sensitive relays (with the absolute value of sensitivity 
bigger than a selection threshold 𝜉1) to the load points in 𝐵𝐿
′  can be easily found and 
grouped as a set 𝐴𝐿. Then the corresponding set of transmission lines 𝐵𝑇𝐿is the set of 
main power flow paths to the critical loads. 
Meanwhile, also based on equation (4.38), the sensitivity matrix 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮 between the 
critical relay margins 𝑴𝑨𝑳 in 𝐴𝐿 and the apparent generator powers 𝑺𝑮 can be given by: 
 ∆𝑴𝑨𝑳 = 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮∆𝑺𝑮 (4.48)  
Based on 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮, the relative sensitive generators (with a selection threshold 𝜉3) to the 
relays in 𝐴𝐿  can be found subsequently and grouped as 𝐵𝐺𝐿, which is the set of main 
sources supplying the load flow. In this way, the sensitive maps (which are built by links 
from critical loads, through sensitive transmission lines and related relays, to generators) 
can be depicted directly and easily, as shown in Fig. 4.2. 
Critical loads B' L by 
PIBL and ξ2
Sensitive relays AL 
by HMB' L and ξ1
Sensitive generators 
BGL by HALG and ξ3
 
Fig. 4.2 Sensitive map between loads, relays and generators 




4.3.1.2 Vulnerable relay detection 
(a) Performance indexes of relays 
Based on the definition of sensitivity, the margin sensitivities of relays to those 
critical loads represent the variation speed of margins to load variations. Moreover, the 
distance from measured apparent impedance to the setting, i.e. the margin of relay i ( 𝑀𝑖), 
is already a useful index to show whether this relay and related power component are 
operated close to their loadability limit in a Normal state. Also in the emergency states, 
the margin represents the distance to be recovered to Normal state. So in order to 
discover the relays which are more vulnerable to load variations, a performance index 







|𝑀1|,⋯ , ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝐵𝐿′ /
|𝑀𝑛|}
 (4.49)  
where 𝑃𝐼𝑟𝑗 is the performance index of relay j in 𝐴𝐿; 𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the margin sensitivity of 
relay j to the critical load i in 𝐵𝐿
′ ; 𝑀𝑗  is the online measured margin of relay j; n 
represents the number of all the related sensitive relays in 𝐴𝐿; and 𝑤𝑖 is the related weight 
of load 𝑖, which is expressed as: 
 𝑤𝑖 = |𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑖| ∑ |𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑘|
𝑘∈𝐵𝐿
′
⁄  (4.50)  
𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑖 represents the performance index of load i, 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑘 is the performance index of load 
k in critical load set 𝐵𝐿
′ . The load with bigger 𝑤𝑖  means relay margins will be more 
vulnerable to this load. Since the power injected into bus node is assumed positive, only 
the relays in the positive direction with positive sensitivities are considered here under 
overloading situations. 
It can be seen from equation (4.49), if the relay j has bigger 𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿𝑖𝑗 and smaller |𝑀𝑖|, 
the 𝑃𝐼𝑟𝑗  will be bigger, which means this relay are more vulnerable to the load 
increments; otherwise, the related relay is less vulnerable. Based on 𝑃𝐼𝑟𝑗, the n relays in 
𝐴𝐿 can be classified into two sets with a threshold 𝜉1
′ , i.e. high vulnerable set and low 
vulnerable set, which is important for emergency state monitoring and emergency control 





(b) State signals of each relay 
Based on the design of distance relay in Chapter III, according to state signals of 
relays and breakers, the Control center (CC) can sense the critical relays in emergency 
states immediately. From Fig. 4.3, the five states can be detected according to the 
prevailing position of 𝑍𝑎𝑖 and breaker states; and the detailed meanings of signal codes 
for different states can be found in the section 3.3.1.  
In the Normal state (0001) or tripping state (1111 or 1101), the CC will do nothing 
but keep its monitoring function. Those relays in Urgent state (0011) and Zone 3 start 
state (0111 or 0101) will be grouped into set 𝐴𝐿
′ , which will be selected to do sensitivity 
analysis and preparation for related emergency control strategy defining. If the relay is 
already in tripped state (XXX0) with the breaker signal set to “0”, the CC will register 










































Fig. 4.3 Diverse operation states and related state signals detected by relays 
This method is more direct and fast than the sensitivity method, but the sensitivity 
analysis can supply more information for both normal and emergency situations. 
(c) Vulnerable relay detection 
Based on the methods discussed above, the flowchart of vulnerable relay detection 
combining both two methods can be depicted in Fig. 4.4. 
By virtue of WAMS, the sensitivity analysis in this thesis, which includes sensitivity 
calculation, vulnerable relay detection and related supply sets formation, can be done in 
Control center. On the other side, the local relays can do their local measurements and 
decisions on which states they are in; meanwhile they can share their data and state 




signals with Control center in the environment based on MAS (detailed explanations are 
made in Chapter VI). Then the vulnerable relays in both normal operation situation and 
overloading situation can be accurately detected by the MAS based control system, 






















Fig. 4.4  Vulnerable relay detection 
4.3.2 Detection of sensitive controllers 
In order to timely adjust the emergency states and prevent the unexpected relay 
operations, three control measures (i.e. the load shedding, generator reschedule and 
inverse load tap changer control) will be mainly adopted. Take the overload induced 
Zone 3 start state for an example, the emergency load shedding and generator reschedule 
would be adopted as main control measures. Before the execution of control measures, 
the effective controllers can be found out based on sensitivity information. 
The sensitivities 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺  between critical relays in 𝐴𝐿
′  and injection powers are then 
adopted here to search the sensitive control points, as given by (4.51). If the generators 
and loads are located on different buses, also the generators or loads on the same bus are 
integrated into one generator or load, then 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺  can be easily divided into two 
submatrices 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮 and 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳, which are the sensitivity matrices of 𝑴𝑨′𝑳 to generator 
and load powers (𝑺𝑮 and 𝑺𝑳) respectively, and given by (4.52). 
 ∆𝑴𝑨′𝑳  = 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺∆𝑺 (4.51)  
 
∆𝑴𝑨′𝑳 = H𝑨′𝑳𝑺∆𝑺 = [𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮   𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳] [
∆𝑺𝑮
∆𝑺𝑳
] (4.52)  
If one generator and one load on the same bus i need to be considered separately, the 





can be expressed by (4.53), with the assumption that only one critical relay is detected in 
the set 𝐴𝐿
′ : 
 [𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮   𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳] = [… ,𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝑖, … , … ,𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝑖, …] (4.53)  
Obviously, at this situation, the dimension of [𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮   𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳] will be bigger than 
H𝑨′𝑳𝑺. And the bus i can be used as a control point for both LS and GR.  
In this way, the relationships between critical relays in 𝐴𝐿
′   and those injection powers 
(generators in 𝐵𝐺  and loads in 𝐵𝐿 ) are defined by sensitivity matrices. According to 
𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮 and 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳, the sensitive control points for GR and LS can be easily obtained and 
classified. Actually for a critical relay, only few control points with larger absolute values 
of sensitivities have the significant effects on the relay operation margin. 
(a) Performance indexes of controllers 
Normally except the related sensitivities, the control effects of both LS and GR 
controllers will be limited by many other factors, such as the control orders from CC, 
prevailing operation states of controllers and their regulation limits. Here consider 
regulation limits and related sensitivities, the performance indexes of these controllers 
can be given by: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖 =
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗∈𝐴𝐿′  |𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑗|∆𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
max
𝑛
{∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗∈𝐴𝐿′  |𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆1𝑗|∆𝑆1𝑚𝑎𝑥,⋯ ,
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗∈𝐴𝐿′  |𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝑛𝑗|∆𝑆𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥}
 (4.54)  
where 𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖 is the performance index of controller i; 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑗 is the margin sensitivity of 
relay j in 𝐴𝐿
′  to the control point i (generator or load); n represents the number of all the 
related sensitive control points; ∆𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the regulation limits of control point i; and 𝑤𝑗 
is the related weight of relay 𝑗, which is expressed as: 
 𝑤𝑗 = |𝑀𝑗| ∑ |𝑀𝑘|
𝑘∈𝐴𝐿
′  
⁄  (4.55)  
In the emergency states, the margins of relays in 𝐴𝐿
′  are negative, so when |𝑀𝑗| is 
bigger, the relay j is harder to be recovered, which is different with the normal situation.  
Based on related 𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖, the effective generator and load controllers will be selected as 
set 𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿  and 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿  with threshold 𝜉2
′  and 𝜉3
′  respectively. Then sensitive map and 
inclusion relationship between those sensitive and vulnerable sets can be observed in Fig. 
4.5. Normally, 𝐴𝐿
′ ⊂ 𝐴𝐿, 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿 ⊂ 𝐵𝐺𝐿. 
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Fig. 4.5 Sensitive map and inclusion relation between sensitive sets 
4.3.3 Emergency state prediction and identification 
Based on the vulnerable relay detection methods proposed above, not only the 
specific states can be detected, but also sensitive relationships between related relays and 
power components can be defined. However in the complex situation, i.e. cascading 
events, the reasons inducing an emergency state may be very diffident. If the unexpected 
relay operation cannot be identified and blocked, those sensitivity based analysis methods 
and subsequent emergency controls will be meaningless. So identification and prediction 
are significant for overload emergency states after outage contingencies or those 
unexpected control operations. 
4.3.3.1 Load flow transferring due to line outage 
(a) N-1 situation 
Line outage induced load flow transferring to overload, as a basic process of 
cascading events, may trigger the unexpected relay operations. With the aim of finding 
the influence factors between relay measured impedance and load flow transferring, the 
sensitivity method can also be applied here. The impedance seen by Relay 1 in Fig. 4.6 
can be rewritten with (4.56)-(4.58). 
Line l
SijÐjlineij
Bus i Bus j
Connect to other part 
of network
Relay 1 Relay 2
 
Fig. 4.6 Traditional distance relay on Line l  
 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝑗𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗 (4.56)  
 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≈



















 (4.58)  
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑖𝑗
−1
= 𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝑗𝐵𝑖𝑗, 𝑍𝑖𝑗 is the impedance of Line l ignoring the susceptance 
to the ground. 
 Impedance sensitivity to system operation variables 
Similar to impedance margin sensitivity formula (4.16) (4.17), the linearized form of 
(4.57) (4.58) is given by (4.59) (4.60). 
 ∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑅𝜃𝑖∆𝜃𝑖 + 𝐶𝑅𝜃𝑗∆𝜃𝑗 + 𝐶𝑅𝑣𝑖∆𝑉𝑖 + 𝐶𝑅𝑣𝑗∆𝑉𝑗  (4.59)  











































where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the sensitivity matrix including the sensitivities of impedance (𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗) to 
related bus voltages (𝜃𝑖, 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑉𝑖, 𝑉𝑗), 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑗 are submatrices of 𝐶𝑖𝑗. 
Taking all the concerned relays into consideration, the sensitivity of impedance can 
be expressed in the matrix form as (4.62) (4.63); also based on load flow Jacobian 𝑱, the 
sensitivity 𝑯  of impedance to injection powers can be derived from (4.64), where 
































] (4.63)  
where 
 𝑯 = 𝑪𝑱−𝟏 (4.64)  
 Flow transferring prediction and identification 
In order to predict the post outage load flow transferring based on pre outage system 
data, the simulation method of line outage is shown in Fig. 4.7. Fig. 4.7 (a) is a network 




operated in normal situation without line outage. Suppose line l from bus m to bus n was 
tripped by circuit breakers due to some kind of fault, as shown in Fig. 4.7 (b). A line 
outage may be modeled by adding two virtual power injections (∆𝑃𝑚, ∆𝑄𝑚, ∆𝑃𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑛) to 
the network, one at each end of the line to be tripped [84], which is shown in Fig. 4.7 (c). 
At the situation of Fig. 4.7 (c), the line is still kept in the network, and the effects of its 
being tripped are modeled by the virtual injections.  
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Bus m Bus n
Connect to other part 
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(a) Network before line l outage 
Line l
Bus m Bus n












(b) Network after line l outage           (c) Modeling the outage by injections 
Fig. 4.7 Line outage simulation in power network 
With the aim of making these two situations have the equal effect, the virtual power 
flow on line l is only supplied by the virtual power injections in Fig. 4.7 (c), i.e. the 
necessary requirements about the active power and reactive power on line l (considering 
the susceptance to the ground) should be satisfied as: 
 𝑃𝑚𝑛
′ = 𝑃𝑚𝑛 + ∆𝑃𝑚𝑛 = ∆𝑃𝑚 = −∆𝑃𝑛 (4.65)  
 
𝑄𝑚𝑛


















′ = 𝑉𝑚 + ∆𝑉𝑚 (4.67)  
 𝑉𝑛










′  represent these variables in the post fault state; ∆𝑃𝑚𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑚𝑛, ∆𝑉𝑚  and 
∆𝑉𝑛  represent the variations of these variables when the virtual injections have been 
applied, b is the susceptance of line l to ground. 
In this way, it can be assumed that line l is isolated from the remainder of the network 
even though the breakers are closed. Compared the situation in Fig. 4.7 (c) with Fig. 4.7 
(a), the variations are mainly expressed by those virtual injections. So if the ∆𝑃𝑚, ∆𝑄𝑚 
and ∆𝑃𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑛 can be obtained, the variation of impedances in the relays of rest lines can 
be easily deduced by (4.63) based on pre fault system data. 
 Virtual injection powers calculation 
The line flows 𝑃𝑚𝑛, 𝑄𝑚𝑛 of the line l can be expressed as: 
 𝑃𝑚𝑛 = 𝑉𝑚𝑉𝑛(𝐺𝑚𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑚𝑛 + 𝐵𝑚𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑚𝑛) − 𝐺𝑚𝑛𝑉𝑚
2 (4.69)  
 𝑄𝑚𝑛 ≈ −𝑉𝑚𝑉𝑛(𝐺𝑚𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑚𝑛 − 𝐵𝑚𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑚𝑛) − 𝐵𝑚𝑛𝑉𝑚
2 (4.70)  
Then the linear relationship between line flow and these virtual injection powers can 















] (4.71)  
 𝐿𝑚𝑛 = 𝐷𝑚𝑛𝐽𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑛
−1 (4.72)  
where 𝐷𝑚𝑛  is the sensitivity matrix including the sensitivities of line flow to the bus 
voltages (𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑗 , 𝑉𝑖 , 𝑉𝑗), 𝐿𝑚𝑛  is the sensitivity matrix of line flow to virtual injections. 
𝐽𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑛 is the submatrix of load flow Jacobian 𝑱. 
According to load flow sensitivities in the pre fault state, ∆Vmand ∆𝑉𝑛can be also 
expressed by ∆𝑃𝑚, ∆𝑄𝑚, ∆𝑃𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑛, then based on equations (4.65)-(4.72),  ∆𝑃𝑚, ∆𝑄𝑚 , 
∆𝑃𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑛 can be calculated easily. 
 Sensitivity based relay impedance prediction 
When the virtual injection variations ∆𝑃𝑚, ∆𝑄𝑚  and ∆𝑃𝑛, ∆𝑄𝑛 are obtained, the 
impedances seen by relays in the post fault state can be previously calculated based on 




the pre fault sensitivities. Based on equation (4.63), the predicted impedance variations 
(∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑙 , ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗

















] (4.73)  
where 𝐽𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑛  is the submatrix of load flow Jacobian 𝑱, and 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑛  is the submatrix of 𝑯 
defined by (4.64). 
 Flow transferring identification 
After the line l is tripped by the related relay to clear the fault, the practical 
impedance can be real time measured by the relays on the remaining transmission lines, 
named by 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑀 ; and the predicted one can be named by 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 . It can be inferred that in 
those outage induced load flow transferring cases, 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃  and 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑀  will be approximately 
same; while in the cases of internal faults, this condition cannot be satisfied. In order to 
distinguish the load flow transferring from internal faults, the identification criterion can 
be written as: 
 |𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑀 − 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 | < 1|𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗

















0  and 𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
0 are measured impedance in the pre fault state; ∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃  and ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃  are predicted 
variation of the impedance in the post fault state; 1  represents the threshold of error 
caused by linearization and neglecting transient characteristics of components. If the 
criterion holds, this relay will define this trigger caused by line outage induced flow 
transferring. It should be blocked or extend the delay settings until this line reached its 
thermal limit, and the emergency countermeasures should be taken to eliminate the 
overload situation. Otherwise, if the criterion cannot hold, the relay system will define 
this situation as an internal fault and trip the line according to traditional functions. The 
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Fig. 4.8  Flowchart of N-1 line outage induced load flow transferring identification 
 Transient period consideration 
So far in the identification and predication method, the network structure and all other 
node injections have been assumed unchanged. However, during transient period in the 
post fault stage, node injection powers are not constant, especially the reactive powers of 
generators, which is the main reason of error production. Assume that the load model 
applies static constant power load, the variation of generator node injection should be 
only considered then. So, according to superposition principle, the final predicted relay 
impedance variation (∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 , ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗



























































 (4.78)  




𝐽𝑖𝑗𝑔 and 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑔 are the submatrices of 𝑱 and 𝑯 respectively, which represent the sensitivities 
of node voltages and relay impedances to generator node injections. ∆𝑃𝑔1, ∆𝑄𝑔1⋯∆𝑃𝑔𝑛, 
∆𝑄𝑔𝑛 represent the variations of n generator node injections. 
Actually, the sensitivity matrix 𝑯 between impedances and injection powers is a high 
order matrix and the values of most elements in each line are quite small, which means 
for specific branch in the network, few node injections have the significant influence on 
the relay measured impedances. So in order to decrease the measurement points in the 
post fault stage, the generator nodes with bigger performance index will be chosen to be 
considered in the prediction algorithm.  
(b) N-k situation 
If the N-k outage is composed by one after one N-1 outage, then the N-1 outage 
identification method can still be effective. However, if the N-k outage occurs at one time, 
then this method is hard to be realized due to calculation complexity of virtual injection 
powers, e.g. 5 branches got cut by the relays due to a bus bar fault in the blackout 
scenario on 19-bus test system. 
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In the case of one time N-k outage, the communication based on MAS environment 
and WAMS will be mainly relied on. The online state signals of relays on the related 
components will be collected firstly once the N-k outage occurs, and then related 
impedance sensitivity matrix will be calculated based on updated system wide 
information. Meanwhile the variation of generator nodes and load nodes will be 
considered as well. In this way, the impedance variation (∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 , ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 ) on any line ij in 
the post N-k outage can be predicted as well. The workflow chart can be seen in Fig. 4.9. 
4.3.3.2 Load flow transferring due to LTC operations 
Based on the analysis on the blackout scenarios in Chapter 3, the normal LTC 
operation under heavy loading situation is also regarded as an unexpected control 
operation which could induce overloading situation and trigger the unexpected relay 
operations. In order to identify this kind of overload, similarly, sensitivity based 
prediction and identification method can be defined.  
 Impedance sensitivity to tap ratios 
The equivalent circuit and impedance margin sensitivity model for transformer with 
tap changer are already given in 4.2.2.3, similarly, according to the equations (4.43), the 





] = 𝑯 [
∆𝑷
∆𝑸
] = 𝓛𝒁𝒓∆𝒓 (4.79)  
where 𝓛𝒁𝒓  is the sensitivity matrix between measured impedances and tap ratios, and 
given by: 
 𝓛𝒁𝒓 = 𝑯𝓛𝐒𝐫 (4.80)  
 Sensitivity based relay impedance prediction 
Base on the sensitivity model, the impedances seen by relays can be previously 
calculated before every next step of LTC operations. Then based on the equation (4.81), 
the predicted impedance variations (∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑙𝑡, ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑙𝑡) on any transmission line ij after next 










] (4.81)  
Here assume k LTCs change their taps by one step at the same time, if all their 
operations are at the different time, then there could be only one element in the matrix 
∆𝒓 = [∆r1 … ∆rk]
𝑻. 𝓛𝒁𝒓.𝒊𝒋𝒌 is the submatrix of 𝓛𝒁𝒓. 




 LTC operation identification 
Similarly, in order to identify the unexpected LTC operation induced overloading 
situation, the identification criterion based on measured data 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑀  and predicted data 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃  
can be given by: 
 |𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑀 − 𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃 | < 2|𝑍𝑎𝑖𝑗

















0  and 𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
0 are measured impedance before every next step of tap operation; ∆𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑙𝑡 and 
∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑙𝑡are predicted variation of the impedance after every next step; 2 is the threshold of 
errors. 
The identification rules are almost the same with the case of load flow transferring 
induced overload, except the block signal will be also sent to related LTC controllers to 
stop their continually unexpected operation. The flowchart of this identification method is 
shown in Fig. 4.10. 
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4.4 Case study 
4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Take the 19-bus test power system in Fig. 3.7 for an example; the sensitivity analysis 
can be conducted based on the former descriptions.  
4.4.1.1 Initial normal situation 
In a normal operation state, the status information of generation and load 
consumption level can be observed in Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix. A.1. Firstly, 
based on the physical structure and blackout scenario analysis (in former chapter), the test 
system can be divided into four areas, and it can be easily found the biggest load 
consumption center (Load 1) is at Bus 12 in Area 2 and take up about 70% of total load, 
and all the generators in the whole system supply the power to this load. The load set 𝐵𝐿 
is given by 𝐵𝐿 = {Load 1, Load 2, Load 3, Load 4}. 















Total generation: 4119.8 MVA
Total load: 4029.8 MVA
Total loss: 90 MVA
 
Fig. 4.11Power data and physical areas in eastern Denmark system 
Then, the sensitivities 𝑯𝑴𝑩𝑳  between all distance relays and loads in this normal 
operation state can be calculated quickly, as shown in Table 4.1. The performance 
indexes 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿  of four loads are also given in the table with green color. By virtue of 
directional characteristics considered in the distance relay settings, the relays in the 




negative direction are neglected because they won’t be easy to be affected by overloading 
operation conditions. Based on 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝐿, the critical load set can be easily obtained: 𝐵𝐿
′ =
{Load 1}, the threshold is set as 𝜉2 = 3, considering the size and type of the loads. 
Also since the SVC (±50Mvar) at Bus 16 is set to control the voltage of Bus 13 
(135kV), and only wind generators are in Area 4 with limited capacities, the distance 
relays in this area are not easy to be influenced by load variations, except the case when 
the SVC hits its limit and the voltages in Area 4 decreased a lot. So in the Normal state of 
SVC operation, the relays in this area with their sensitivities in olive green color in Table 
4.1 are not considered in the sensitivity analysis. 
Table 4.1 Performance index 𝑷𝑰𝑩𝑳 of loads and sensitivities 𝑯𝑴𝑩𝑳 of relays to loads 
  S7 S10 S11 S12 
𝑷𝑰𝑩𝑳 -1.3776 2.309 1.23 3.1392 
RG01 -0.019 0.014 0.0077 0.0105 
RG11 -0.00453 0.0137 0.0029 0.0213 
RG21 -0.0135 0.0297 0.0048 0.0096 
RG22 -0.0174 0.0141 0.0066 0.0098 
RTL0605 -0.0763 -0.0668 -9.00E-05 -0.0049 
RTL0706 -0.0245 -0.0172 0.0006 -0.0032 
RTL0809 -0.0009 0.0163 0.0007 0.0337 
RTL1009 -0.0019 -0.016 0.0008 0.0116 
RTX0105 -0.0024 0.0018 0.001 0.0013 
RTX0508 -0.0037 -0.0002 0.0033 0.0008 
RTX0209 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0002 0.0018 
RTX0310 -0.002 0.0044 0.0007 0.0014 
RTX0407 -0.0033 0.0027 0.0013 0.0019 
RTX0609 -0.0255 -0.0082 -0.0252 0.003 
RTX1007 0.0218 -0.0251 0.0199 0.0028 
RTX0811 -0.0008 0.0013 0.0236 0.0014 
RTX0912 -0.0004 0.0003 8.80E-05 0.0016 
RTL1310 -0.0025 0.0175 0.0017 0.0085 
RTL1413 -0.0037 0.0258 0.0025 0.0126 
RTX1513 -0.0037 0.0082 0.0013 0.0026 
RTX1613 -0.0459 0.3245 0.031 0.0198 
RTX1815 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0002 0.0004 
RTX1714 -0.0051 0.0357 0.0034 0.0174 
RTX1917 -0.006 0.0423 0.004 0.0207 
Based on the sensitivity data of relays on generators (in the pink color), transformers 
and transmission lines (in the blue color), the relative sensitive relays can be easily 
selected and underlined in Table 4.1. The relay 𝑅𝐺01  on G01, 𝑅𝐺11  on G11, 𝑅𝐺21  on 





𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 on transmission line TL1009 between Bus 10 and Bus 9 are the sensitive relays 
with bigger sensitivities (the threshold 𝜉1 is set to 0.005), and grouped as 𝐴𝐿. The related 
transmission lines can be grouped as 𝐵𝑇𝐿. This is the first step. 
𝐴𝐿 = {𝑅𝐺01, 𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝐺21, 𝑅𝐺22, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009} 
𝐵𝑇𝐿 = {𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑇𝐿1009} 
Then, in the second step, the sensitivities of these selected relays to apparent 
generator powers can be deduced based on equation (4.48), as shown in Table 4.2 
Table 4.2 Sensitivities 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮 of relays to Generators 
𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮  S1 (G01) S2 (G11) S3 (G21) S4 (G22) S18 (LWF) S19 (OWF) 
RG01 0.0063 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009 
RG11 -3.4E-06 0.0056 3.2E-05 -8.2E-05 -1.3E-03 -1.8E-03 
RG21 0.0018 9.5E-05 0.0189 0.0006 -0.0139 -0.015 
RG22 3.5E-03 1.0E-04 3.3E-03 0.0078 -4.3E-03 -4.6E-03 
RTL0809 -0.0186 2.07E-05 -0.009 -0.0133 -0.0027 -0.0022 
RTL1009 -0.0063 3.28E-05 -0.0226 -0.007 -0.0173 -0.0162 
It can be seen from Table 4.2, the relative more sensitive generators to the relays in 
𝐴𝐿 are underlined. Then the set of main sources, which mainly supply the load flows 
through the sensitive relays in 𝐴𝐿 can be defined (the threshold 𝜉3 is set to 0.003): 𝐵𝐺𝐿 =
{𝐵𝐺𝐿1, 𝐵𝐺𝐿2, 𝐵𝐺𝐿3, 𝐵𝐺𝐿4, 𝐵𝐺𝐿5, 𝐵𝐺𝐿6} = {{G01}, {G11}, {G21}, {G22}, {G01, G21, G22},  
{G01, G21, G22, LWF,OWF}}. 
Meanwhile, based on the physical connection relationship between these elements as 
shown in Fig. 4.11 (a), the sensitive map can be easily obtained, which can be depicted in 
Fig. 4.12 (b). It can be seen that there are four supply paths to Load 1, three of them are 
more sensitive in the preset Normal state, and the one through transformer TX0609 are 
less sensitive. Based on the sensitive map, it can be inferred that in the normal operation 
state, variation of critical loads in load set 𝐵𝐿
′will mainly influence the margins of relays 
in relay set 𝐴𝐿, and the variation of output power in generator set 𝐵𝐺𝐿. 
Also it can be seen that in the normal operation state, 𝑅𝐺01 and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 are serially 
connected in one supply path, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 are serially connected with 𝑅𝐺21 and 𝑅𝐺22in the 
other supply path, and 𝑅𝐺11 is the third supply path. Based on sensitivity values in Table 
4.1, the 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 and 𝑅𝐺11are with bigger sensitivities, which could represent the 
three different supply paths. 




































(a) Physical connection relationship                         (b) Sensitive map 
Fig. 4.11 Critical load, sensitive relays and sensitive generators in the system 
4.4.1.2 Emergency situations 
(a) Detection of vulnerable relays 
Here we further take the blackout scenario (the one with relay activated) on the 19-
bus system in Chapter 3 for an example. The initial Normal state is the same as the one 
described above. The three phase fault, which occurred on bus 6 at about 11s, induced an 
N-5 contingency. From 11s to about 65s, the system survived an oscillation and got 
temporary stable under the N-5 situation, as shown in Fig. 4.12. However, the load 
restoration and LTC operations firstly induced backup relay 𝑅𝐺11 on G11 hit its field 
current limit at about 70s, and then the Zone 3 relay on TL0809 operated at 86s to trip 
this line with one second delay. Thereafter, the system entered into a fast voltage collapse 
together with cascading trips.  
In the post fault N-5 situation, the sensitivities at 62s (before the first LTC operation) 
and 86.5s (𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 in a Zone 3 start state) are adopted as examples to be analyzed, as 
shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Similarly, the relays in the negative direction are 







Fig. 4.12 Blackout scenario of cascading events on 19-bus system 
Table 4.3 𝑷𝑰𝑩𝑳 and 𝑯𝑴𝑩𝑳 in the N-5 situation 
 
Normal state under N-5 at 62s 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 in Zone 3 start state at 86.5s 
 
S7 S10 S11 S12 S7 S10 S11 S12 
𝑷𝑰𝑩𝑳 -5.9481 -2.048 1.022 4.6563 -7.3688 -3.4926 0.7324 5.5462 
RG01 -0.0076 0.0098 0.0134 0.0152 -0.0097 -0.0054 0.0174 0.0089 
RG11 -0.0189 -0.00936 0.00176 0.0194 -0.0126 -0.0122 0.0019 0.017 
RG21 -0.0367 -0.0176 0.0053 0.0091 -0.0258 0.0104 0.0003 0.0038 
RG22 -0.0539 0.0033 0.0004 0.0049 -0.0507 0.0043 0.0001 0.0015 
RTL0809 -0.0403 -0.02 -0.0005 0.0409 -0.0222 -0.013 3.14E-05 0.0256 
RTL1009 -0.012 -0.0082 0.0004 0.0057 -0.0108 -0.0085 0.0004 0.005 
RTX0105 -0.0008 0.0019 0.0144 0.0162 -0.001 -0.0006 0.0018 0.0082 
RTX0508 0.0013 0.0025 0.0097 0.0102 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0064 0.0075 
RTX0209 -0.003 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0011 0.0002 0.002 
RTX0310 -0.0056 0.0014 0.0002 0.002 -0.0033 0.0013 4.17E-05 0.0005 
RTX0407 -0.012 0.0007 1.00E-04 0.0011 -0.011 0.0009 2.95E-05 0.0003 
RTX0710 -0.0328 0.0007 1.00E-04 0.001 -0.0315 0.0004 9.54E-05 0.0011 
RTX0811 -0.001 -0.0006 2.30E-02 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0007 2.38E-02 0.0008 
RTX0912 -0.0009 -0.0005 1.00E-04 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0004 5.61E-05 0.0013 
From Table 4.3, in the Normal state under N-5 situation, the sensitive relays (𝐴𝐿) to 
the critical load (Load 1) can be selected with the threshold 𝜉1 = 0.005. Then the related 
𝐵𝑇𝐿 as well as 𝐵𝐺𝐿 based on Table 4.4 with the threshold 𝜉3 = 0.003 can be given by 
𝐴𝐿 = {
{𝑅𝐺01, 𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝐺21, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009, 𝑅𝑇𝑋0105, 𝑅𝑇𝑋0508}      Normal state 
{𝑅𝐺01, 𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009, 𝑅𝑇𝑋0105, 𝑅𝑇𝑋0508}          Zone 3 start state
 
𝐵𝑇𝐿 = {
{𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑇𝐿1009}                       Normal state
{𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑇𝐿1009}              Zone 3 start state
 
𝐵𝐺𝐿 = {
{{G01}, {G11}, {G21}, {G01, G22}, {G21, G22, LWF, OWF}, {G01}, {G01}} Normal state
{{G01}, {G11}, {G01}, {G21, G22, LWF, OWF}, {G01}, {G01}}               Zone 3 start state
 













































Table 4.4 Sensitivities 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮 of relays to loads in the N-5 situation 
𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮 Normal state under N-5 at 62s 
 
S1 (G01) S2 (G11) S3 (G21) S4 (G22) S18 (LWF) S19 (OWF) 
RG01 0.0065 6.25E-06 -3.32E-06 -3.22E-05 -3.22E-05 -3.22E-05 
RG11 -4.18E-05 0.0056 -5.28E-05 -5.12E-04 -5.12E-04 -5.12E-04 
RG21 -1.27E-05 0.0004 0.0047 -7.43E-04 -7.18E-04 -7.18E-04 
RTL0809 -0.0281 2.10E-03 -0.0015 0.0093 -0.0012 -0.0012 
RTL1009 -6.68E-06 1.59E-05 -0.0074 -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.004 
RTX0105 -0.01 6.94E-07 -3.68E-07 0.0028 -3.32E-06 -3.34E-06 
RTX0508 -0.0096 6.56E-07 -3.48E-07 -0.0005 -3.14E-06 -3.16E-06 
 
𝑅𝐺11 in Urgent state and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 in Zone 3 start state at 86.5 
 
S1 (G01) S2 (G11) S3 (G21) S4 (G22) S18 (LWF) S19 (OWF) 
RG01 0.037 4.39E-04 2.61E-04 2.13E-04 1.96E-04 1.81E-04 
RG11 3.07E-04 0.0128 2.40E-04 4.47E-04 4.18E-04 4.07E-04 
RTL0809 -0.011 1.15E-04 -6.30E-05 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
RTL1009 -6.08E-06 1.35E-05 -0.0065 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0032 
RTX0105 -0.008 5.56E-07 -3.05E-07 -3.57E-06 -3.37E-06 -3.39E-06 
RTX0508 -0.0066 4.65E-07 -2.55E-07 -2.99E-06 -2.83E-06 -2.84E-06 
Similarly, the sensitive map under these two states can be depicted respectively, as 
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By virtue of local measured impedances at 62s and 86.5s, the margins and 
performance indexes of the relays can be obtained as shown in Table 4.5 together with 
the data in the pre fault stage. It can be seen that the margins of 𝑅𝐺11 and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 were 
negative and with high PI at 86.5s. When the measured impedance violated the relay 
settings, the state signals of 𝑅𝐺11  and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809  were given with “0011” and “0101” 
respectively, which can be selected from 𝐴𝐿 and grouped as vulnerable relay set 𝐴𝐿
′  with 
threshold 𝜉1
′ = 0.2: 
𝐴𝐿
′ = {𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809} 
Table 4.5 The margins and performance indexes of the relays 
  
Initial state Normal state under N-5 Zone 3 start state under N-5 
M (p.u.) 𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿/|𝑀| PI M (p.u.) 𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿/|𝑀| PI M (p.u.) 𝐻𝑀𝐵′𝐿/|𝑀| PI 
RG01 0.0797 0.1317 0.0866 0.0675 0.2251 0.0536 0.0575 0.1548 0.0331 
RG11 0.014 1.5214 1 0.005 4.2 1 -0.0053 3.238 0.694 
RG21 0.0773 0.1243 0.0818 0.0658 0.1384 0.033 0.0523 0.0727 0.0156 
RG22 0.0625 0.1568 0.1032 0.055 0.0891 0.0212 0.049 0.0306 0.0066 
RTL0809 0.1108 0.304 0.2 0.0878 0.4659 0.1109 -0.0055 4.6656 1 
RTL1009 0.1701 0.0682 0.0449 0.0137 0.4155 0.0989 0.0077 0.8679 0.139 
RTX0105 0.0888 0.0146 0.0096 0.079 0.2051 0.0488 0.066 0.1242 0.0266 
RTX0508 0.0889 0.009 0.0059 0.0775 0.1316 0.0313 0.0695 0.1079 0.0231 
RTX0209 0.029 0.062 0.0408 0.0275 0.08 0.019 0.0115 0.1739 0.0373 
RTX0310 0.0923 0.0152 0.01 0.0808 0.0248 0.0059 0.0673 0.0074 0.0016 
RTX0407 0.0831 0.0229 0.0151 0.0831 0.0132 0.0032 0.077 0.0039 0.0008 
RTX0710 0.2443 0.0115 0.0075 0.0433 0.0231 0.0055 0.037 0.0297 0.0064 
RTX0811 0.0658 0.0213 0.014 0.0619 0.0113 0.0027 0.0619 0.0129 0.0028 
RTX0912 0.0149 0.1072 0.0705 0.0127 0.1807 0.043 0.0061 0.2116 0.0453 
Actually, in the initial state and normal operation state under N-5 situation, 𝑅𝐺11 and 
𝑅𝑇𝐿0809  already had high PIs, which can be an early warning that they are more 
vulnerable than other relays. Based on the local detected state signals at 86.5s, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 
was in Zone 3 start state (0101) which was more dangerous than 𝑅𝐺11 (0011) in Urgent 
state. The PIs also showed a same trend at 86.5s, i.e. PI of 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 was higher than 𝑅𝐺11 
because the measured impedance just crossed the Zone 3 setting of 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809. But at this 
moment, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 on the last supply path was in Normal state but close to its loadability 
limit, which means this supply path between Area 3 and Area 3 still has some remained 
margin to take more load flow. This margin reserve regulation between supply paths 
could be considered in the design of control strategies which will be in next Chapter. 
Based on these data in Table 4.5, the sensitivity chart and performance indexes chart 
can be depicted as Fig. 4.14 (a) and (b) respectively. The trend of margin sensitivities and 
relay PIs can be observed more clearly. 





(a) Sensitivity chart of relays to critical load 
 
(b) Performance index chart of relays to critical load 
Fig. 4.14 Sensitivity and performance index charts 
(b) Detection of sensitive controllers 
Based on the former results, at 86.5s, 𝐴𝐿
′ = {𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809}, the sensitivities 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳 
(to loads) and 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮 (to generators) can be obtained as shown in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. 
Table 4.6 The sensitivities of relay in 𝐴𝐿
′  to load powers 
𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳 At 86.5s 
 S7 S10 S11 S12 
RG11 -0.0126 -0.0122 0.0019 0.017 
RTL0809 -0.0222 -0.013 3.14E-05 0.0256 
Table 4.7 The sensitivities of relay in 𝐴𝐿
′  to generator powers 
𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮 At 86.5s (RG11 in Urgent state, RTL0809 in Zone 3 start state) 
 
S1 (G01) S2 (G11) S3 (G21) S4 (G22) S18 (LWF) S19 (OWF) 
RG11 3.07E-04 0.0128 2.40E-04 4.47E-04 4.18E-04 4.07E-04 












































Suppose the regulation limit of controllers is 20% of total capacity for each load or 
generator, then the performance index 𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖 can be calculated based on equation (4.54), as 
shown in Table 4. 8.  
Table 4.8 Performance indexes of the LS and GR controllers 
  S7 S10 S11 S12 S1 S2 S3 S4 S18 S19  
𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖  0.0325 0.094 0.0107 1 0.2236 0.162 0.0021 0.0016 0.0013 0.0004 
It can be seen from performance indexes of the controllers, LS controller on Load 1 at 
bus 12 is the most effective controller to adjust the emergency states on 𝑅𝐺11 and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 
the threshold can be set: 𝜉2
′ = 0.5 . Meanwhile, the signs of sensitivities should be 
considered for the controller selection, e.g. the LS controller with negative sensitivity 
may not be adopted since loads should not be increased under an overloading situation. 
Also, G01 at bus 1 and G11 at bus 2 are the more effective GR controllers with 𝜉3
′ = 0.1. 
Obviously, the PIs will be changed when the operation state and control amount 
limits change. The control strategy design will be concretely introduced in next chapter. 
4.4.2 Prediction and identification of emergency states 
4.4.2.1 Line outage induced overloading situation 













Fig. 4.15 TL0809 outage induced by a three phase fault 




In order to investigate the N-1 line outage induced overloading situation, suppose at 
3s, a three phase permanent short circuit fault occurred on the line TL0809 in the 19-bus 
test system, and then this line was tripped 0.1s later. The Zone 3 relays on the line 
TL1009 and transformer TX0609 were overloaded due to load flow transferring, the relay 
RTL1009 on TL1009 is chosen as a studied example, which is shown in Fig. 4.15. The line 
flow and measured impedance seen by RTL1009 can be observed in Fig. 4.16. 
 
(a)  Line flow                                (b) Impedance locus of relay RTL1009 
Fig. 4.16 Line flow and impedance seen by RTL1009 
When the proposed prediction and identification algorithm is taken into effect, the 
virtual injections and the sensitivities based on pre fault system data can be obtained by 
equation (4.71), as shown in Table 4.9. Then based on the impedance sensitivity method 
described in section 4.3.3.1, the related sensitivities and the predicted impedance 
variation can be obtained, as shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.9 Virtual injections and related sensitivities 
For Line TL0809 Outage between Bus 9 and Bus 8 
Sensitivity matrix 𝑫𝟖𝟗 Virtual Injections (p.u.) 
53.3641 − 53.3641   15.9851   − 5.7506













Sensitivity matrix 𝑳𝟖𝟗 
0.0090   − 0.5486    0.0141   − 0.0148
0.0071      0.0058     0.1168    − 0.2042
 
Table 4.10 Impedance prediction on TL1009 
For Line TL1009 between Bus 10 and Bus 9 
Sensitivity matrix 𝑪𝟏𝟎𝟗 Predicted impedance (ohm) 
−1.1346    1.1346   − 0.0312    0.0318


















Sensitivity matrix 𝑯𝟏𝟎𝟗𝟖𝟗 
0.0001     0.0064        0.0006       0.0005
−0.000 − 0.0009  − 0.0007  − 0.0057
 















































With the consideration of node injection variation, if the delay of communication 
takes 5 circles, the prediction calculation can be started after 10 circles, namely 0.2s after 
the fault. Here the nodes of generator G01, G11, G21 and G22 will be chosen to be 
monitored. The injection variations of these nodes can be seen in Fig. 4.17. 
 
(a)  Power injection from G01                      (b) Power injection from G11 
 
(c)  Power injection from G21                      (d) Power injection from G22 
Fig. 4.17 Generator injection variations 
 
Fig. 4.18 Predicted impedance locus of relay RTL1009 
From Fig. 4.18, the predicted impedance locus in blue color can be observed. The 
biggest error about 12% between predicted impedance and measured impedance (black 
locus) appeared just after the fault was cleared. But in about 500ms, the error decreased 
into 8%. So the threshold of identification criterion (4.74) can be set as 1 = 8%. Then 












































































































this N-1 line outage induced load flow transferring together with the load flow 
transferring induced relay operation can be predicted and identified by the proposed 
protection strategy. 
(b) N-k situation 
The former cascaded blackout scenario on the 19-bus test system is adopted here as 
the research object. Since a three phase permanent short circuit fault occurred on the Bus 
6 at 11s, then an N-5 contingency happened due to fault clearing, as shown in Fig. 4.19. 
The relay RTL0809 is chosen as a studied example. The line flow and measured impedance 
seen by RTL0809 from 0s to 50.1s can be observed in Fig. 4.20. 







Fig. 4.19  Overload of RTL0809 induced by ULTC operations 
 
(a)  Line flow                                           (b) Impedance locus of relay 
Fig. 4.20 Line flow and impedance seen by RTL1009 












































Assume the nodes of main generator G01, G11, G21 and G22 will be chosen to be 
monitored. The injection variations can be seen in Fig. 4.21. If the communication delay 
takes 5 circles, the impedance sensitivity calculation can be started after 10 circles, 
namely 0.2s after the fault. Then based on collected injection variations and the 
calculated sensitivities at 11.2s, the predicted impedance locus can be calculated and 
depicted in Fig. 4.22. The predicted impedance locus is in red color while the measured 
impedance locus is in blue color.  
 
Fig. 4.21 Injection variations of generators 
 
Fig. 4.22 Predicted impedance locus of relay RTL1009 
During the oscillation period, the error is quite big due to the strong nonlinear 
characteristics and not considering the other injection variations (such as loads). The 
sensitivities cannot represent accurate relationships between system variables in this 
period. When the oscillation died out and system became stable, the error between 
predicted impedance and measured impedance became smaller consequently. Fortunately, 
in this case, the oscillation did not drive any impedance violating the Zone 3 settings. 
More precise methods are required to identify this kind of events involved with 
oscillation and block the possible relay operation under oscillation, which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 













































































4.4.2.2 ULTC operation induced overloading situation 
In order to identify the ULTC operation induced overloading situation, here the case 
of cascaded blackout on the 19-bus test system is still adopted as the research object. If a 
three phase permanent short circuit fault occurred on the Bus 6 at 5s, then in the post N-5 
contingency stage, the ULTC on TX0912 started to operate at about 60s. Due to continue 
tap changer operations, the Zone 3 relay RTL0809 on TL0809 was tripped firstly. And the 
system would experience cascading events and collapse finally, as shown in Fig. 3.14. 
The relay RTL0809 is still chosen as a studied example; here assume all the tripping signals 
are blocked in the post fault stage, the line flow and impedance seen by RTL0809 are shown 
in Fig. 4.23.  
The impedance loci from 55s to 100s will be focused. When the proposed 
identification method is applied, assume 𝑟0 = 1 and ∆𝑟 = 0.01, the related sensitivities 
and predicted impedance of RTL0809 at the first step are shown in Table 4.13. Similarly, 
the predicting calculation can be started at 0.2s after every step of ULTC operation. The 
injection variations and impedance curves are shown in Fig. 4.24. 
 
(a) Line flow in 100s                         (b) Line flow from 55s to 100s 
  
(c) Impedance locus of RTL0809              (d) Impedance locus from 55s to 100s 
Fig. 4.23 Line flow and impedance seen by RTL0809 




























































































Table 4.13 Impedance prediction on TL0809 and related sensitivities at the first step 
𝓛𝑺𝒓𝟏𝟐𝟗 of powers to tap ratio 0.5025   − 0.5025   91.9816   91.9816 
𝑪𝟖𝟗 of impedance of 
RTL0809 to local voltages 
−3.1630    3.1630   − 0.1787    0.1928
−0.1765    0.1765    3.2034   − 3.4546
 
𝑯𝟖𝟗𝟏𝟐𝟗 of impedance of R2 to 
powers on transformer TX0912 
0.0637    0.0637   − 0.0064    0.0003 
−0.0073   − 0.0067  0.0567    0.0015 



















(a)  Active power of generators                             (b) Reactive power of generators 
 
(c)  Impedance loci of relay R2 
Fig. 4.24Generator powers and impedance loci seen by TL0809 
It can be seen from Fig. 4.24 (c), the biggest error is about 80% between predicted 
impedance (blue locus) and measured impedance (black locus). So the threshold of 
identification criterion can be set as 2 = 80%. It should be noted that, the variations of 






















































































load power was not considered in this case, that is why the predicted error here is a little 
bigger. Also, it can be seen that the predicted impedance violates the Zone 3 before it 
really happens which may give an early alarm to Control center. Then emergency control 
strategies, such as the ULTC blocking or inverse controlling, can be applied timely and 
effectively to adjust this overloading situation. 
4.5 Summary 
A sensitivity method is adopted in this chapter to online analyze the relationship 
between relay-measured impedances and the system operation variables. Based on online 
calculation of sensitivities and performance indices, the vulnerable relays and sensitive 
controllers can be quickly detected under different operation states. The sensitive map 
and sensitive supply paths can be also depicted easily, which give effective indicators to 
define suitable emergency controls for diverse emergency states.  
Meanwhile, based on impedance sensitivity, the overloading situations caused by line 
outage and LTC operations, as basic processes of cascading events, can be predicted and 
identified effectively. In this way, the Zone 3 relay can differentiate the load flow 
transferring induced emergency states from a fault state, and the unexpected relay 
operations can be blocked timely, which gives time for emergency controls to adjust the 






Chapter 5  
Special protection and emergency control design for 
emergency state prevention 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the design of protection and control strategies will be mainly focused. 
Based on sensitivity analysis in former chapters, the detailed control algorithms will be 
presented. Also according to the specific emergency state identified by the methods 
described in the last chapter, the diverse protection and control strategies will be suitably 
placed to adjust the corresponding emergency state. 
Since the control methods are mainly placed on load side, the optimal control 
algorithm will be applied to minimize the total load loss in the protection and control 
strategies. On the other hand, the load dynamic restoration characteristics in the post fault 
stage needs be considered to ensure the secure relay margin in a long run since this kind 
of loads reaches its steady state characteristics slowly. 
The case studies are based on former described cascading events on 19-bus test 
system in RTDS, simulation results demonstrate the developed protection and control 
strategies can prevent the unexpected relay operations and adjust the related emergency 
states successfully. 
5.2 Control strategy design for emergency states  
Since distance relays are mainly considered in this thesis, the states of these critical 
relays and the causes of the related states will be the basis of control strategy defining. 
The state signals of emergency states will be used to initiate the corresponding control 
strategies when Control center receives these emergency state signals. The related 
controllers will then execute the defined control strategies to adjust the emergency states. 
Whether the emergency states have been adjusted to Normal state successfully will be 




reflected by apparent impedance loci, which are checked by dispersed relays again. The 
















































Fig. 5.1 The basic structure of control strategy design 
From Fig. 5.1, the distance relay margin is an importance index in the design of 
control strategy; also, the required relay margin 𝑀𝑖
𝑟𝑒𝑞
 is defined as the 0.05𝑍𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖  (red 
dotted line) to ensure that the loadability margin is no less than the required 5% [80]. As 
for the critical relay i in emergency state, the expected increment ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑝





−𝑀𝑖 = 5%𝑍𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 − (𝑍𝑎𝑖 − 𝑍𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖) 
= (1 + 5%)𝑍𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 − 𝑍𝑎𝑖 
(5.1) 
Based on former analysis, the overload emergency states include Urgent state and 
Zone 3 start state. When the Urgent state has been detected, the inverse load tap changer 
control (ILTC) will be adopted as main countermeasure to adjust system state, meanwhile 
the normal load shedding (LS) will be used as a backup strategy [87]. When Zone 3 start 
state has been identified, the related trip signal will be blocked for several seconds, and 
the emergency LS will be chosen as main countermeasure in order to adjust this state 
timely before the unexpected relay trips, while the generator reschedule (GR) and inverse 
tap changer control (ILTC) will be used as a backup strategy. In Tripping state, the 
Control center will do nothing but let the traditional function of the critical relay to deal 
with it. And the Normal state will be regarded as a secure operation state or a return state 
after the control execution. The final aim of all the protection and control strategies is to 





5.2.1 Inverse tap changer control 
The inverse tap changer control (ILTC) is adopted as main control strategy to adjust 
the identified Urgent states which are detected by dispersed relays. When Control center 
detects the Urgent state signals-“0011”, the following procedures will be executed. 
5.2.1.1 Selection of control points 
Firstly, the control points for ILTC will be selected based on sensitivities between 
relay margins and tap ratios. Based on equations (4.39) to (4.44), for the critical backup 






where ∆𝑟𝑘 = 𝑛∆𝑟, n is a integer, ∆𝑟  is the step size of tap changer, l represents the 
number of all the related transformers with load tap changers, ℒ𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑘  represents the 
sensitivity of relay margin 𝑀𝑖  to any tap changer k (∈ 𝑙). According to ℒ𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑘  and the 
available regulation limit of tap changer ∆𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘, the similar performance index 𝑃𝐼𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑘 of 






{|ℒ𝑀𝑟𝑖1|∆𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥1, ⋯ , |ℒ𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑙|∆𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙}
 (5.3) 
A suitable threshold 𝜉4 can be set to divide all the related tap changers into two groups 
with different priorities: the tap changers with higher 𝑃𝐼𝑙𝑡𝑐(≥ 𝜉4 ) will be classified to the 
first group, and all the related tap changers will constitute the second group.  
Then, in the progress of inverse tap changer control, the tap changers in the first 
group with higher 𝑃𝐼𝑙𝑡𝑐  will be blocked firstly to prevent the possible unexpected 
operations, then the detailed control amount will be defined based on these tap changers, 
and finally these tap changers will be changed to the inverse control mode and execute 
the defined control amounts. Normally, the tap changers with high 𝑃𝐼𝑙𝑡𝑐 will be relatively 
less, so if the Urgent states cannot be adjusted only based on first group, then more 
control points from the second group will be considered to strength the control effect, and 
finally realize the aim to adjust the Urgent state to Normal state. 




5.2.1.2 Determination of control amounts 
Suppose the first group for ILTC is denoted as 𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1 , then the control amount 
∆𝑟𝑘 (𝑘 ∈ 𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1) can be solved out based on the following objective function (5.4) with 
the consideration to minimize the total control amount 𝑇𝑟. ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 represents the expected 
increment of relay margin defined by (5.1). 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑟 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 { ∑ ∆𝑟𝑘
𝑘∈𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1
} 





∗ ≥ 𝑉𝑗1𝑚𝑖𝑛; 
|∆𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘| ≥ |∆𝑟𝑘| ≥ 0; 
(5.4) 
where ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ is the achieved increment of related relay margin, and 𝑉𝑗1
∗  is achieved voltage 
magnitude at the transmission side of controlled transformer 𝑗 (𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1). These two 
variables can be expressed by (5.5) and (5.6). 𝑉𝑗1𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑉𝑗1𝑚𝑖𝑛 represent the maximum 
value and minimum value of 𝑉𝑗1 ,  𝑉𝑗1
0  represents the initial value of 𝑉𝑗1  before the 
initiation of ILTC, ℒ𝑉𝑟𝑗𝑘 represents the sensitivity of bus voltage 𝑉𝑗1 to tap changer 𝑘, 
which can be calculated based on 𝑱−𝟏 and 𝓛𝑺𝒓. 
 ∆𝑀𝑖












The first constraint in (5.4) is used to achieve secure positive margin of critical relays, 
the second one is the specific limitations for voltage magnitudes at transmission sides of 
controlled transformers in the selected group, and the third one represents specific 
limitations for the possible control amounts on the controllable tap changers (𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1). 
Since the control amount ∆𝑟𝑘 on tap changer 𝑘 will be normally realized step by step, 
the consuming time will depend on how many steps required and the delay time ∆𝑇𝑘 for 
each following step. Also, if there are more sensitive tap changing controllers can be 
controlled together, then the consuming time will be less. The chart of workflow can be 





It should be noted that, under Urgent states, the normal three-step under voltage load 
shedding strategy is very important as a backup strategy for ILTC to prevent the 
unacceptable low voltage at the load side or possible failure of ILTC control strategy. 
Start
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Classify all control points into two 
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Define the specific control amounts in 
the selected group based on optimization 
objective function (5.4)
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Is the solution reasonable?
Yes
Yes
Wait for ILTC execution
No
Data updating and 
start a new case
No
 
Fig. 5.2 Workflow of ILTC for overload induced Urgent states 
5.2.2 Load shedding 
When Zone 3 start state is detected by a relay, meanwhile this emergency state is 
identified as the one caused by overloading conditions, then the trip of this relay and 
related breaker will be regarded as an unexpected operation which could deteriorate 
system structure and stability. In order to adjust this kind of emergency states as soon as 
possible, emergency load shedding scheme (LS) as the best choice will be adopted. The 
detailed procedures are described as follows: 




5.2.2.1 Selection of critical relays 
When the overloading situation induces the measured impedance violate the Zone 3 
setting, some generator backup relay may already detect the Urgent state, e.g. in the case 
of cascaded blackout in section 4.4.1.2, the relay 𝑅𝐺11 on G11 hit its field current limit 
firstly, and then the Zone 3 relay 𝑅TL0809 on TL0809 got violated subsequently. Based on 
performance index analysis shown in Fig. 4.14, the 𝑅TL0809’s 𝑃𝐼𝑟  (=1) is higher than 
𝑅𝐺11’s 𝑃𝐼𝑟 (=0.694), also the Zone 3 start state is more dangerous than Urgent state, but 
according to definition of 𝑃𝐼𝑟, the violated relay with negative margin and low 𝑃𝐼𝑟 will 
be harder to be recovered. So only considering the relay in Zone 3 start state may be not 
enough to adjust the overloading situation in the system. In order to adjust all the 
emergency states, all the relays in the emergency states including Zone 3 start state and 
Urgent state should be selected as critical relays in 𝐴𝐿
′  to define the LS control strategy. 
5.2.2.2 Selection of control points 
In order to find effective control points, the sensitivities 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆between relay margins 
and apparent load powers will be utilized. Based on the analysis in section 4.3.2, the 
control points can be selected based on performance indexes (𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑖) defined by equation 
(4.54) with a suitable threshold 𝜉2
′ . 
Similar to ILTC strategy, based on 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑐𝑗  for load shedding points, all the LS 
controllers can be divided into two groups. The first group will include the LS controllers 
with higher 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑐(> 𝜉2
′) to all the relays in 𝐴𝐿
′ , and the second group will include all the 
LS controllers in the system. When emergency LS strategy is triggered by the 
identification of Zone 3 start state, the detailed strategy will be defined firstly based on 
the controllers in the first group. And the second group will be the backup if the 
emergency states cannot be adjusted only based on the first group.  
5.2.2.3 Determination of control amounts 
Assume the first group of control points for emergency LS is denoted as 𝐵𝐿𝑆1, then in 
order to minimize the total shedding amount on the selected loads, an optimal load 
shedding strategy is applied with the following objective function: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝑆1 }, 
s.t.    ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ ≥ ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑝
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐿
′  






where |∆𝑆𝑗|𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the limit of LS controller j, ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗 is the shedding amount on the 
related load j,  ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ is the achieved increment of related relay margin on relay i, which 
can be expressed as (5.8). 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the margin sensitivity of relay i in 𝐴𝐿
′  to the selected 
controllable load j.  
 ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗∆𝑆𝐿𝑗
𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝑆1
 (5.8) 
5.2.2.4 The work flow of emergency LS control strategy 
According to the content discussed above, the work flowchart of the proposed LS 
strategy can be depicted by Fig. 5.3. 
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Fig. 5.3 Flowchart of proposed LS strategy 
5.2.3 Generator reschedule 
In the overloading situations, the control measures on the sensitive loads will be more 
effective than those on the sensitive generators. Also since the governor system normally 
take the responsibility to do primary frequency control, the active power difference will 
be compensated after execution of emergency LS strategy. But if the LS amount is too 




big beyond the regulation capability of governors, the system may encounter the angle 
stability problem. So in order to suitably compensate the active power unbalance, a 
sensitivity based generator reschedule (GR) control is designed in place to modify the 
active power reference in the governor, which can be regarded as one kind of secondary 
frequency control [1].  
Besides, by decreasing the active power output, the local generator can send more 
reactive power to support the voltage and prevent the overloading situation. So here the 
GR control can be utilized as an auxiliary control strategy, which will be executed at the 
same time with emergency LS control strategy. Also it will make effects on operation 
margins of critical relays, which is required to be considered in the progress of relay 
margin adjusting. 
5.2.3.1 Selection of control points 
Consider GR control as an ancillary control for LS control strategy, the local sensitive 
GR controllers which are more close to critical loads will be the most effective 
controllers, because it can not only compensate the active power unbalance but also can 
send more reactive power at the same time to support the voltage. The sensitive map and 
related sensitivities defined in section 4.3.1.1 will be utilized to selected GR control 
points. Based on 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑮 and threshold 𝜉3, the more sensitive generators will be selected as 
the first group 𝐵𝐺𝑅1, the other sensitive generators will be the second group 𝐵𝐺𝑅2. 
5.2.3.2 Determination of control amounts 
Then in order to determinate control amount of GR strategy combined with LS 
strategy, the objective function can be given as: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝑆1 }, 
s.t.    ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ ≥ ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑝
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐿
′  
|∆𝑆𝑦|𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ |∆𝑆𝑦| ≥ 0 
∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑗
𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝑆1




where |∆𝑆𝑦|𝑚𝑎𝑥  represents the regulation limit of LS or GR controller 𝑦  (𝑦 ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑆1 ∪





sensitive generator 𝑥, 𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑗 and 𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐺𝑥 are power factors of related load and generator 
respectively. 
The last constraint in (5.9) is for active power balance between LS and GR, the 
meanings of the first and second ones are same with (5.7), except the ∆𝑀𝑖
∗  needs to 
consider the effect of GR control, which is given by (5.10).  
 ∆𝑀𝑖




 (5.10)  
where 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗  is the margin sensitivity between critical relay i in 𝐴𝐿
′  and 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑗 , 
𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑥 is the margin sensitivity between critical relay i and sensitive generator 𝑥. 
5.2.3.3 The modified work flow of combined LS and GR 
strategy 
Based on the above discussion, the modified work flow of combined LS and GR 
control strategy can be depicted as: 
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Critical relays selection
Define the specific control amounts in 
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Fig. 5.4 Flowchart of proposed LS and GR strategy 




5.3 Integrated optimization and compensation strategy 
5.3.1 Integrated sensitivity 
Based on the control strategies described above, all the controllers (i.e. tap changers, 
LS controllers and GR controllers) can be utilized to effectively regulate the critical relay 
margins. If all the effects of these controllers have been considered together, the 
integrated sensitivities can be utilized and obtained based on linear superposition 
principle. Then the variation of relay margins can be expressed by (5.11), where the 𝑛, 𝑚, 
𝑙 are the number of related controllers in the related first groups. It can also be written as 













 ∆𝑴𝑨′𝑳 = 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳∆𝑺𝑳 +𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮∆𝑺𝑮 + 𝓛𝑴𝒓∆𝒓 






Then the integrated sensitivity matrix 𝑰𝑨′𝑳 can be obtained by (5.13), where the sub 
matrix of it can be deduced by (4.52) (4.53) and (5.2) respectively. 
 𝑰𝑨′𝑳 = [𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑳 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺𝑮 𝓛𝑴𝒓] (5.13) 
5.3.2 The priority of control strategies 
Due to different emergency state, the main control strategy and backup control 
strategy will be different. Moreover, the time responses of different control strategies are 
diverse. The emergency LS strategy is required to be executed and adjust the Zone 3 start 
state as soon as possible, and ILTC may take tens of seconds to adjust the Urgent state by 
continuous tap changing. 
5.3.2.1 The priority of control strategies for different emergency 
states 
As we know, the state signals of relays are designed based on different emergency 





Based on the values of Dg2i, Dg3i (of generator relay) or DL2ij, DL3ij (of transmission line 
relay), the achieved margin ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ can be expressed as: 
 
∆𝑀𝑖












where 𝐷2𝑐 and 𝐷3𝑐 represent the state signals Dg2i, Dg3i or DL2ij, DL3ij of the most critical 
relay in 𝐴𝐿
′ . 
Actually, the most critical relay will be featured with highest performance index, so 
the state of the relay in 𝐴′ with highest 𝑃𝐼𝑟 decide which state the system is in now.  
If the Control center just detects the Urgent states of some relays, i.e. 𝐷2𝑐 = 0,𝐷3𝑐 =
1, then the first part multiplied with 𝐷2𝑐 in the right side of (5.14) will be eliminated, and 
the second part multiplied with 𝐷2𝑐̅̅ ̅̅̅𝐷3𝑐  will be kept for the determination of control 
amount. The equation becomes the same with (5.5) in ILTC control. Or if the Control 
center detects the Zone 3 start states of some relays, i.e. 𝐷2𝑐 = 1, 𝐷3𝑐 = 1𝑜𝑟 0, then the 
first part in the right side of (5.14) is kept and the second part will be eliminated. At this 
time the equation becomes the same with (5.12) which is the emergency LS and GR 
control. 
In this way, the different control strategy can be combined together with different 
priorities to prevent related emergency states. 
5.3.2.2 The priority of control strategies for one emergency state 
As we designed in the beginning of this chapter, when the Urgent state is detected, 
the ILTC will be the main control strategy with normal LS as backup, which is already 
introduced above. And the normal LS strategy is designed based on the standard model 
described in [87], which is not discussed here. 
If the Control center detects the Zone 3 start state, the emergency LS strategy will be 
the main control strategy, GR control will be the ancillary control for active power 
balance, and the ILTC could be the backup strategy initiated to share the LS burden and 




keep the voltage at transmission side. As a backup control, the ILTC will be mainly used 
to keep the voltage level at transmission side, and margin sensitivity analysis will not be 
considered in this backup ILTC control. 
5.3.3 Load restoration characteristics consideration 
So far, all the control strategies are based on online sensitivity analysis at the 
prevailing system operation point, and the load powers are default regarded as constant 
power load. However, based on the equations (3.1)-(3.6), the load with restoration 
characteristics is varying with the variations of voltage and time. 
In this thesis, the restoration load will apply the classic parameters: 𝛼𝑠 = 𝛽𝑠 = 0, 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡 = 2 ,  𝑇𝑃 = 𝑇𝑄 = 100𝑠 ,  𝑧𝑃  and 𝑧𝑄  are initialized with 1  [16]. The 𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑖  will 
keep constant during load restoration. Then this kind of load will firstly respond with its 
transient characteristics (i.e. impedance load characteristics) when a big voltage variation 
is experienced on the load bus i. Thereafter it will slowly restore based on its time 
characteristics (3.3) (3.4). Finally the load will reach its steady state characteristics (i.e. 
constant power load). Since the post fault load restoration is normally associated with 
continually LTC actions and emergency controls, all the sensitivity based control 
algorithms are defined based on the measured load power in transient characteristics.  
So in order to predict the possible restoration amount of loads, we suppose the 
execution of LS is at time t, due to the variation of voltage 𝑉𝑖 at the load bus i, there will 
be inevitable load restoration (e.g. ∆𝑃𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑒𝑠) according to the load dynamics, which can be 
given by (5.15). Also suppose the 𝑉𝑖 recovers from 𝑉𝑖𝑡 to at least the low voltage limit (i.e. 
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.9𝑝𝑢  ), 𝐷𝑃𝑖  is the sensitivity of active load power 𝑃𝐿𝑖  to bus voltage,  𝑃𝐿𝑖  is 
defined by (3.1), then the restored active power can be approximately given by: 
 ∆𝑃𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑉𝑖𝑡) = 𝐷𝑃𝑖∆𝑉𝑖 (5.15) 
where 
 𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 𝜕𝑃𝐿𝑖/𝜕𝑉𝑖 (5.16) 
This load restoration may make the achieved margin 𝑀𝐴′
∗  become smaller and even 
negative again to trigger the backup relays. In order to prevent the unexpected relay trips 
all at once, this part of load restoration amount should be predicted and added into LS 
amount in advance. Then the total LS amount ∆𝑃𝐿𝑖











𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑖) is the active power part of calculated LS amount, ∆𝑆𝐿𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑛 is 
the calculated LS amount based on online sensitivity analysis, 𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑖 is the load power 
factor.  
Similarly, considering constant load power factor, the apparent LS amount can be 





Then the work flow chart of emergency controls can be modified with consideration 
of control priorities and load restoration dynamics, which is given by Fig. 5.5. 
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Fig. 5.5  Flowchart of control strategy considering priority and load restoration 
5.3.4 Basic processes of protection and control strategies 
Based on the control strategies presented so far, the work flowchart of the proposed 
protection and control scheme can be depicted in Fig. 5.6. 
This work flowchart can be compared with the Fig. 5.1. Firstly, the workflow will go 
into Detection area, which includes vulnerable relay detection and specific relay state 




confirmation. The function chart of vulnerable relay detection can be seen Fig. 4.4 based 
on the local detection together with sensitivity analysis in Control center. Secondly, the 
work flows into the Analysis area, which includes the prediction and identification of 
overloading emergency states and has been discussed in section 4.3.3. The third area is 
Decision making area, which includes the detailed emergency control strategy defining. 
The flowchart of emergency LS and GR strategy can be seen in Fig. 5.4, and the ILTC 
strategy can be observed in Fig. 5.2. The fourth area is the Execution area in which the 
distributed controllers will execute the defined control strategies. Then workflow will go 
back to Detection area to check if all the relays have been recovered into Normal state, or 
else, another round of work flow will be conducted similarly. 
Start
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State of breaker change? Load flow analysis
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Fig. 5.6  Work flowchart of proposed protection and control scheme 
According to the work flow chart in Fig. 5.6, the basic processes of emergency 
control and protection system can be categorized as: 
 State detection based on relay system 
 Analysis and decision making in Control center according to detected states 





 Execution of defined control strategy by distributed controllers following the 
orders from Control center 
Besides, wait for tripping can be also regarded as one of defined strategies. When the 
protection and control strategies are taken into effect to prevent the case of cascaded 
blackouts, these control processes will interrupt and regulate the basic processes of 
cascading events. Sometimes, if the regulations fail, the basic event processes will be 
mixed with the control processes and make the progress of cascading events even more 
complex. How to deal with this situation will be discussed in following chapter. 
5.4 Case study 
5.4.1 Urgent state prevention 
In the cascaded blackout case described in Chapter 3, after the bus bar fault happened, 
the unexpected LTC operation started at about 65s which further decreased the voltage at 
the load side. 5s later, the local generator G11 hit its field current limiter and the state 
signal of RG11 is changed from “0001” (Normal state) to “0011” (Urgent state) 
immediately. According to the work flow in Fig. 5.6, when Control center receive these 
Urgent state signals and identify the system state as an urgent overloading situation, the 
ILTC will be initiated as main control strategy with 𝐷2𝑐 = 0 and 𝐷2𝑐̅̅ ̅̅̅𝐷3𝑐 = 1. The related 
sensitivities and performance indexes are shown in Table 5.1, the 𝜉4 can be set as 0.5. 
The control amounts considering the load restoration are given in Table 5.2.  In this case, 
the tap changer controller on load transformer TX0912 is in the first control group 𝐵𝑙𝑡𝑐1. 
It can be seen that the tap changer should be inversely controlled by 6 steps when 
load restoration dynamics is considered. With the successful execution of ILTC, the bus 
voltage variations, tap position variations and impedance loci seen by RG11 can be 
observed in the following Fig. 5.7, Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9.   
Table 5.1 Sensitivities and performance indexes of LTC controllers 
 For LTC on TX0912 For LTC on TX0811 
𝓛𝑴𝒓 -0.18866 -0.03702 
∆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒌 0.2  (20stepsX0.01) 0.2 
𝑷𝑰𝒍𝒕𝒄 1 0.19621 
 




Table 5.2 Expected relay margin increment and related control amounts 
For LTC on TX0912 
∆𝑀2
𝑒𝑥𝑝
 0.00325 p.u. ∆𝑟𝑇𝑋0912 -0.0172 (ILTC two steps) 
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 of LTC 0.92 p.u. ∆𝑉 0.018 p.u. 
ℒ𝑉𝑟 1.022 ∆𝑟𝑇𝑋0912 -0.0176 
Load restoration consideration 
𝐷𝐿1 49.5871 𝐷𝐿2 11.0451 
∆𝑆𝐿12
𝑟𝑒𝑠 1.021 p.u. ∆𝑟𝑇𝑋0912
𝑟𝑒𝑠  -0.0335 (ILTC four steps) 
 
Fig. 5.7  System bus voltages with control strategy activation 
 
Fig. 5.8  Variation of tap positions during ILTC 
The first step of ILTC is started at 75s, considering 5s delay after blocking the normal 
LTC operation. The normal LS is initiated when voltage is lower than 0.9 p.u. with 15s 
delay. In this case, the normal LS shed the load at 101s with preset 10%. It can be seen 
that after the successful execution of the control strategy, all the voltages return beyond 
the 0.9 p.u., and the Urgent state (0011) of RG11 has been adjusted into Normal state 
























































(0001). In Fig. 5.9, the red locus represents the situation with successfully ILTC and 
normal LS execution, and the blue locus represents the cascaded blackout. Obviously, the 
basic process of cascading events, which is overload due to load side voltage control 
induced load increment, has been corrected into a new process which drives the system 
into Normal state. 
 
Fig. 5.9 Impedance loci seen by RG11 
5.4.2 Zone 3 start state prevention 
In order to validate the LS and GR strategy against Zone 3 start state, the studied 
cascaded blackout case is simulated without initiation of ILTC control and normal LS 
control when G11 hit its field current limiter. Thereafter, at about 87s, the relay RTL0809 
on transmission line TL0809 was triggered when impedance locus entered Zone 3 area. 
The state of RTL0809 was changed from Normal state (0001) to Zone 3 start state (0101) 
directly. When Control center receive these state signals and identify the system state as 
an overloading situation induced Zone 3 start state, the emergency LS and GR control 
will be initiated as the main control strategy with 𝐷2𝑐 = 1 and 𝐷2𝑐̅̅ ̅̅̅𝐷3𝑐 = 0, based on 
equation (5.14) and work flow in Fig. 5.6. 
According to the sensitivity analysis in section 4.4.1.2, the relay RTL0809 and RG11 
should be identified as vulnerable relays in 𝐴𝐿
′ , even though RTL0809 showed a higher 𝑃𝐼𝑟, 
which is already given in Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.14. Also based on sensitivities and 
performance indexes of related controllers given in Table 4.6-4.8, the LS controller on 
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Load 1 is selected into first LS group 𝐵𝐿𝑆1with threshold 𝜉2
′ = 0.5. And the GR controller 
on G11 will be selected as an auxiliary controller, which is the closest one to Load 1. 
Then according to the linear programming algorithm and the objective function (5.9), the 
related control amount considering load restoration dynamics can be obtained, as shown in 
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. The base MVA adopted in this thesis is 100 MVA. 
Table 5.3 Expected relay margin increment and related control amounts 
 Expected margin ∆𝑴𝒆𝒙𝒑 (𝒑. 𝒖. ) ∆𝑺 (𝒑. 𝒖. )on Load 1 
RTL0809 0.0189 0.54 
RG11 0.0076 2.027 
Table 5.4 Total LS and GR amount considering restoration  
For Load 1 and G11 For Load 2  and G01 
𝐷𝐿1 57.6461 𝐷𝐿2 13.0974 
∆𝑆12








Based on effective and fast communication, the distributed controllers will receive the 
orders from Control center and execute them immediately. It can be seen from Fig. 5.10, 
that after timely execution at 87.5s, the bus voltages were recovered to a safe level over 
0.9pu. Also in Fig. 5.11, the impedance loci between 35s and 220s have been depicted, 
the critical relays were reset back when measured impedance in red color moved into 
Normal area (the black loci represent the collapse situation with relays being blocked in 
the post fault stage, and the blue loci represent the collapse situation with relays 
activated). The state signals of RG11 were changed from “0011” to “0001”, as well as the 
ones of RTL1009. And RTL0809’s state signals were changed from “0101” to “0001”. 
It should be noted that the LTCs did not participate in the adjustment of the emergent 
states in this case due to their long time delay, and their state signals were reset to zero 
level immediately after execution of LS and GR. In this way, the proposed wide area 
protection strategy can timely and successfully adjust the system state, prevent the 






Fig. 5.10 Bus voltages with protection strategy activated 
 
(a) Impedance loci of relay RG11 
 
(b) Impedance loci of relay RTL0809 
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(c) Impedance loci of relay RTL1009 
Fig. 5.11 Impedance loci measured by critical relays 
By virtue of successful execution of the proposed control strategies, the progress of 
cascading events has been effectively prevented. The basic processes of cascading events 
have been stopped and adjusted, such as transmission line tripping due to overloading 
situation in this case. In this way, the control strategies successfully change the original 
development progress of cascading events into a healthy progress and keep the normal 
operation of power systems. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the sensitivity based special protection and control strategies are 
presented according to the identified emergency states under overloading situation. 
Corresponding to Urgent state, ILTC will be adopted as the main control strategy and 
normal UVLS strategy will be backup strategy. When Zone 3 start state is detected, the 
emergency LS control will be set as main control strategy, GR regulation will be the 
ancillary control for LS and the ILTC will be backup strategy. The priority between 
different strategies can be defined by related state signals and integrated sensitivities. The 
case studies, based on the cascaded blackout scenario on 19-bus test system, demonstrate 
that the proposed special protection and control strategy (SPECS) can successfully adjust 
the overload emergency states and prevent those processes involved with unexpected 
cascading events. 
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Chapter 6  
Implementation and improvement of SPECS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In order to implement the proposed special protection and emergency control strategy 
(SPECS), multi-agent system (MAS) is adopted as a tool to build a suitable environment 
for emergency state detection, sensitivity analysis, control strategy defining and 
execution. 
In this chapter, the relevant concepts and applications about MAS will be firstly 
introduced; then the detailed implementation of proposed SPECS based on a hierarchical 
MAS will be presented; real time hybrid simulation platform based on LabVIEW and 
RTDS will be introduced to demonstrate the MAS based SPECS. Moreover, in order to 
effectively monitor and regulate the mixed processes of cascading events and control 
strategies, the concept of process control is introduced and adopted to improve the 
SPECS and make it more reliable. Finally, case study based on the hybrid simulation 
platform will be presented to validate the effectiveness of proposed MAS based SPECS. 
6.2 MAS for power system application 
6.2.1 Agent technology 
6.2.1.1 Definition of agent 
Owing to the fast development of distributed artificial intelligence and computer 
network technology, the “agent”, especially “soft agent”, has been born and widely used 
in a number of industrial technologies. So far, there is no generally accepted definition of 
the term “agent”. Based on diverse application requirements, the agent will be designed 
with different characteristics. The paper [88] gives a comparison of those already existing 
definition from a computer science perspective. The definition presented by Wooldridge 
and Jennings [89], which is more frequently quoted, is adopted here: 




“Agent is a software (or hardware) entity, which is situated in some environment and 






Fig. 6.1  An agent in its environment 
An abstract view of an agent function can be observed in Fig. 6.1; the agent detects 
the requirements or variations of its environment, and produces output actions that affect 
the environment.  
6.2.1.2 Features of agent 
According to Wooldridge’s definition, an entity situated in an environment can be 
regarded as an agent if it can act autonomously in response to environmental changes. So 
the autonomy is the primary feature of an agent, which can operate without the 
intervention from others and control its states by itself. Besides, as an intelligent agent, 
the following three features are required: 
 Sociality 
An intelligent agent is able to cooperate with humans or other agents in the common 
environment in order to achieve its or global tasks.  
 Reactivity 
Intelligent agents have the ability to perceive the variation of its environment (such as 
state changing of other agents) and respond quickly. 
  Pro-activeness 
Intelligent agents do not only response simply to its environment but also act 
proactively to realize some tasks. For example, if the communication fails between two 
agents, then these two agents will change their preset behaviors to communicate with 
other agents and realize the original tasks. 
Normally, the intelligent agents can be categorized into three types [90]: 
 Reactive type: It quickly responses to any interferences from the environment 





 Deliberative type: It can learn and analyze the detected situation, and change its 
states and response according to rule-based inference. 
 Hybrid type: It integrates both reactive type and deliberative type, i.e. it is able to 
quickly response to its environment after reasonable inference.  
Also it can be inferred that one agent could be a tiny hybrid system including both 
software and hardware. Furthermore, an agent can be mobile if necessary, such as Google 
map application in the mobile phone can be regarded as a mobile agent, which includes 
the application software together with the hardware-mobile phone. 
6.2.1.3 The structure of multi-agent system 
Due to the random variation of environment, single agent sometimes cannot deal with 
complex situation. So the multi-agent system (MAS) is built by two or more agents to 
handle the complex situation and realize the task targets together. MAS behaviors like a 
human organization or society, so the thinking way and organization structure could be 
similar. Under Wooldridge’s definitions, the social ability is an important feature of an 
agent; therefore the development of communication network between agents in MAS is 
necessary. In this thesis, the author focuses on the application of MAS in which the 
communication network is well supported. Three basic structure types of MAS are as 
follows [91]: 
 Peer to peer structure 
The peer to peer structure type is shown in Fig. 6.2. All the agents are in the same 
layer and communicate with each other. Under this structure, the information exchanging 
is fast and flexible, but the communication network will be complicated if the number of 
agents is large. 
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Fig. 6.2  The peer to peer structure of MAS 
 Blackboard structure 




The blackboard structure of MAS can be observed in Fig. 6.3. The blackboard agent 
is used as an information recorder to share the information between distributed agents. 
Also, the blackboard agent can be used as Control center in the higher layer to coordinate 
all the agents in the lower layer to realize some complex tasks. The information 
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Fig. 6.3  The blackboard structure of MAS 
 Alliance structure 
The alliance structure is a hybrid structure composed by several blackboard structures 
and peer to peer structures. From Fig. 6.4, the structure of agent 1 and agent 2 in the 
higher layer belongs to the peer to peer structure. The agent 1.1, agent 1.2 and agent 1.n 
in the lower layer together with agent 1 in the higher layer compose one group, which is 
in the blackboard structure, as well as agent 2.1, agent 2.2 and agent 2.n together with 
agent 2. The alliance structure with distinct layers is suitable for a bigger system and its 

















Fig. 6.4  An agent in its environment 
6.2.2 Application of MAS 
Based on the characteristics and structure types, MAS has its advantages on two 
aspects [92]. One is construction of flexible and extensible distributed software/hardware 





based on intelligent software/hardware setup systems. So MAS has been widely used in 
the areas of manufacturing industry, the traffic control, information management, 
electronic business, medical application and etc. In the power industry, the application of 















Fig. 6.5  The application of MAS in power system 
Compared with traditional power system modeling tools, MAS provides an object-
oriented system design, which is better to model the power system components as 
distributed intelligent objects. And the interaction behaviors between objects can be 
accordingly modeled based on unified principles. The paper in [93] proposed a multi-
agent model of wind-solar power generation system, which is designed and simulated 
with the consideration of randomicity and complexity of climate environment. And in 
Greece, agent technology has been used to build Smart houses as proactive customers, 
which negotiate and collaborate as intelligent agents in close interaction with their 
external environment [94]. 
Also, MAS has been used to realize the complex algorithms and regulate the power 
system operations. The paper [95] has adopted MAS to divide the total optimal power 
flow function into sub functions, which is executed by dispersed agents. Then the result 
from each agent will be integrated to obtain the final optimal result. The paper [96] 
proposed a MAS based particle swarm optimization approach for optimal reactive power 
dispatching. Each agent represents one particle in this algorithm, i.e. one candidate 
solution for optimal reactive dispatching. In [97], an autonomous regional active network 
management system is developed based MAS to provide flexible and extensible methods 
for voltage control, power flow management and automatic restoration. And In [98], an 
Energy-Saving Generation Dispatching mode is built to be accordance with safety, 
energy-saving and environmental protecting characteristics. 




With the development of electrical market in this century, MAS has been widely 
adopted to simulate the mechanism and operation rules in the electrical market. The paper 
[99] proposed a MAS based trading model of electrical market, which is able to help 
market participants make decisions based on their own benefits; meanwhile without a 
central controller, the minimum transmission cost of whole system can be reached. Also 
in [100], an electric vehicle aggregation agent has been designed as a commercial 
middleman between electricity market and EV owners. This agent participates with bids 
for purchasing electrical energy and selling secondary reserve. 
In order to timely collect and manipulate the system wide information, MAS 
technology is also a good tool in condition monitoring and fault diagnosis [101]-[107]. In 
[106], a novel MAS has been integrated with a legacy SCADA interpretation system, 
which provides a flexible and scalable architecture to interpret digital fault recorder (DFR) 
record and enhance fault record retrieval from remote DFRs. 
Moreover, protection engineers also try to build protective agents based on 
microcomputer protection devices. MAS technology, which shows its advantages on 
condition monitoring and fault diagnosis, also apparently can be a good platform to 
upgrade traditional protection schemes or develop novel schemes based on wide area 
information [108]-[110]. The paper [108] designed a multi-agent based adaptive wide-
area current differential protection system. Based on the graph theory and expert system, 
predictive self-healing strategies have been proposed to prevent misoperation of the relay 
agent. And in paper [109], agent are used to give each protection component control 
ability as well as the ability to communicate with other agents, based on a simulation 
engine called EPOCHS (electric power and communication synchronizing simulator). 
This system can detect primary and remote faults, relay misoperation, breaker failures, 
and to compensate such problems with a much better performance than can be done in 
traditional schemes. 
Then in order to face the ever-increasing challenge of security problems in power 
system, some researchers start to further investigate the capability of MAS based 
protection system dealing with more complicated situations, such as voltage collapse, 
cascading events and etc. In [111] [112], an emergency control system based on MAS is 
presented. The control system is designed with the ability to define a coordinated control 





instability problems. The paper [113] presents DefPlans, an environment envisaged to 
specify and validate defense plans for bulk power systems. In this software environment, 
it is possible to specify the emergency control functionality according to the multi-agents 
paradigm, and validate them by the Power System Dynamic simulator.  The SPID 
(Strategic Power Infrastructure Defense) system proposed in the paper [114]-[116] is 
built to avoid catastrophic power outages through the failure analysis, vulnerability 
assessment, and adaptive control actions. MAS has been adopted based on bargain 
methods to identify the decision options to reduce the system vulnerability.  
In this thesis, in order to deal with the voltage instability induced cascading events, 
the tasks on detection, identification, prevention and control are of the same importance. 
Multi-agent system technology is an effective and suitable approach to build such special 
protection and emergency control system with a large number of distributed autonomous 
agents and intelligent interactions involved.  
6.3 Implementation of SPECS based on MAS 
6.3.1 The targets of SPECS 
Based on the working principle of proposed SPECS depicted in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.6 
of last chapter, the targets of this protection scheme are to adjust the overload emergency 
states and prevent the related unexpected relay operations. After the execution of related 
control strategies, all the violated relays will be hopefully adjusted from emergency states 
to Normal states, i.e. the impedance locus will finally moved into normal area, as shown 
in Fig. 6.6 with a generator relay settings as an example. The returning of relays also 












Fig. 6.6  The application of MAS in power system 




6.3.2 Structure of MAS for SPECS implementation 
In order to implement the proposed SPECS effectively, the structure of MAS in Fig. 
6.7 is adopted, where the distributed relays and controllers work as device agents. They 
not only execute the normal function automatically but also can be modified to fulfill the 
extra functions according to external requirements. In this way, the distributed agents are 
organized by MAS to achieve the global targets for adjusting emergency states and 
preventing unexpected relay and control operations. 
Every agent in this system has three basic functions. First function is for information 
collection, which might include local measurements of the current, voltage, and the status 
of related equipments; second one is to make decisions according to the prevailing state; 
last one is to produce output actions or information, such as breaker trip or block signals, 
state signals or information, control orders and etc. Moreover, this MAS based control 
system adopts a three-layer blackboard structure, which is comprised of distributed agent 
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Fig. 6.7  The basic structure of MAS based SPECS 
 Distributed agent layer 
The distributed equipment controllers or relays are designed as the lowest layer of the 
MAS, including the generator controllers and relays, transmission line relays, load 
shedding controller, load tap changer controller and etc. Besides fulfilling their normal 





communicate with the corresponding higher level agents, and then execute some extra 
functions accordingly. 
 Cooperation society layer 
The distributed agents in the lowest layer can be grouped into agent societies 
according to the similarity of their functions, such as generation agent society, 
transmission agent society, load agent society and etc. This is the middle layer which 
builds an effective cooperation environment between agents. At this layer, the state 
information of each agent can be monitored and collected if the communication network 
is well developed between the agents. These society agents can also communicate with 
higher layer agents to exchange and update the state information and control orders in a 
wider area. 
 Central processing layer 
In the highest layer of the MAS, Control center (CC) agent is designed to coordinate 
with all the lower level agents for collecting and sharing information, identifying system 
emergency state, generating and executing the control strategies. The algorithms of 
control strategies will be mainly fulfilled in CC, such as integrated network information 
processing, control strategy defining and etc. 
6.3.3 Distributed agents and agent societies 
6.3.3.1 Distributed agent 
(a) Relay agent 
All the distance relays of the generators and transmission lines are regarded as agents 
in the distributed layer, which are based on impedance principle and modeled with the 
standard distance relay model embedded in RTDS. The work flowchart of a generator 
relay agent can be observed in Fig. 6.8. The relays on transmission lines are similar. 
The relay agent will online detect the position of Zai and send the related state signals 
to CC and other agents; based on the settings described in Section 3.3.1, the functions 
framed with red dashed line are new ones including cooperation and communication with 
other agents. The functions related to communication are with blue bold edges. 
By this way, in addition to the traditional relay functions, the relay agents can help 
CC to collect and detect the information of equipment emergency states, such as the 




position of Zai and related margin MGi; and then in CC a corresponding control strategy 
will be generated. Moreover, with the sensitivity information, the local relay agents can 
predict and identify the overload induced emergency states, and then the unexpected 
relay operations can be detected and blocked timely. The detailed workflow of the 
prediction and identification function can be observed in section 4.3.3. Obviously, the 
relay agents belong to hybrid type with those improved relay functions.  
Initiation















































Block the relay 
trip signal
 
Fig. 6.8 The work flowchart of relay agent on the ith generator 
(b) Control agents 
Based on the control strategies introduced in former chapter, LTC, LS and GR 
controllers will be also regarded as important agents in the distributed agent layer, which 
is able to perform extra functions when they receive the orders from agents in the higher 
layers. The workflows are shown in Fig. 6.9. The extra control function will be started 
when the signals of Dtg for the g
th LTC, DLSh for the h
th LS and DGn for the n
th Governor 
are set to high level by CC. After successful execution of the related emergency controls, 





Similarly, the functions framed with red dashed line are new ones for communication 
with other agents and execution of the related control strategies. The detailed workflow 
of related emergency control functions with black bold edges in Fig. 6.9 can be observed 
in Fig. 5.2, Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 respectively. The functions related to communication are 
set with blue bold edges. The defining of related control strategies is mainly conducted in 

























































 (a) LTC agent                                (b) LS agent                               (c) GR agent 
Fig. 6.9  The work flowcharts of LTC agent, LS agent and GR agent 
(c) CC agent 
The agent of Control center in the highest layer of MAS will perform three tasks 
based on wide area collected information. The first task is to real time detect the 
vulnerable relays and collect the information of related emergency states including the 
changes of breaker states, and renew the state information of whole system; the second 
task is to do related sensitivity analysis and timely identify the emergency states caused 
by load flow transferring; and the third task will define reasonable control strategies to 
adjust the identified emergency states, and send control orders to related relay agents and 
controller agents. The work flowchart of CC agent is shown in Fig. 6.10. 
Basically, it will firstly collect important information including the state signals from 
critical relay agents (Dg1i, Dg2i, Dg3i or DL1j, DL2j, DL3j, and Dbi or Dbj), the state signals 
from LTC, LS, GR control agents (DTg, DLSh, DGn) and state information of power 
components (node voltages and powers, status of tap changers, relay impedance and etc). 
Thus, the system emergency states can be detected and identified based on sensitivity 
analysis. When an overload Urgent state has been detected and identified, the emergency 
LTC control (i.e. ILTC) will be started as main control strategy. When the overload 




induced Zone 3 violations have been identified, the emergency LS and GR control 
strategy will be initiated immediately. 
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Fig. 6.10 The work flowchart of CC agent 
The detailed workflow of the functions with black bold edges in Fig. 6.10 can be 
found in former chapters, and the communication functions are important during the 
workflow, which are set with blue bold edges. It should be note that the control strategies 
do not interrupt the traditional function of the relay, except the block function when the 
overloading situations are identified. So if the CC receives the information that some Zai 
is in Zone 12 area or the emergency states caused by faults, traditional function in relay 
system will cope with these situations to trip the component while the emergency control 
strategy will not be initiated by CC. Moreover, if the control strategies fail to adjust the 





the related component inevitably. Obviously, here the CC agent is an agent in hybrid type 
with fast reactive behaviors and specific information analysis. 
6.3.3.2 Agent society 
When the power system is toward a post fault long term voltage instability situation, 
there may be a big area with a number of relays and controllers involved. The distributed 
agents with similar characteristics can be grouped into one agent society. According to 
diverse characteristics, the related agent societies can be generated,  which are relay agent 
society (RAS), LTC agent society (LTAS), load shedding agent society (LSAS) and 
generator reschedule agent society (GAS), as shown in Fig. 6.11. 
Assume the communication network is well developed; the agents can communicate 
with each other not only within the same society, but also among different agent societies 
and system layers. When the power system experiences the overload emergency states at 
the risk of cascading events, the critical relays in RAS and most effective control 
locations in LTAS or LSAS can be easily identified, grouped and mapped according to 
the proposed sensitivity methods, which has been discussed in Chapter 4; meanwhile, the 
effectiveness of control strategy can be verified effectively, because the RAS can check 
the measured impedance on each relay directly and LSAS or LTAS will return the state 
of controllers after execution of related control strategies. In this way, the societies 
become middle agents as “blackboards” between CC and diverse societies, and then the 
work burden of CC can be alleviated to some extent. 
 
Fig. 6.11 Agent societies in the proposed MAS 




Also from Fig. 6.11, the structure of propose MAS can be easily observed, the peer to 
peer structure is adopted to organize the agents in same layer, and the blackboard 
structure organizes the agents in different layers; such as the relay agents in RAS are in 
peer to peer structure, and the RAS and distributed relay agents are in blackboard 
structure. In this way, all the agents can be efficiently coordinated to realize the system 
wide protection and control strategies. 
6.3.4 Hybrid simulation platform 
6.3.4.1 Structure of hybrid simulation platform 
In order to effectively simulate the cascading events and test the proposed SPECS, a 
real time hybrid simulation platform has been built based on RTDS and LabVIEW, as 
shown in Fig. 6.12. With the powerful libraries and programming environment, the 
intelligent agents can easily be programmed in LabVIEW by an end user [122]. Also 
since the power system modeling is accomplished by RTDS in this thesis, and the 
LabVIEW can provide a fast data transmission and communication interface with RTDS, 
so the proposed SPECS in former chapters can be suitably implemented in the simulation 




















































Fig. 6.12 MAS based SPECS in hybrid simulation platform 
Based on the standard models in the library of RTDS, the power system model are 
developed, which is named as primary physical layer in Fig. 6.12; and the distributed 





information exchange between the agents and societies, which is named as second 
physical layer. The detection, selection and mapping functions of different agent societies 
will be modeled by LabVIEW in the real time operation system (RTOS) [123], which is 
denoted as coordination layer. All the functions in CC including the sensitivity based 
control strategies are also implemented by LabVIEW with a powerful RTOS, which is 
denoted as Control center layer and shown in Appendix A.2. 
6.3.4.2 Communication consideration 
In the hybrid simulation platform, the NI DAQmx cards (NI PCIe-6363) [124] are 
adopted to exchange data between LabVIEW RTOS and RTDS in real time. The 
maximum analog input sampling rate is 2 Mega Sampling/second, maximum analog 
output update rate is 2.86 MS/s, and maximum digital I/O rate is up to 10MHz. Since the 
normal time step of RTDS simulation is about 50 us, so real time data exchange between 
LabVIEW RTOS and RTDS through NI DAQmx cards can be easily realized. 
Also, based on real time LabVIEW module, the real time communication network in 
MAS can be built, as shown in Fig. 6.12. To take advantage of parallel processing on a 
multiple-CPU system, many real time design and application can be done based on 
symmetrical multiprocessing technology [125]. The network communication and data 
exchanging between LabVIEW host system and target system (i.e. RTOS) can be based 
on three options, which are transmission control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol 
(UDP) and shared variable communication in NI publish subscribe protocol (NI PSP). 
Since the former two communication methods in LabVIEW cannot be used in time 
critical control loop, i.e. they are not suitable for real time application. But the NI PSP 
with the characteristic of real time fast input fast output (RT FIFO) enabled is different, 
which provides a real time deterministic data transfer method that does not add jitter to a 
time-critical application in LabVIEW [126]. So the network published shared variables 
with RT FIFO characteristics are built in the suitable places of MAS, such as relay 
impedance information, results of real time sensitivity analysis and etc. Then these 
variables will be subscribed immediately through the shared variable engines of all the 
LabVIEW hosts and targets, and the real time application in different agents can obtain 
and access these network shared variables in real time. However, due to limited network 
buffering, which is used to decrease the likelihood of shared variable data loss in 




applications, the number of shared variables is limited according to the capability of 
computer system. 
As for the transmit delay of communication system in the practical power system, it 
can take on as 5μs/km as far as the delay of multiplexer and repeater in whole optic fiber 
system is considered [62]. Since the normal backup time delay from starting signal to 
breaker action is about 500ms, and with blocking signal set to delay several seconds, the 
communication tasks of proposed SPECS, i.e. those blue functions in the workflows of 
diverse agents, can be conducted and finished timely. Also with powerful processing 
ability of agents in higher layer and fast sensitivity algorithms, the final aims of SPECS 
can be effectively realized to prevent the unexpected relay operations and correct the 
system emergency states in the practical situation. 
6.3.5 Process control strategy based on MAS 
6.3.5.1 Introduction 
As one kind of control methods, process control deals with architectures, mechanisms 
and algorithms for keeping the output of a specific process within a desired range [127]. 
It is widely used in the industrial application, such as oil refining, paper manufacturing, 
chemicals, power plants and many other industries [128].  
So far in this thesis, the whole progress of SPECS is basically straightforward and 
without monitoring and regulating the possible failures in the progress. It is very 
important to build process monitor and regulation control for the operation reliability of 
proposed SPECS. Also, in order to further minimize the load loss, reserve regulation in 
the sensitive sets of transmission lines can be conducted by this fast supervisory process 
control. 
Therefore, more efforts are required to develop a more secure and reliable control 
system for SPECS implementation. 
6.3.5.2 Basic processes of proposed SPECS 
In a power system, when the load demand increases beyond the supply capability of 
the power system, the overload states of relevant power components is hereby induced. 
According to the basic structure of MAS based SPECS in Fig. 6.12. The classic fluid 
representation for a supply chain [129] can be applied here to describe the basic processes 





used to represent the basic structure of power network (including generation, 
transmission and load consumption), i.e. the primary physical layer. The detectors and 
controllers represent the relays and power system component controllers, which are in 



















Fig. 6.13 The processes of basic task flow 
The integrated detection function and execution function in turquoise blocks represent 
the tasks of agent societies in the coordination layer of MAS. The centre controller will 
fulfill the analysis and decision making tasks in the highest layer. Then power flows can 
be modeled using the fluid analogy, and fluid level in tank can represent the loading state 
of related power components. Therefore, the aim of SPECS is to maintain the levels in 
desired limits and keep stable power flows without interruption. In this supervisory 
system, the basic operation processes of MAS based SPECS can be described as follows:  
 State detection based on relay system 
Firstly, the overload states of power system components will be detected and 



























Fig. 6.14 Levels and Areas for operation states for a distance relay 




Taking a distance backup relay for a generator as an example, the impedance plane in 
the first quadrant is divided into four areas, which correspond to four loading levels of 
related generator as well as the related tank. 
 Analysis and decision making in Control center according to detected states 
from relay system 
Through the cooperation societies, the detected emergency states of system are 
analyzed and identified by related relay agents together with CC, and the sensitivity 
based control strategies are accordingly produced，which is shown in Fig. 6.15. 
In the Fig. 6.15, the agent societies are mainly “middleman” between CC and 
distributed agents of relays and controllers. Their behaviors on subscribing shared 







































Fig. 6.15 Solutions for identified states 
 Execution of defined control strategy by distributed controllers following the 
orders from Control center 
Finally, the distributed controllers will execute the defined control strategies 
immediately when they receive the orders from CC. the state signals of related controllers 
will be sent back to CC through agent societies. The relay agents will be in turn to check 
if the emergency state has been adjusted successfully after execution of control strategies, 





6.3.5.3 Advanced SPECS considering the margin reserve 
regulation 
In these basic processes of SPECS discussed above, the process of analysis and 
decision making will define how the control strategies will be executed, i.e. the process 
of control strategy execution. If the sequence or priority of control strategies is changed, 
then the related sensitivity analysis, control effect and process will be varied accordingly. 
Taking the Zone 3 start state for an example, when the MAS based control system detects 
this emergency state, the related control strategy will be initiated according to Fig. 6.15. 
The emergency LS and GR will be adopted as main control strategy while ILTC will be 
the backup. But GR is used as ancillary control for active power balance in the related 
design in Chapter 5. If the margin reserve regulation in the sensitive supply paths of 
transmission lines could be considered, which utilizes the remain margin of normal 
transmission lines and related relays to take more load flow, then GR strategy can be also 
selected as one of main active control strategies and not just an ancillary control. The 
workflow of this control strategy can be observed in Fig. 6.16. 
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Fig. 6.16 Workflow of emergency LS and GR with considering reserve regulation 




Based on online data of power network and the methods in section 4.3.1, the set of 
critical vulnerable relays (𝐴𝐿
′ ) in the emergency states can be easily obtained. And the 
sensitive relationship between critical relays and injection powers can be defined based 
on sensitivity 𝑯𝑨′𝑳𝑺 defined by (4.51). The set of related components may have two main 
subsets, i.e. critical generator set 𝐵𝐺𝐴′ and critical transmission line set 𝐵𝑇𝐴′. Then the 
procedures of control point selection can be conducted as: 
 First selection of control points 
Based on the sensitivity analysis in section 4.3.2, the effective controllers can be 
selected based on the performance indexes.  
According to 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑐𝑗  of LS points, all the LS controllers can be divided into two 
groups. The first group will include the LS controllers with higher 𝑃𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑐(> 𝜉2
′) to all the 
relays in 𝐴𝐿
′ , and the second group will include all the LS controllers in the system, which 
has been discussed in section 5.2.2. Based on 𝑃𝐼𝐺𝑅𝑐𝑗  of GR controllers, similarly, the 
more effective GR control points with higher 𝑃𝐼𝐺𝑅𝑐(> 𝜉3
′) will be selected as the first 
group, and the second group will include all the related GR controllers, which is different 
from GR ancillary control in section 5.2.3. Normally, the generator already in Urgent 
state will not be selected due to its importance role to support the load locally lest the 
load flow will be transferred from remote place. Then two control sets can be obtained: 
generator set 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿 and load set 𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿. 
 Finding the supply sets to critical loads 
Secondly, according to the methods introduced in section 4.3.2, the supply sets and 
sensitive map can be quickly obtained. The related sensitive supply path set (including 
those in Normal states) to the critical load points can be easily found and grouped to a set 
𝐴𝐿1. Then the corresponding set of transmission lines 𝐵𝑇𝐿is the set of main power flow 
paths to the critical loads. Meanwhile, based on the control point selection method 
discussed above, the related sensitive generators to these relays in 𝐴𝐿1 are defined as 𝐵𝐺𝐿, 
which is the set of main sources supplying the load flow through the relays. Obviously, 
𝐴𝐿
′ ⊂ 𝐴𝐿1 , 𝐵𝑇𝐴′ ⊂ 𝐵𝑇𝐿 , 𝐵𝐺𝐴′ ⊂ 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿 ⊂ 𝐵𝐺𝐿 , the related sensitive map and inclusion 
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Fig. 6.17 Sensitive map and relationships based on sensitivity analysis 
 Second selection of control points 
Thirdly, according to the Fig. 6.17,  the sets of relay 𝐴𝑟, transmission lines 𝐵𝑇𝑟 and 
generators 𝐵𝐺𝑟, which are still in Normal state and have reserve margin to take more load 
flow, can be easily obtained by (6.1)-(6.4) respectively. 
 𝐴𝑟 = 𝐴𝐿1 − 𝐴𝐿
′  (6.1) 
 𝐵𝑇𝑟 = 𝐵𝑇𝐿 − 𝐵𝑇𝐴′ (6.2) 
 𝐵𝐺𝑟 = 𝐵𝐺𝐿 − 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿 (6.3) 
Then these generators in 𝐵𝐺𝑟 will be considered as additional control points, then the 
power in 𝐵𝐺𝑟 and 𝐵𝑇𝑟 are adjusted to send more load flow to the critical loads within 
their capability limits. In this way, the emergency states of components in 𝐴𝐿
′ , 𝐵𝐺𝐴′ and 
𝐵𝑇𝐴′  will be alleviated to some extent; also, the relays in 𝐴𝑟 won’t be overloaded. 
 Optimization of the control strategy 
Then the achieved increment ∆𝑀𝑖
∗ in (5.10) of former LS and GR strategy will be 
rewritten as: 
 ∆𝑀𝑖













In the right part of equation (6.4), the first and second options represent effects of LS 
and GR in the control set 𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿  and 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿  defined in the first step, the third option 
represents the effect of GR in the control set 𝐵𝐺𝑟 considering reserve margin regulation 
defined in the third step. Also for the relays in 𝐴𝑟, the LS and GR strategy will change 
the margins of them, which may induce these relay into the emergency states. So the 
margin variations of these relays in 𝐴𝑟 are required to be considered, the equation (6.5) 
can be also adopted to consider ∆𝑀𝑝
∗ with related sensitivities (𝑝 ∈ 𝐴𝑟). 
Therefore, the objective function in (5.9) will be rewritten as: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿 }, 













The first constraint is used to achieve secure positive margin including both critical 
relays and those relays in reverse regulation (𝑞 ∈ 𝐴𝐿
′ ∪ 𝐴𝑟), the second one is specific 
limitations for the possible control amounts on the controllable controllers (𝑚 ∈ 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿 ∪
𝐵𝐺𝑟 ∪ 𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿), and the last one is for active power balance. 
6.3.5.4 Advanced MAS structure for process control 
Based on the previous contents, it can be inferred that whether the emergency states 
can be adjusted and prevented successfully mainly depends on the fast and effective 
control strategy defining and execution. When the relay reserve margin regulation is 
considered, the progress of control execution becomes complex. If the related 
countermeasures fail to prevent the emergency states and subsequent trips, the system 
will experience a more complex situation. So in order to improve the effectiveness and 
reliability of this protection and control scheme, an advanced MAS based on hierarchical 
control structure is proposed here, as shown in Fig. 6.18. 
The central agent named Supervisory Control center (SCC) is responsible for general 
supervision of all other agents’ performances, i.e. states variations of relays, controllers 
and main functions in CC. Based on these real time state signals, the processes of 





regulation and compensation control strategies can be defined to timely adjust the 
processes of normal control strategies, if some possible failures occur in normal control 
processes. Moreover, human-machine interface (HMI) is built to support the supervisory 
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Fig. 6.18 Advanced MAS structure for process control 
Besides the Dgi, Dbi (or DLij, Dbij) signals are already designed for the states of i
th relay 
and breaker, the signals of DTj for the j
th LTC, DLSm for the m
th LS controller and DGn for 
the nth GR controller are set to represent the states of distributed controllers, as well as 
Dda and Dde are set for the states of functions in CC. Moreover, Did is set for overload 
identification function states. Zero level means an overloading situation, and high level 
represents a faulty situation.  
(a) Supervisory control agent 
The basic functions of SCC can be observed in Fig. 6.19. Except the same functions 
of CC as a backup, the states of relays, controllers and CC functions will be detected by 
the state supervisor in SCC. Also, based on principle of virtual state machine [130] and 
complex event processing [131], the state transitions of control and basic event processes 
will be traced. In this way, the Supervisory Control center can easily identify the 
variations of control process and the prevailing operation situation in the whole progress. 
Then compared with normal operation processes and initial settings, if there are abnormal 
processes occurring, the operation supervisor will conduct process regulations against 
these abnormal process variations. 




























Fig. 6.19 The structure of Supervisory Control center 
(b) The processes of cascading events under proposed SPECS 
 The basic states and basic processes under the proposed SPECS can be observed in 
Fig. 6.20. The basic numbered states include the event states (in yellow blocks) and 
control states (in green blocks). And the basic transitions, i.e. state transitions, include 
normal transitions (black arrows), fail transitions (red arrows) and the transitions of 
cascading events (bold blue arrows), etc. The state signals for each control state are 




































































According to the state diagram in Fig. 6.20, the diverse states can be identified by 
different combination of state signals. Also, the basic processes can be identified based 
on combinations of state transitions, which is given in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 State transitions in basic processes 
 Basic processes State transitions 
1 
Power component outage due to faults or temporary 
maintenance 
12/3/4/53/4/54/55 
2 Overload due to outage induced load flow transferring 52711 or 53812 
3 Overload due to LTC induced load flow transferring 2711 or 3812 
4 




1 State detection based on relay system 12/3/4/57/8/10/6 
2 
Analysis and decision making in Control center 
according to detected states from relay system 
71114 or 81215 
3 
Execution of control strategy by distributed controllers 
when the orders from CC is received 
141618 or 151719 
The front four processes with yellow numbers belong to event processes, while the 
rear three processes with green numbers belong to control processes. The control 
processes are responsible to prevent the development of event processes and regulate the 
emergency state into Normal state through normal transitions. The whole evolution 
progress is more complex but with clearer cause-effect relationships under SPECS, 
especially, when overload identification criteria are applied. When single state can be 
clearly identified, these basic processes can be effectively traced by sequential 
combination of detected signal states. The event processes with number 1, 2, 3 and all 
control processes belong to normal processes, and the event process 4 belongs to 
abnormal process.. 
6.3.5.5 Process regulation control based on integrated sensitivity 
(a) Process regulation 
Based on above process supervisory method, the state and the process transitions can 
be clearly traced. From the Fig. 6.20, when the fail transitions in red color occur, the 
emergency states will get worse, which may induce the further cascading events even 
under the proposed SPECS, i.e. event process 4 in Table 6.1. So when a fail transition 
happens, the SCC will be responsible to trace and detect it, and then the related regulation 
control should be initiated to prevent the deterioration of system state, or else, the 
cascading events will occur unstoppably.  




As for the situation of CC failure in communication when the emergency states are 
detected, the SCC will substitute to do analysis and decision making, or just change 
another CC to fulfill the related tasks. 
As for the situations that some controllers cannot be communicated, the SCC will 
firstly change the priority of existing control strategies, and then change the selection of 
control points. The process regulation (in brown dashed arrows) can be seen in Fig. 6.21 





























































Fig. 6.21 Process regulation for controller failures 
Moreover, if some controllers can be contacted but fail to execute the LS and GR 
control strategy, the related component may be tripped unexpectedly when time period of 
relay blocking has been run out, and then the regulation control should be defined 
immediately as a backup. At this situation, except the further LS and GR, smart islanding 
may be a good backup alternative to make the system survive this worse situation, which 





(b) Sensitivity based control strategy considering process control 
In order to change the selection of control points, the state signals of controllers can 
be considered in regulation limits ∆𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 of controllers, which can be expressed as: 
 ∆𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐷?̅?𝑘𝑆𝑖 (6.6)  
where 𝐷𝑖 is state signal of the controller i, k is the controllable ratio and 𝑆𝑖 is the total 
capacity of controlled object. 
According to process regulation discussed above, the SCC can monitor and regulate 
execution process of control strategies. Taking the emergency LS and GR strategy 
against Zone 3 start state for an example, if some LS and GR controllers are not available, 
the formula (6.5) will be corrected by: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛  𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿 𝐷𝐿𝑆𝑗
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, 




|∆𝑆𝑚|𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ |∆𝑆𝑚| ≥ 0 
∑ ∆𝑆𝐺𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐺𝑥𝐷𝐺𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑥∈𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿
+ ∑ ∆𝑆𝐺𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐺𝑦𝐷𝐺𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑦∈𝐵𝐺𝑟
= − ∑ ∆𝑆𝐿𝑗𝑐𝑜𝑠∅𝐿𝑗
𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿
𝐷𝐿𝑆𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
(6.7)  
where ∆𝑀𝑞
∗ can be given by (6.8) with consideration of integrated sensitivity. 
 
∆𝑀𝑖
∗ = 𝐷2𝑐 ( ∑ 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑗∆𝑆𝐿𝑗
𝑗∈𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿
𝐷𝐿𝑆𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + ∑ 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑥∆𝑆𝐺𝑥𝐷𝐺𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑥∈𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿
+ ∑ 𝐻𝐴′𝐿𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑦∆𝑆𝐺𝑟𝑦𝐷𝐺𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑦∈𝐵𝐺𝑟
) 





In this way, when the xth generator cannot be regulated, the related element in (6.7) 
(6.8) will be eliminated due to the binary variable 𝐷𝐺𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0 . Otherwise, the related 
element will be accounted if 𝐷𝐺𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 1. Therefore, the control process will be regulated 
timely and effectively under the SCC. 
6.3.5.6 Implementation of SPECS considering process control 
The main functions and algorithms of SCC are implemented in host system based on 
the LabVIEW environment and DSC toolkit (Data logging and Supervisory Control) 
[132], which are shown in Fig. 6.22. The SCC is in a higher layer than CC, which is 
named as super center layer. Every lower agent and its behaviors will be projected as an 
image in SCC, so there is a mirrored image structure with three inner layers in the super 




center layer, i.e. Control center image layer, agent society image layer and distributed 
agent image layer. In this way, the states of lower agents can be timely supervised, and 
the loading levels of related power system components can be monitored as well. Besides, 
the basic control processes can be identified based on the state transitions of control 
functions in the Control center while projected in the Control center image layer. Also the 
event processes can be identified based on combinations of state transitions of distributed 
agents while projected in the distributed agent image layer, e.g. the cascaded blackout 




























































































































Fig. 6.22 States/processes transition tracing and regulation under SPECS 
Then according to Fig. 6.21, the operation supervisor in SCC will compare the 
detected  state and basic process with  those normal processes or state transitions. If the 
fail transitions or event process 4 are identified, the process regulation control will be 
defined and initiated immediately, which has already been discussed in former contents. 
6.4 Case study 
In the case of cascaded blackout on 19-bus test system as shown in Fig. 6.23, if LTC 





when RG11 detected Urgent state (0011), then RTL0809 would be triggered at 87s, the Zone 
3 start state and the related state or process transition (52711 to 11143) will 
be identified and the state signals will be shared in MAS. CC will do sensitivity analysis 
and define the related control strategies immediately, based on the workflow in Fig. 6.10. 
And SCC will identify the failing transition and regulate the control strategy to prevent 
the further development of this abnormal process. 
RTL0809
RG11





Fig. 6.23 The 19-bus test system in the post fault stage 
6.4.1 Control strategies considering margin reverse regulation 
 Critical components categorization 
Firstly, at 87s, the critical relays RTL0809 (in Zone 3 start state) and RG11 (in Urgent 
state) will be detected, identified and grouped as set 𝐴𝐿
′  together with critical power 
components {G11, TL0809}. 
 First selection of control points 
According to online sensitivities calculation, the relevant sensitivities and 
performance indexes will be deduced immediately, which have been already given in 




Table 4.6-4.8. The most effective LS and GR control sets can be obtained as: 𝐵𝐿𝐴′𝐿= 
{Load 1}, 𝐵𝐺𝐴′𝐿= {G01}. Also because G11 is already operated in an urgent overload 
state and close to the Load 1, so it is not selected, even though it has larger sensitivity and 
PI, which is different from the GR strategy considered as ancillary control in Chapter 5. 
Hereby, the state signal 𝐷𝐺11 of GR controller on G11 will be set to high level. 
 The supply sets and control points for reserve regulation 
In this case, the critical load in 𝐵𝐿
′  is Load 1. According to sensitivity based method 
described in section 4.3.1.1, the relative sensitive relays to Load 1 can be easily found: 
𝐴𝐿1= {𝑅𝐺11, 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009}. Also, the related sets of transmission line and generators 
can be found: 𝐵𝑇𝐿 = {  𝑇𝐿0809, 𝑇𝐿1009 }, 𝐵𝐺𝐿 = {G01, G21, Local WF}. G22 and 
offshore WF (OWF) are not selected because they are already operated close to their 
capability limits, the state signals 𝐷𝐺22 and 𝐷𝐺𝑜𝑓 will be set to high level. 
Then, based on (6.1)-(6.3), the sets of relays, transmission lines and generators with 
redundant reserve can be obtained: 𝐴𝑟= {𝑅𝑇𝐿1009}, 𝐵𝑇𝑟= { 𝑇𝐿1009}, and 𝐵𝐺𝑟= {G21, 
Local WF}, which are selected secondly for GR control points.  
 Optimized control strategy 
In order to minimize the load loss in the LS and GR control strategy. Based on the 
principles and optimal objective functions described in Section 6.3.5.3, the detailed 
control strategy is shown in Table 6.2.  
















0.0076 0.0189 0.0077 
5.184 -0.071 0 0 
2 3.979 -1.07 0.54 0.11 
The number “1” in the first column of Table 6.2 represents the original control 
strategy without the consideration of reserve margin regulation, and “2” represents the 
strategy considering the regulation of reserve margin in the supply sets. Obviously, the 
smaller total LS amount is achieved by this advanced protection and control strategy 
without compromising security and reliability, which is proved by real time simulation 





6.4.2 Strategy execution and supervisory 
In order to effectively execute and supervise the whole process of proposed SPECS, 
the proposed MAS based process control are taken into effect to monitor the states of 
agents and then regulate the reserve margins in supply sets timely. 
For this case, 𝐷𝐺11 = 𝐷𝐺22 = 𝐷𝐺𝑜𝑓 = 1 means the controllers of these components 
will refuse to execute orders from CC, also this worsen overloading situation is caused by 
LTC agent failing to be initiated. So SCC will be responsible to detect these situations, 
and regulate the control process. The front panel of supervisory control system built in 
LabVIEW can be seen in Fig. 6.24. 
There are five modules in the front panel of LabVIEW, which are initiation module, 
detection module, analysis module, decision making and execution module, and process 
supervisory module. The data communication channels and settings will be initiated in 
initiation module. Emergency states featured in different colorful lights will be detected 
in detection module. Sensitivity analysis, overloading identification and critical sets 
grouping will be conducted by analysis module. Control regulation, optimization and 
execution orders will be produced by decision making and execution module. The results 
of execution will be checked by detection module in turn. 
 
Fig. 6.24 The front panel of control system in LabVIEW 
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20 states of power system under SPECS  




Moreover, the physic process of whole protection strategy can be supervised by the 
process supervisory module (i.e. SCC) in Fig. 6.24, which is conducted by DSC toolkit 
(Data logging and Supervisory Control) in LabVIEW. The tanks represent the power 
components, the pipes gives the states of breakers and the multi state valves are used to 
show the states of distributed controllers. According to classic fluid flow representation, 
the pipes and tanks which represent transmission lines, transformer and breakers around 
Bus 6 are blank due to the bus bar fault; then TL0809 is fully loaded, and TL1009 is still 
with some reserve margin; also the valves of G11, G22, OWF together with the LTC on 
TX0912 are set in red color which means they can’t be controlled by CC in this situation. 
The state transitions are traced by 20 signal lights at the bottom of Fig. 6.24. So based on 
this LabVIEW toolkit and sensitivity method, the state information of whole power 
system and the processes under proposed SPECS can be supervised delicately. 
Finally, the distributed controller agents execute control strategy immediately and 
successfully, under the effective supervisory and fast sensitivity analysis. It can be seen 
from Fig. 6.25 (a) and (b) that after timely execution at 87.5s, all the bus voltages are 
recovered to a safe level over 0.9pu. Moreover, due to better control strategy and less LS 
amount, the critical bus voltages 𝑉𝑏9 and 𝑉𝑏12 in Fig. 6.25 (b) are stabilized more quickly 
and recovered to a lower level compared with Fig. 6.25 (a). 
 
(a) Bus voltages with normal control process 




































(b) Bus voltages with advanced control process 
 
(c) Impedance loci of 𝑅𝐺11 with normal and advanced control process 
 
(d) Impedance loci of 𝑅𝐺11 with normal and advanced control process 
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(e) Impedance loci of 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 with normal and advanced control process 
Fig. 6.25 Bus voltages and impedance loci in the normal control and the advanced control 
From the figures of impedance loci, all the critical relays are reset back when 
measured impedances in red and brown colors move into Normal area over the expected 
margin. In the impedance plane, the black loci represent the collapse situation with relays 
being blocked in the post fault stage, the blue loci represent the collapse situation with 
relays activated, brown ones is under the original control strategy and red ones represent 
the progress with advanced control strategy considering margin reserve regulation. All 
the loci in four situations start at the time 35s in the post fault stage. 
It also can be seen from Fig. 6.25 (c) (d) (e), with consideration of reverse margin 
regulation and advanced control process, the impedance loci in red color settle closer to 
expected margins compared with the brown ones, especially in Fig. 6.25 (e), the red 
impedance locus settles just beyond the expected margin, which means the TL0809, 
TL1009 and G11 take more loads under a better control regulation with less load 
shedding. Because at the time of 87s, 𝑅𝐺11and 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809  hit their relay settings due to 
overloading situation, but 𝑅𝑇𝐿1009 in the sensitive supply path set to Load 1 is still in 
normal state with some redundant reserve margin. Then in the advanced control with the 
reverse margin regulation, TL1009 takes more load flow nearly to its loadability limit 
when G21 together with LWF increase the active power output and G01 decreases the 
active power output. Hereafter the load flow supplied from TL0809 and G11 are 
decreased, the related overload states are alleviated, voltage decreasing are accordingly 
alleviated due to G11 and G01 supporting more reactive powers. Hereby the required 
total load shedding amount are decreased. After timely execution of GR and LS at the 
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same time, the results of real time simulation in Fig. 6.25 (b) (c) (d) (e) demonstrate the 
advanced process control gives a better protection strategy to prevent emergent system 
states and minimize the LS amount. 
It should be noted that the critical LTC on TX0912 failed to be controlled in this case, 
so it did not participate in the adjustment of the emergent states. Also, in order to 
compare with the former case under normal control strategy, the process regulation 
control considering margin reserve regulation in this case was initiated when zone 3 relay 
𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 got triggered. Actually, the process regulation could be initiated earlier when the 
LTC agent failure on TX0912 was detected at about 70s and before 𝑅𝑇𝐿0809 got triggered, 
then LS amount will be minimized further.  
Based on this simulation case, it can be seen that the proposed SPECS considering 
process control can timely and reliably adjust those worsen situation, finally prevent the 
unexpected trips and recover the system operation states. 
6.5 Summary 
The implementation and improvement of SPECS are focused in this chapter. A multi-
agent system based control structure is adopted to implement the proposed SPECS. The 
merits and features of MAS are presented and suitable for proposed SPECS. The detailed 
implementation is based on three layers, i.e. agents in the distributed layer, agent 
societies in the coordination layer and Control center in the center processing layer. A 
hybrid simulation platform based on RTDS and LabVIEW is set up to simulate the 
cascaded blackout and validate the SPECS in a real time environment. 
The concept of process control is used to supervise the progress of cascading events 
prevention under SPECS, and an effective process regulation control is proposed to 
adjust those abnormal or failing control processes. Also the margin reserve regulation is 
considered in the control strategy defining, which could further minimize the load loss 
during control strategy execution. 
The MAS structure is then improved with consideration of process control. The 
supervisory control agent is built in the highest level to implement the process monitor 
and control over all the agents. The simulation results based on hybrid simulation 




platform demonstrate the advanced SPECS has the ability to successfully and reliably 







Chapter 7  
Conclusion and perspective 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of this PhD project is to develop a wide area special protection 
and emergency control scheme that can provide effective countermeasures against long 
term voltage instability induced cascading events and blackouts in power system.  
In order to have an in-depth analysis and understanding on the long term voltage 
instability induced cascading events, the simplified eastern Denmark power system has 
been adopted as a test system, and the detailed models of concerned power components 
are developed, such as FCL model, LTC model, restoration load model, distance relay 
model and etc. Due to the contribution of distance relays to historical cascading events, 
the loadability of distance relay has been discussed. The capability limit curves of 
generator and loadability of transmission lines have been considered in the design of 
relay backup settings. Then the relay operation margin in the impedance plane and related 
state signals are adopted as an indicator to express the loading level and emergency states 
locally. The scenarios of cascaded blackouts have been simulated successfully based on 
RTDS. The progress of cascading events has been decomposed into basic processes 
which is easier to be identified and analyzed. 
In order to realize the system wide emergency state awareness and fast analysis, a 
sensitivity method has been adopted to online analyze the relationship between relay 
measured impedances and the system operation variables. Based on sensitive 
relationships and performance indexes, the vulnerable relays and sensitive power system 
components can be quickly detected under different operation states. The sensitive map 
and sensitive supply paths can be also depicted easily, which give effective indicators for 
defining suitable emergency controls against diverse emergency states. Meanwhile, for 
prevention of unexpected relay operation, impedance sensitivity based identification 
methods have been proposed to predict and identify overload emergency states, which are 
caused by the line outage and LTC operations induced load flow transferring. 




Accordingly, the Zone 3 relay can effectively differentiate the load flow transferring 
induced emergency states from a fault state, and the unexpected relay operations can be 
blocked timely, which gives time for emergency controls to adjust the emergency states 
to the Normal state. 
With aim of effectively adjusting those identified emergency states, sensitivity based 
special protection and control strategies have been designed, which can quickly define 
the detailed control points and control amounts based on the results of sensitive analysis 
and linear programming algorithm. Also, an integrated sensitivity method with the 
priority consideration has been designed for the quick selection of related control 
strategies. Basically, corresponding to Urgent state, ILTC will be the main control 
strategy and normal UVLS strategy will be backup strategy. And for Zone 3 start state, 
the emergency LS control along with GR regulation will be adopted as main control 
strategy, the ILTC will be backup strategy. The simulation results demonstrate that the 
proposed special protection and control strategy (SPECS) can successfully identify the 
overload induced emergency states and prevent the basic blackout processes involved 
with unexpected relay operations. 
For implementation of SPECS, a multi-agent system based control structure has been 
proposed. Based on the distinct merits and features of MAS, the proposed SPECS has 
been designed with a three-layer multi-agent system, i.e. relay and control agents in the 
distributed layer, agent societies in the coordination layer and Control center in the center 
processing layer. This MAS based SPECS has been developed based on a hybrid 
simulation platform which is composed by RTDS and LabVIEW. Then the cascaded 
blackout scenarios and the proposed SPECS have been successfully simulated and 
validated together in a real-time hardware in loop environment.  
In order to deal with possible failures in the control execution process or when some 
unexpected situations occur, an advanced MAS-based SPECS has been proposed with 
consideration of process control and regulation. This advanced SPECS can monitor the 
progress of cascading events under proposed control strategies, and timely define 
effective regulation controls on those abnormal or failing control processes. The basic 
processes are confirmed and identified by state signals and sensitivity based identification 





this advanced SPECS has the ability to successfully and reliably prevent the long term 
voltage instability induced emergency states and unexpected relay operations. 
The main contributions of this thesis: 
 Voltage instability induced cascading events on Eastern Denmark power 
system have been simulated in RTDS. The progress of cascading events has 
been analyzed based on impedance loci and decomposed into different phases. 
 A system wide detection method for overloading situations has been proposed 
based on improved distance relay system considering loadability. 
 A sensitivity method based on impedance margin of distance relay has been 
proposed in order to fast define the variation relationships between the relay 
margins and other system variables. Also, for load flow transferring induced 
overloading situation, an impedance sensitivity method has been proposed to 
identify this overloading situation from faulty situations. 
 Based on sensitivity analysis, a special protection and emergency control 
scheme has been proposed to correspondingly adjust the different overload 
induced emergency states. 
 A multi agent system based SPECS has been proposed to effectively and 
reliably coordinate distributed relay agents and controller agents, which realize 
the final purpose of preventing the unexpected cascading trips. 
 A hybrid real time simulation platform has been built based on RTDS and 
LabVIEW. Then the multi agent system based SPECS can be validated and 
demonstrated in a real-time hardware-in-loop simulation environment. 
7.2 Future work 
During the progress of this research work, some interesting and relevant topics are 
identified, which could be considered for further investigation in the future and listed as 
follows: 
 Adaptive relay setting regulation considering voltage instability 
The voltage stability margin will be changed when system network or operation 
condition changes. The fixed settings of encroachment element is not enough for voltage 




instability detection under cascading events, especially for the relays on the transmission 
lines, which should be updated and adapted online with WAMS based system wide 
information. 
 Rotor angle instability induced unexpected relay operations 
There were also many rotor angle instability induced cascading events in the history. 
The reasons and mechanism of this kind of events are very different from voltage 
instability induced ones. Normally, these two instability problems would trigger each 
other during the cascading events. Under these situations, the sensitivity based methods 
are fast but with big errors. So the suitable algorithms of analysis, identification and 
regulation control on angle instability should be further investigated and designed. 
Also, the other characteristics of relays could be considered in the local relay function 
improvement, such as adaptive power swing blocking settings in the distance relay. 
 Local identification based on relay detected electrical variables 
When communication network is not developed in some parts of power system, the 
accurate identification and estimation method for overloading situation based on local 
measurements will be relied on. 
 Further consideration on special protection and emergency control 
Smart islanding control strategy could be considered as a last defense backup control 
when load shedding strategy fails to adjust the emergency state and unexpected relay 
operation occurs. Also, the black start control should be designed to effectively restore 
the power system after a cascaded blackout. 
 Communication network development for MAS based control system 
In order to timely prevent the unexpected control and relay operations, the fast 
information communication between dispersed agents is very importance. So 
communication network development and the function of agent societies should be 
further investigated to minimize the time delay and possible information loss. 
 Further investigation on reliability of SPECS 
Many other reasons, which could induce failure control processes, could be 
considered in the design of Supervisory Control center, such as communication failures, 





be applied in MAS to improve the efficiency of whole control system, such as particle 
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A.1 Relevant data of the power system model of Eastern Denmark 
The one line diagram of 19-bus test system simplified from Eastern Denmark power 



















Fig. A.1 The one line diagram of 19-bus test system in RTDS 
The initial load flow data of generators and loads are given in Table A.1 and Table 
A.2 [83]. The dynamic data about synchronous generators, excitation system, governor 
system, LTC data are given in Table A.3 -Table A.8 [1][75][76][77][78][79].  
Table A.1 Generation data in the initial Normal state 
Gen no. Bus. no S0 (MVA) P (MW) Q (Mvar) S (MVA) Vset (p.u.) 
G01 1 2500 845 231 876 1.02 
G11 2 1500 1218.6 722.3 1416.6 1.03 
G21 3 1400 621.8 388 732.9 1.025 
G22 4 750 634.56 111.6 644.3 1.03 
LWF 18 550 300 0 300 1.01 






Table A.2 Load consumptions information in the initiate Normal state 
Load no. Bus no. P (MW) Q (Mvar) S (MVA) 
Load 3 7 100 -50 111.8 
Load 4 10 330 300 446 
Load 2 11 650 140 665 
Load 1 12 2450 1370 2807 
Table A.3 Dynamic data of Generators 









G01 20 0.15 2 2 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.2 6.6 2.5 0.04 0.06 
G11 5 0.15 2.09 2.04 0.254 0.39 0.2 0.2 6.6 1.3 0.038 0.06 
G21 5 0.15 2.1 2 0.365 0.7 0.2 0.2 7.4 2.5 0.041 0.08 
G22 5 0.15 2.43 2.33 0.307 0.6 0.2 0.2 7.5 2.5 0.029 0.06 
Table A.4 Exciter data of BBSEX1 
G01 G11 
𝑇𝑓 0.04 𝑇4 0.02 𝑇𝑓 0.04 𝑇4 0.02 
𝐾 40 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 6.1 𝐾 110 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 5 
𝑇1 4 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 -6.1 𝑇1 8 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 -5 
𝑇2 1.2 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 5.2 𝑇2 2 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 5 
𝑇3 0.1 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝐼𝑁 -4.1 𝑇3 0.05 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝐼𝑁 -5 
G21 G22 
𝑇𝑓 0.04 𝑇4 0.02 𝑇𝑓 0.04 𝑇4 0.02 
𝐾 140 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 5.25 𝐾 40 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 6.1 
𝑇1 12.09 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 -4.75 𝑇1 4 𝑉𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 -6.1 
𝑇2 1.37 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 5.25 𝑇2 1.2 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 5.3 
𝑇3 0.0565 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝐼𝑁 -4.75 𝑇3 0.1 𝐸𝐹𝑚𝐼𝑁 -4.1 
Table A.5 FCL data 
For G22 
𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥1 2.85 𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥2 3 −𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑀 -3.85 
𝐾1 0.248 𝐾2 12.6   
For G01, G11, G21 
𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥1 2.68 𝐼𝑓𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥2 3 −𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑀 -3.85 
𝐾1 0.248 𝐾2 12.6   
Table A.6 Governor System data of IEEE Type 1 
𝐾 20 𝑈𝑐 -0.1 𝐾2 0 𝑇5 10.1 
𝑇1 0.001 𝑃𝑚𝑥 1.0 𝐾3 0.24 𝐾4 0 
𝑇2 0.001 𝑃𝑚𝑛 0 𝑇6 0.5 𝐾5 0.47 
𝑇3 0.05 𝑇4 0.376 𝐾6 0 𝑇7 0 





Table A.7 PSS data of IEE2ST 
𝑉𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 20 𝑇3 3 𝑇8 0.05 
𝐾1 24.4 𝑇4 3 𝑇9 0 
𝐾2 0 𝑇5 0.15 𝑇10 0.001 
𝑇1 0 𝑇6 0.05 𝑈𝐿 -0.1 
𝑇2 0 𝑇7 0.15 𝐿𝐿 0.1 
Table A.8 LTC data 
LTC Delay on first 
step (s) 
Delay on 











TX0912 30 5 0.01 [0.8, 1.2] 12 0.92 0.02 
TX0811 30 5 0.01 [0.8, 1.2] 11 0.92 0.02 
A.2 The hybrid simulation platform based on RTDS and LabVIEW 
 


















Fig. A.3 Block diagram of CC 
 
  (a) Sub VI of sensitivity analysis VI                            (b) Sub VI of decision making VI 
Fig. A.4 Block diagram of sub VIs in Control center 
 
Fig. A.5 HMI in Supervisory Control Center 
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